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Abstract
This thesis provides an in-depth discussion on the risk and efficiency of the
banks. The thesis consists of three major empirical chapters.Chapter 1 is an
introduction to the topic where backgrounds, motivations and contributions of
the thesis are discussed.
Chapter 2 examines the role of the European Banking Authority(EBA)’s
capital exercise and technical efficiency of the banks.In October 2011, the
European Banking Authority (EBA), the institution charged with setting har-
monised supervisory standards for banks in EU member states, announced
that major European banking groups would have to increase their core tier 1
capital ratios to 9 percent of their risk-weighted assets by June 2012 (EBA,
2011b).Using a sample of 194 banks from 15 EU countries and bootstrap data
envelopment analysis (DEA) to provide evidence on the impact of EBA’s cap-
ital exercise on banks’ efficiency.In the first stage of the analysis, we mea-
sure the efficiency by employing Boostrap DEA. We then use Double Boot-
strap Truncated regression to investigate the impact of the capital exercise on
banks’ technical efficiency. We estimate several specifications while controlling
for bank-specific attributes and country-level characteristics accounting for
macroeconomic conditions, financial development and market structure. The
results indicate that EBA’s capital exercise came, as a shock for the banks
would be contributing towards making the banks more stable.It would be pre-
venting banks from excessive risk-taking activities. Furthermore,it would be
allowing the banks to withstand the financial distress and contributing to banks
becoming less prone to the systemic risk. The study finds that the capital re-
quirements would be creating favourable economic conditions, which would be
affecting the extent, depth, and quality of financial intermediation and banking
services.
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive analysis of the risk measures on the
i
cost efficiency of the banks.The financial crisis revealed the problems in the
banking sector for supervisors and other stakeholders in identifying and com-
paring the bank’s information across different jurisdictions. The Basel Com-
mittee found that there are no consistent international standards for cate-
gorising problem loans. This chapter looks into the role of the harmonised
definition of Non-Performing Exposures and Funding Liquidity Risk on the
cost efficiency of the banks.This chapter looks into the marginal effects of the
risk measures on cost efficiency. Also, the chapter investigates the marginal
effects of risk measures on cost efficiency over time and across different regions.
The heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model is used for the estimation, which
will allow finding the effect of each risk measure on the mean and variance of
the cost efficiency.The results indicate Funding Liquidity Risk has a positive
effect on the mean and the variance on the inefficiency effect. This means a
bank with a higher Funding Liquidity Risk will have a lower and more varied
cost efficiency. Non-Performing Exposures have a significantly positive effect
on the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect. The study compares aver-
age cost efficiency and marginal effects of the risk measures on the mean and
variance across the groups sorted by the criteria variables. The results indicate
that there are non-linear effects of some of the risk factors such as Funding
Liquidity Risk and Non-Performing Exposures on the mean and variance of
the inefficiency effect.
Chapter 4 investigates into the role of Cross-Border Exposures and Liq-
uidity Shocks on the technical efficiency of the banks.Using a sample of 1931
banks in 15 countries in Europe, the impact of cross-border banking, i.e., geo-
graphical diversification, on individual banks with liquidity shock in relation to
the financial development of the home country. For measuring the technical ef-
ficiency, Weighted Russell Distance Directional Model (WRDDM) is used.The
results indicate that the changes in the technical efficiency of the banks fac-
ing liquidity shocks are more unstable. The technical efficiency of the banks
facing Liquidity Shocks is much lower during the Global Financial Crisis. The
technical efficiency of the banks not facing liquidity shock is more similar to
the average technical efficiency of the banks. The decline in the cross-border
exposures was witnessed with a decline in efficiency. However, the decline was
minimum in the domestic exposures. Following this, Honore’s Tobit Estimator
ii
results provide evidence of the cross-border exposures with liquidity shock on
the efficiency of the banks in relation to the financial development of the home
country. The results indicate that banks are more likely to invest in countries
with similar levels of financial development. By investing in such countries, the
bank can improve its technical efficiency. However, in countries with high fi-
nancial development, the banks improve efficiency by reducing exposures from
countries with lower financial development. The results indicate that the role
of financial development and cross-border exposures play in the efficiency of
the banks.
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1.1 Background and Motivation
Over the years, Bank efficiency has been on the topmost research agenda. The
reasons behind the increase in bank efficiency research are due to the changes
in the regulatory and operating environment which contributes to banks be-
coming more concerned about controlling their costs while optimising rev-
enues(Chortareas et al., 2013).Efficiency in simple terms can be related to how
best a bank makes use of all available resources by transforming them into the
desired outputs.Efficiency for the bank can be defined as the maximum amount
of output that will be produced for a certain amount of input.Based on this
definition, efficiency can be viewed as a dimension of bank performance.For
example, a bank is doing well if it is efficient in its operation.Efficiency can
be further observed in terms of the real quantity of output produced or in
terms of cost incurred during the production of a given amount of output.This
leads to two types of efficiency: technical efficiency and cost efficiency. Tech-
nical efficiency refers to the ability of optimal utilisation of available resources
either by producing maximum output for a given input bundle or by using
minimum inputs to produce a given output.Cost efficiency measures how close
a bank’s costs to the minimum possible costs of a best-practise bank that pro-
duce the same bundle of outputs using the same bundle of inputs under the
same conditions(Berger et al., 1997).
Efficiency can be nurtured by a conducive environment that permits the
banks to make the best decision regarding the best combination of inputs to
be used or the appropriate output mix.In turn,the banking environment is
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influenced by the measures introduced and taken by the authority,for exam-
ple,financial liberalisation.The focus of efficiency research in developed coun-
tries has been on the implications of efficiency results for financial institutions
in the areas of government policy, such as deregulation, bank failure, merger
and acquisition, and so on.The estimated efficiency results are regressed against
a set of variables to identify possible factors that explain the differences in
performance across financial institutions.Empirical studies have reached no
agreement on the sources of the measured inefficiency differences.During the
last decade, there has been numerous banking reforms in developing and tran-
sition economies.As a result,bank efficiency in these countries has received
considerable attention.These reforms generally starts with financial liberali-
sation and deregulation,followed by ownership reform through privatisation
usually in the forms of foreign ownership participation and/or going pub-
lic.Therefore,efficiency studies have focused on examining the effects of various
reforms on bank performance.
Financial stability is important for sound economic growth.It is also con-
sidered as a precondition for conducting effective economic policy.While, a
stable and strong macroeconomic setting is one of the cornerstones of the fi-
nancial stability.It is important to recognise the primary function of the finan-
cial system in facilitating the deployment and allocation of economic resources
spatially and timely. However, in uncertain economic conditions, the finan-
cial system might fail to harmonise with the changes in the financial environ-
ment(Pasiouras et al., 2009).Therefore,since the onset of the global financial
crisis,we have increasingly heard about the need for reforms in the financial
system to enhance financial stability and resolve the crisis.Indeed,the reforms
in the financial system are not entirely new, despite the wave of new reforms in
the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis.Historically,shocks in the fi-
nancial market have called for reforms in the financial system.For example,the
Latin American debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis, though the success
of these reforms is questionable due to the recurrence and breadth of such
crises.Undoubtedly,the primary functions of the financial system have always
essentially been the same in all the countries, from West to East.However,there
are sizeable differences that include variations in cultural, political,and histor-
ical backgrounds.Additionally, variations exist in the institutional mechanisms
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through which the reforms are applied.Although,there is substantial and var-
ied evidence on the role of the financial system in shaping economic develop-
ment.There are serious shortcomings due to the differences across countries
based on the quality of financial information,soundness of corporate gover-
nance,mechanism of diversified risk, and facilitation of trade.These differences
might impede any reform vision in the financial system(Merton, 1990).There-
fore, there is a need to develop benchmark financial systems across the world
for evaluating financial soundness and economic performance.This might pro-
vide a clear picture of financial conditions in each country, especially in a fi-
nancial environment of rapid changes and increased movement towards global
connections among different financial systems across the globe.
This thesis brings together several quantitative solutions to bank efficiency
through three empirical studies.The thesis adds to the literature on bank effi-
ciency.Shocks and reforms in the banking sector play a significant role in bank
efficiency.During the Global Financial Crisis,the aggregate liquidity shock is
associated with the increasing volatility of asset prices with aggravated con-
cerns over counterparty risk,liquidity risk and market conditions.This resulted
in disruptions in the interbank market(Gorton and Metrick, 2012).Such shocks
impact the efficiency of the bank.Bank inefficiencies could have direct implica-
tions for the social welfare in the form of deadweight social costs(Chortareas et
al., 2013).The inefficient banks would price their output above the marginal so-
cial cost which results in achieving higher profits.In the aftermath of the recent
crisis, achieving higher efficiency has become the most significant factor for the
survival of the banks.These investigations can provide valuable information for
policymakers and regulators in the future.
1.2 Contribution and Structure
In light of the motivation which is outlined above, this thesis contributed to the
field of bank efficiency by exploring new aspects of shocks and reforms in the
banking sector. These applications are presented in three self-contained chap-
ters(chapters 2-4). All chapters employ either parametric or non-parametric
technique for measuring the efficiency of the bank. These chapters aim to
provide an analysis of the shocks and reforms in the banking sector on bank
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efficiency.The results contribute to the growing literature on the importance
of the shocks and reforms in the banking sector.
Chapter 2 examines the role of the European Banking Authority(EBA)’s
Capital Exercise on the technical efficiency of the banks. In October 2011,
EBA announced that major European banking groups would have to increase
their core tier 1 capital ratios to 9 percent of their risk-weighted assets by June
2012(EBA, 2011b). This announcement came largely as a surprise, as EBA
had just conducted rigorous stress tests in the summer of 2011 and had already
released detailed information on the exposure of European banks to sovereign
risk.Most of the studies have focused on the role of the Basel Accord on the
efficiency of the banks.Basel III permitted banks to have a transition period
before the regulations are fully implemented (BIS, 2011b). This allows the
banks to have time to make the necessary time to make the adjustments with-
out affecting their efficiency.The new required ratio by the EBA was higher
than that planned under the transition to Basel III.Furthermore,it was ex-
plicitly not related to the level of risks of any particular banking group, but
rather to ensure that all large European banks accumulated sufficient capital
cushions to withstand further deterioration in the sovereign debt crisis. The
horizon set by the EBA to meet the higher required was shorter compared
to Basel III process. This makes the case for the observed change in lending
over the period was a result of the capital requirement shock. All of these
elements reflect that the capital exercise comes close to a natural experiment
and providing a rare opportunity to observe an exogenous regulatory shock to
bank capital.
Using a sample of 194 banks from 15 EU countries and Bootrap data en-
velopment analysis (DEA) to provide evidence on the impact of EBA’s capital
exercise on banks’ efficiency. In the first stage of the analysis, we measure
efficiency by employing Bootstrap DEA. We then use Double Bootstrap Trun-
cated regression to investigate the impact of capital exercise on banks’ techni-
cal efficiency.The results of DEA indicate that the average bank in the sample
could improve its technical efficiency by 52.47% after the capital shock. Be-
fore the capital shock, it was 50.7%. Following this, the Double Bootstrap
Truncated regression results provide evidence of the factors which determine
the efficiency of the banks before and after the announcement has been made.
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For the bank-specific characteristics, after the announcement, it is found that
Non-Performing Loans, Return on Equity and Loan Activity of the bank are
statistically significant and have a negative impact on the efficiency of the
bank. While the capital of the bank has a statistically positive impact on ef-
ficiency. When taking macroeconomic condition into account, it is found that
after the announcement Capital of the bank is statistically significant and has
a positive impact on the efficiency of the bank and Return on Equity and Loan
Activity have a negative impact. While the real GDP growth has a statisti-
cally positive impact on the efficiency of the bank. When controlling for the
financial development, the size of the bank, the size of the market and the
activity in the banking sector are significant and have a positive impact on the
efficiency and Return on Equity has a negative impact. When controlling for
the market structure, the loan activity, return on equity and non-performing
loans have a significant and negative relationship with the efficiency. Finally,
controlling for all the factors, the loan activity, return on equity and market
concentration has a statistically significant and negative impact while financial
development and real GDP growth have a statistically significant and positive
impact on the efficiency.
The stricter capital regulations by EBA would only be improving the effi-
ciency of the banks if the regulatory screening ability is low. When the capital
regulations are placed, the banks are looking to substitute the loans with alter-
native forms of assets. The banks are looking to for different asset portfolios
which would be generating better returns and requires the different resources
to be managed. The results indicate that the capital requirement by EBA
which came as a shock for the banks would be contributing towards making
the banks more stable. It would be preventing banks from excessive risk-taking
activities. Furthermore, it would be allowing the banks to withstand financial
distress. Although, the capital requirements would not be a highly significant
benefit for the efficiency gains. But, it would be creating favourable economic
conditions which would affect the extent, depth and quality of financial inter-
mediation and banking services.
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive analysis of the risk measures on the
cost efficiency of the banks. The Basel Committee found that there are no
consistent international standards for categorising problem loans.Banks used
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different methodologies and assumptions for valuations, provisioning and risk
weightings, increasing opacity and reducing comparability for end-users (BIS,
2016). The definition of Non-Performing Exposures (NPEs) introduces har-
monised criteria for categorising loans and debt securities that are centred on
delinquency status (90 days past due) or the unlikeliness of repayment (BIS,
2016). The NPEs ratio is defined as the sum of outstanding nonperforming
loans, advances and debt securities divided by all gross carrying amounts of
loans, advances and debt securities. NPEs is the widest concept as it includes
loans, debt securities and certain off-balance sheet exposures, but may exclude
certain asset classes, such as foreclosed collateral. Liquidity risk has been
recognised as a significant threat to financial institutions management and fi-
nancial system stability. Generally, banks are required to maintain a liquidity
buffer for managing liquidity risk and to insure against liquidity shocks.Hong
et al. (2014) showed that systematic liquidity risk was an important contrib-
utor to bank failures occurring over 2009–2010 in the aftermath of the crisis.
Furthermore, they found that liquidity risk could lead to bank failures through
systematic and idiosyncratic channels. The theoretical predictions of Acharya
and Naqvi (2012) and Wagner (2007) on the implications of short-term liq-
uidity for bank risk-taking and bank stability suggest that the high levels of
asset liquidity could potentially increase bank risk. Also, it requires further
attention because of the significant welfare costs which risky banks may pose
as witnessed in the recent crisis. Deposits shield the banks from bank run risk.
Banks with higher deposits have less funding liquidity risk which reduces mar-
ket discipline and leads to higher risk-taking by banks.Keeley (1990) found that
deposit insurance creates a moral hazard for excessive risk-taking by banks in
response to increase in deposits at the cost of the deposit insurer.
Using a sample of 2630 banks in 6 different global regions from 2010 to 2018,
this study investigates the impact of the NPEs and Funding Liquidity Risk on
the Cost Efficiency of the banks. To conduct a comprehensive analysis of the
effects of NPEs, Funding Liquidity Risk and Liquidity Risk on the efficiency
of the banks. To analyse the role of NPEs and Funding Liquidity Risk on
cost efficiency, the study adopts the heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model
in the estimation. This allows us to specify both the mean and variance of the
inefficiency instability and investigate the non-monotonic effects on efficiency.
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Furthermore, this chapter looks into the marginal effects of the risk measures
on cost efficiency. Also, the chapter investigates the marginal effects on risk
measures on the cost efficiency over time and across different regions.
The results indicate Funding Liquidity Risk has a positive effect on the
mean and the variance on the inefficiency effect. This means a bank with a
higher Funding Liquidity Risk will have a lower and more varied cost efficiency.
Liquidity Risk has a significantly positive effect on the inefficiency effect. This
indicates that an increase in Liquidity Risk lowers the profitability of the bank,
which pushes down the cost efficiency of the bank and increases the fluctuation
of the cost efficiency. Additionally, NPEs has a significantly positive effect on
the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect.
The chapter compares average cost efficiency and marginal effects of the risk
measures on the mean and variance across the groups sorted by the criteria
variables. The results indicate that there are non-linear effects of some of
the risk factors such as Funding Liquidity Risk and NPEs on the mean and
variance of the inefficiency effect. However, for Liquidity Risk, the marginal
effects indicate a non-monotonic effect. The effects of the risk measures are not
consistent over time. For Funding Liquidity Risk, the marginal effect on mean
is very high in 2011. After 2011, the effect starts declining until 2016. However,
from 2017 onwards, the effect has again started increasing. The marginal effect
shows the negative effect on cost efficiency. The marginal effect on variance
has both a negative and positive effect on the cost efficiency over the years.
For Non-Performing Exposures, The marginal effect on mean has a positive
effect on the cost efficiency and the marginal effect on variance shows inverse
U-shape like pattern. For Liquidity Risk, the marginal effect on mean shows
U-shape pattern and variance has a negative effect on the cost efficiency.
The study investigated the marginal effects of how these risk measures
affect both the level and variability of the inefficiency effect across six different
global regions.For Funding Liquidity Risk, the marginal effects on the mean
of the inefficiency effect of the banks in Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the
Caribbean , Middle East, and the United States and Canada show a non-
monotonic pattern. The marginal effects on variability of the inefficiency effect
for Latin America, the Middle East, and the United States and Canada reveal
a non-monotonic pattern. In these regions, the banks in the lowest group
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have a negative variability in the lowest group and turn positive in the middle
and highest groups. For Liquidity Risk, The marginal effects on the mean in
Europe show a non-monotonic pattern. It shows a negative inefficiency effect
on the low and middle groups whereas a positive inefficiency effect on the
highest group. The marginal effects on the variability across on the groups in
Europe is positive and shows a monotonic effect. This reveals that the cost
efficiency is more varied among the banks in Europe. For Non-Performing
Exposures, marginal effects on the mean of the inefficiency effect across all
the regions reveals a positive inefficiency effect. On average across the groups,
Latin America and Caribbean has the highest positive inefficiency impact. The
marginal effects on variability on the inefficiency effect increases as we move
along the groups.The lowest group has the lowest variability, this increase as
we move to middle and highest groups.
The study provides an in-depth analysis of the risk measures.The recent
crisis showed how inconsistent international standards for categorising problem
loans and high funding liquidity risk proved to be a major problem for the
banks.This investigation will be useful for the regulators and policymakers.As
an increase in the different risk measures have different impact across the
bank’s efficiency in different regions.The results will be useful for the regulators
and policymakers.The results will help in shaping new regulations which will
be preventing the bank from excessive risk-taking.Additionally,the results show
how the changes in the risk measures impacts the cost efficiency.
Chapter 4 investigates into the role of Cross-Border Exposures and Liq-
uidity Shocks on the Technical Efficiency of the banks. During the crisis, the
banks decreased their local lending and their cross-border lending (Takáts,
2010) and (Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2013). De Haas et al. (2011) found that
the reduction in cross-border lending is limited for the banks which are geo-
graphically closer to the borrower and have a local office or strong relations
with the local banks. The effects on the cross border lending depend on the
interaction of borrower’s demand and lender’s supply. This chapter investi-
gates the impact of cross-border banking, i.e., geographical diversification, on
individual banks with liquidity shock in relation to the financial development
of the home country. Generally, diversification has the potential to reduce risk
(Markowitz, 1959). There are opposite views on whether geographical diversi-
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fication is beneficial for banks.Levy and Sarnat (1970) found that geographical
diversification could generate positive effects, as there is a non-perfect corre-
lation across country-specific risks. Therefore, resulting in risk reduction in
an internationally diversified portfolio. However,Winton (1999) argues that
geographical diversification is not always beneficial. For example, when banks
have loans with high downside risks or when banks expand into sectors where
they have little expertise. Also, the further a bank away from its home country,
the more difficult it may be to manage.
To analyse the impact of the cross border banking with liquidity shock
on the efficiency scores estimated by Weighted Russell Directional Distance
Model by using sub-samples based on the financial development of the home
country. Using a sample of 1931 banks in 15 countries in Europe, the chapter
examines the role of Cross-Border Exposures and Liquidity Shock on Technical
Efficiency of the banks.
The results indicate that the changes in the technical efficiency of the banks
facing liquidity shocks are more unstable. The technical efficiency of the banks
facing Liquidity Shocks is much lower during the Global Financial Crisis. The
technical efficiency of the banks not facing liquidity shock is more similar to
the average technical efficiency of the banks. The decline in the cross-border
exposures was witnessed with a decline in efficiency. But, the decline was min-
imum in the domestic exposures. This reflects the significance of the cross-
border exposures on the efficiency of the banks. Following this, Honore’s Tobit
Estimator results provide evidence of the cross-border exposures with liquidity
shock on the efficiency of the banks in relation to the financial development
of the home country. The results indicate that banks are more likely to invest
in countries with similar levels of financial development. By investing in such
countries, the bank can improve its technical efficiency. However, in countries
with high financial development, the banks improve efficiency by reducing ex-
posures from countries with lower financial development. The results indicate
that the role of financial development and cross-border exposures play in the
efficiency of the banks.
The results of the study are significant for the policymakers and the banks.Most
of the banks have increased cross-border exposures over the years. The finan-
cial integration has fostered cross-border banking.Cross-border banking pro-
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vides the banks with an opportunity of diversification. The diversification is
risk-reducing. With favourable economic conditions in the foreign country, the
bank would be more inclined towards increasing their cross-border exposures.
Moreover, investing in a foreign country with a similar level of financial devel-
opment allows the bank to improve and have better returns. It allows the bank
to manage their resources better. The cross-border exposures from favourable
country contribute towards an increase in the efficiency of the banks. The
bank facing liquidity shock would be reducing the cross-border exposures from
regions with less favourable economic conditions. The barriers to cross-border
banking would discourage the banks towards cross-border activities. These
barriers may be in terms of the financial development of a foreign country.
This may hurt the efficiency of the banks.
Financial stability is important for sound economic growth.It is also consid-
ered as a precondition for conducting effective economic policy.While, a stable
and strong macroeconomic setting is one of the cornerstones of the financial
stability.In the recent years, the banking sector witnessed numerous changes
in the regulations.During this period, the banks faced numerous shocks.As a
result, the efficiency of the banks has changed.The thesis aims to provide an
analysis of the shocks and reforms in the banking sector on bank efficiency.The
results contribute to the growing literature on the importance of the shocks
and reforms in the banking sector.Chapter 5 presents the major conclusions
of this thesis and summarises the main findings. This chapter also provides
recommendations for future research that are beyond the scope of this research.
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Chapter 2
EBA’s Capital Exercise and
Technical Efficiency of the
banks.
2.1 Introduction
In October 2011,the European Banking Authority (EBA),the institution charged
with setting harmonised supervisory standards for banks in EU member states,
announced that major European banking groups would have to increase their
core tier 1 capital ratios to 9 percent of their risk-weighted assets by June
2012 (EBA, 2011b). Additionally, these groups were required to hold a new
temporary capital buffer to cover risks linked to sovereign bond holdings. The
main objective of the capital exercise was to restore the confidence in the
bank sector by ensuring the banks were adequately capitalized to mitigate the
unexpected losses.The new requirement was considerably higher than the 5%
requirement at the June 2011 stress test. The banks were provided with a very
short time window to comply with the new requirements in the face of a deep-
ening sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the capital exercise announcement came
soon after the stress tests conducted by the EBA in July 2011.This announce-
ment came when the euro area was still considered to be extremely fragile,
following a tumultuous summer on the sovereign debt markets of several mem-
ber states. Many observers were concerned that impaired bank balance sheets
were leading to weak credit supply and aggravating the recession in several
countries.
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The characteristics of the EBA’s capital exercise are quite unique. Firstly,the
announcing of the capital exercise was unexpected.The EBA announced this
exercise just a few months after drawing tough conclusions from its own July
2011 stress test. In this stress test, none of the eight banking group failed. This
surprise effect limits the odds that participating banks could have preemptively
adjusted their balance sheets, which would bias downward the estimated effect
on lending.Additionally, the new capital requirement was was substantially
higher than that planned under the transition to Basel III.This exercise was
not elated to the level of risks of any particular banking group,but rather to
ensure that all large European banks accumulated sufficient capital cushions to
withstand a further deterioration in the sovereign debt crisis(Mésonniera and
Monksb, 2015).The time horizon set by the EBA to comply with this higher
capital requirement is short when compared with the other requirements.For
example, Basel III allowed the banks to have a transition period before the
regulations are fully implemented.All these characteristics provides us with an
opportunity to observe a exogenous regulatory shock to the bank capital.
The capital structure in the banking sector is considered to be more sig-
nificant than the other industries because of informational failures, principal-
agent issues, bankruptcy costs, taxes, and regulation. Capital acts as a buffer
against loss, and hence failure with limited liability. The proclivity for commer-
cial banks to engage in high-risk activities is curtailed when greater amounts of
capital are at risk. By having a higher capital adequacy ratio in place, it would
be giving the depositors more confidence in a bank’s security and forms a type
of internal fund resource. Additionally, it has been seen that the large banks
tend to hold capital in excess of the most stringent regulatory requirements
as a response to perceived risk exposures and in some instances, with the aim
of maintaining their future profit streams. If the bank is required to have
more capital, the upside gains they would be enjoying from the greater risk-
taking would be countervailed by the potential downside loss of their capital.
Therefore, it is significant to align the capital adequacy regulations with the
incentives of banks with depositors and other creditors.This would contribute
to more careful lending and better bank performance.In the existing literature,
there appears to be mixed results regarding how the capital regulations would
be affecting the efficiency of the banks.
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Indeed, any attempt to evaluate the impact of a capital requirement shock
on the lending supply faces several challenges. First, new regulations, such as
Basel I to III, have generally been announced well ahead of their implemen-
tation explicitly to allow banks to smoothly adjust their balance sheets. This
makes the task of identifying an unexpected shock to capital requirements and
measuring the short-term impact on loan supply quite difficult. Second, as
with the 2007-09 subprime crisis, regulators may increase requirements on ac-
count of a deterioration in the credit quality of borrowers during a downturn.
Similarly to the difficulty of measuring the impact of a bank capital shock more
generally, disentangling demand and supply effects is therefore not straight-
forward. Third, changes to bank regulations tend to affect all large banks of
a given country at the same time, making it difficult to construct appropriate
control groups of untreated but similar institutions.
The theoretical literature on the relationship between bank capital and
credit supply suggests that banks may respond to a shock that increases
their capital constraint by reducing credit supply (Mésonnier and Monks,
2014).Mésonnier and Monks (2014) investigated the impact of a regulatory
shock tightening bank capital requirements on lending to the real economy.The
results reveal that the exercise had pro-cyclical macroeconomic effects on credit
supply.This means that the banks that were not constrained to recapitalise did
not substitute for more constrained lenders. Gropp et al. (2018) showed that
the banks did not raise their capital ratios by increasing their levels of capital,
but by reducing their risk-weighted assets, in particular their credit exposures
to corporate and retail clients.Furthermore,they suggest that the bank were
reluctant to issue new equity to increase their capital ratios when required to
do so by regulators.The evidence of these paper point out that the EBA’s cap-
ital exercise had a damaging impact on bank lending in Europe with adverse
affect on the economy.
This study is closely related to the literature examining the effect of the
capital shock on the bank’s technical efficiency.Barth et al. (2013a) investi-
gated the efficiency of the banks in 72 countries for the period 1999 to 2007
using worldwide surveys on bank regulation.They suggest that greater capital
restrictions are marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency.The
findings suggest that the stricter capital regulations would contribute to re-
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ducing the bank risk,but not be a highly significant benefit for the efficiency
gains.VanHoose (2007) found that by having stricter capital regulations in
place, the efficiency of the banks would be improving only if the regulatory
screening ability is low.When the capital regulations are placed, the banks
are looking for different asset portfolios which would generate better returns
and requires the different resources to be managed.Therefore, the EBA’s cap-
ital exercise raises questions about the bank’s management of its resources
efficiently.
This study attempts to fill in the gap by providing evidence on how the
EBA’s capital shock impacted on the efficiency of the banks. To do so, the
study conducts an analysis of the impact of the capital shock on the efficiency
scores estimated by Bootstrap Data Envelopment Analysis(DEA).The study
uses the balance sheet data of the banks, macroeconomic conditions, financial
development, and market structure to investigate the impact on bank efficiency
while controlling for bank-specific factors. To my best knowledge, this is the
first study to do so. The study uses a sample of 194 banks from 15 countries
that are comprehensive in terms of geographical coverage. The EBA’s capital
exercise made the banks to reconsider their activities in the banking sector and
to manage their portfolios better. It has aimed to make the banking market
less concentrated. The results show that the mean of the Technical Efficiency
for the banks in the sample equal .494 and .475 for before and after the capi-
tal exercise announcement was made by the EBA respectively. Following this,
Simar and Wilson (2007) Double Bootstrap Truncated results provide evidence
of the factors which determine the efficiency of the banks before and after the
announcement has been made. With respect to the bank-specific characteris-
tics, after the announcement, it is found that Non-Performing Loans, Return
on Equity and Loan Activity of the bank are statistically significant and have
a negative impact on the efficiency of the bank. While the capital of the bank
has a statistically positive impact on efficiency. When taking macroeconomic
conditions into account, it is found that after the announcement Capital of the
bank is statistically significant and has a positive impact on the efficiency of the
bank, and Return on Equity and Loan Activity have a negative impact. While
the real GDP growth has a statistically positive impact on the efficiency of the
bank.When controlling for the financial development, the size of the bank, the
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size of the market, and the activity in the banking sector are significant and
have a positive impact on the efficiency, and Return on Equity has a negative
impact. When controlling for the market structure, the loan activity, return on
equity and non-performing loans have a significant and negative relationship
with the efficiency. Finally, controlling for all the factors, the loan activity,
return on equity, and market concentration has a statistically significant and
negative impact while financial development and real GDP growth have a sta-
tistically significant and positive impact on efficiency. Furthermore, the capital
exercise contributed to stabilising the technical efficiency over the years.The
EBA’s capital exercise has contributed towards making the banks more stable
and having less likelihood of having financial distress. Additionally, it would
be preventing banks from excessive risk-taking activities.As the exercise would
create an environment for careful lending and better bank performances.
The empirical results suggests that the capital requirements not only strengthen
financial stability , but also make the technical efficiency of the banks more
stable. The results will be helpful for the EBA and the other regulators to
make the relevant policies. The results show the capital exercise would be pre-
venting the banks from excessive risk-taking activities. Furthermore, it would
be allowing the banks to withstand the financial distress. Although, the capital
requirements would not be a highly significant benefit for the efficiency gains.
But, it would be creating favourable economic conditions which would be af-
fecting the extent, depth, and quality of financial intermediation and banking
services.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of the EBA’s capital exercise and a review of studies that investigated
the efficiency and capital requirements. Section 2.3 outlines Data Envelopment
Analysis while Section 2.4 presents the sample and variables used in the study.
Section 2.5 and 2.6 discusses the results and Section 2.7 concludes the study.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 EBA’s Capital Exercise
On October 26, 2011, The EBA announced its capital exercise which required
banks to strengthen their capital positions by building up a temporary capital
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buffer against sovereign debt exposures and to raise their core tier 1 capital ra-
tio to 9% (EBA, 2011a). The banks were required to meet these requirements
by June 2012.The new requirement was considerably higher than the 5% re-
quirement in the June 2011 stress test.The exercise aimed to build confidence
in the ability of euro-area banks to withstand credit shocks by ensuring the
banks were adequately capitalized.
The elements of the EBA’s capital exercise are fairly unique.Firstly, the
announcement of the capital exercise was unexpected.The EBA announced
this exercise just a few months after drawing tough conclusions from its own
July 2011 stress test. In this stress test, none of the eight banking groups
failed. This surprise effect limits the odds that participating banks could have
preemptively adjusted their balance sheets, which would bias downward the
estimated effect on lending.Secondly,The level of the new required core-tier-1-
to-RWA ratio was substantially higher than that planned under the transition
to Basel III (BIS, 2011b).his exercise was not elated to the level of risks of any
particular banking group,but rather to ensure that all large European banks
accumulated sufficient capital cushions to withstand a further deterioration
in the sovereign debt crisis(Mésonniera and Monksb, 2015).Furthermore, the
time horizon set by the EBA to comply with this higher capital requirement
is short when compared with the other requirements.For example, Basel III
allowed the banks to have a transition period before the regulations are fully
implemented.All these characteristics provides us with an opportunity to ob-
serve a exogenous regulatory shock to the bank capital.
The EBA published an initial country-level estimate of required capital
raising on October 26, 2011. On December 8, 2011, it published a formal rec-
ommendation with bank-level figures based on September 2011 balance sheet
data (EBA, 2011c). Twenty-seven banks were identified as having an aggregate
capital shortfall of e76 billion and were required as a consequence to submit
capital plans to the EBA through their national supervisory authorities by Jan-
uary 20, 2012. (EBA, 2011c).The EBA published a preliminary assessment of
the plan in February 2012 and emphasised that the measures were observed
not be having any negative impact on the lending into the real economy (EBA,
2011c). In July 2012, the preliminary report was published and the majority
of the banks had met the capital requirements. The final report, including
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end-June 2012 detailed balance sheet information for all participating banks
was published on October 3, 2012 (EBA, 2012).
Numerous researchers have criticised the timing of the capital exercise due
to potentially aggravating the credit crunch in the Euro area (Mésonniera and
Monksb, 2015). However, The EBA consistently emphasised the need to ad-
dress the capital shortfalls without constraining credit provision in the real
economy.For example, the recommendation of December 8, 2011, outlined a
hierarchy of capital-raising measures, emphasising the use of liability manage-
ment and stating that national authorities could only agree to asset disposals
if they did not “lead to a reduced flow of lending to the EU’s real economy”
(EBA, 2011c). Furthermore, the EBA and national authorities were to ensure
that capital targets were “not achieved through excessive deleveraging, disrupt-
ing lending into the real economy” (EBA, 2011c). In total, the twenty-seven
banks increased their capital by e115.7 billion (EBA, 2012). According to
the EBA’s final report, e83.2 billion of this was related to direct capital mea-
sures, while e32.5 billion was related to the impact of RWA measures (EBA,
2012). Contributing to the latter figure was a fall in RWAs of e42.9 billion
(0.87 percent of total RWAs as of September 2011) arising from reductions in
lending (EBA, 2012). The EBA concluded: “In line with the Recommenda-
tion, capital plans have not led directly to a significant reduction of lending
into the real economy. A deleveraging process had already started before the
capital exercise and will need to continue in an orderly fashion” (EBA, 2012).
The theoretical literature on the relationship between bank capital and credit
supply suggests that banks may respond to a shock that increases their capital
constraint by reducing credit supply (Mésonnier and Monks, 2014).Mésonnier
and Monks (2014) investigated the impact of a regulatory shock tightening
bank capital requirements on lending to the real economy.The results reveal
that the exercise had pro-cyclical macroeconomic effects on credit supply.This
means that the banks that were not constrained to recapitalize did not sub-
stitute for more constrained lenders. Gropp et al. (2018) showed that the
banks did not raise their capital ratios by increasing their levels of capital, but
by reducing their risk-weighted assets, in particular their credit exposures to
corporate and retail clients.Furthermore,they suggest that the bank were re-
luctant to issue new equity to increase their capital ratios when required to do
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so by regulators.The evidence of these paper point out that the EBA’s capital
exercise had a damaging impact on bank lending in Europe with adverse affect
on the economy.Juelsrud (2018) found that the bank’s estimated conditional
capital shortfall increases when capital requirements increase. This effect is
larger for initially risky banks. The primary reason for this decrease is that
capital requirements reduces the market value of equity. He also suggests that
the long-run marginal expected shortfall of treated institutions increases, in-
dicating that capital requirements not only affects the valuation of banks but
also the moments of their equity return distribution.
2.2.2 Efficiency
Over the years, bank efficiency has been on the top of the most research agenda.
This is because there have been numerous changes in the regulatory and oper-
ating environment.These changes among the banks contribute to making the
banks more concerned regarding the controlling of their costs while optimising
revenues (Chortareas et al., 2013).They suggest that a more effective manage-
ment in controlling costs while maximising the revenues in contexts charac-
terised by the policies which improve bank’s degree of freedom.Therefore, it
results in a more efficient resources allocation process. Efficiency makes the
banks more resilient to the external shocks (Diallo, 2018).This affects positively
and significantly the growth rate of the banks which are more dependent on
external financing.The efficiency of banks helps the economy by fostering eco-
nomic growth and increasing prosperity. An effort to increase the efficiency
levels is a new battle faced by the management.
Definition
In simple terms, efficiency is the ratio of the output to the resources used.
Efficiency in the most simple expression is the maximise result in micro and
macroeconomic level.Efficiency measures more directly reflect the bank’s re-
sponse to market discipline.This is because they are less likely to be reflected
by factors other than bank behaviour.Efficiency is considered to be important
for the banks because any improvement in the efficiency of the banking system
would be contributing in improving savings,investment and resource allocation
process and potential facilities over the country which would be used for the
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development and general welfare(Hosseininassab et al., 2013).
From an economic theory point of view,efficiency is the result of optimised
production and resource allocation. In other words, in a production unit man-
agers and workforce,according to the desired goals of the firm and the avail-
able technological ability, are trying to determine their production amount,
in a way that while using the maximum resources and possibilities, and opti-
mal cost allocation, make optimal use of productive factors (Hosseininassab et
al., 2013).Efficiency is a relative concept and to measure it and to understand
the distance between efficiency and expected and ideal levels, we should be
comparing the performance of the economic units with efficiency in potential
production circumstances (Hosseininassab et al., 2013).
According to Andries and Ursu(2016), the term efficiency for banks means
improved profitability, a greater amount of funds channelled in, better prices
and services quality for consumers, and greater safety in terms of improved
capital buffer in absorbing risk.Bank efficiency is measured by a bank’s ability
to convert its inputs into output while maximising profits or minimising costs
(Belke et al., 2016).A bank would be considered to be inefficient if it uses nu-
merous inputs which are greater than the number of outputs.Additionally, it
would be considered inefficient if the inputs are allocated in the wrong pro-
portions.These measurements of efficiency are least affected by endogeneity
criticism than the financial volume measures because of the bank’s ability to
covert its inputs should influence growth independently of whether the econ-
omy is growing fast or slowly (Belke et al., 2016).An efficient bank should be
considering to support the growth of the economy by choosing the optimal
projects for funding and assigning the optimal costs with the risks at the same
time (Belke et al., 2016).It is significant for the banks to improve their efficiency
because efficiency has a direct impact on the performance and profitability of
the banks (Xu et al., 2015).
Technical Efficiency
Numerous researchers have focused on the technical efficiency of the banks.
Technical efficiency is related to the production of output(s) given some in-
put(s).A production plan is technically efficient if there is no way to produce
more output(s)with the same input(s) or to produce the same output(s) with
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less input(s).Technical Efficiency is associated with the efficient use of the in-
puts within the bank’s technology(Staub et al., 2010). This efficiency explains
a larger part of the overall efficiency that could be inferred as under-utilisation
or wastage of inputs. This measure of the efficiency indicates whether a bank
uses the minimum quantity of inputs to produce a given quantity of outputs
or maximises the output quantity given a certain quantity of inputs.Allocative
efficiency refers to the ability of the bank to use the optimum mix of inputs
given their respective prices.
Cost Efficiency
Cost efficiency is the product of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.
Cost efficiency shows the ability of the bank to provide services by optimum
use of the resources at its disposal. Allocative efficiency or technical efficiency
guides for the bank to become more cost efficient and helps in reducing the
wastage of the resources. Cost efficiency helps in indicating how close a bank’s
cost is to that a best practice bank’s cost would be producing the same out-
puts under the same conditions.Therefore, Cost efficiency is considered as a
wider concept than technical efficiency.Cost efficiency refers to both technical
efficiency and allocative efficiency.
Profit Efficiency
Profit efficiency indicates how close a bank is to earn the profit that a best-
practice bank would be earning under the same condition.It measures how close
to the minimum cost or maximum profit a bank is.Profit efficiency is a much
wider concept because it includes both cost and revenues in the measurement
of efficiency.The computation of profit efficiency is an important source of
information for bank management than the partial vision offered by analysing
cost efficiency.
2.2.3 Efficiency and Capital Requirements
In banking,the capital structure is considered to be more significant than
the other industries because of informational failures, principal-agent issues,
bankruptcy costs, taxes, and regulation.If the regulator decides to put capi-
tal regulations in place, then this would be influencing the following: - 1.The
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quantity and quality of lending made by the banks 2.The decision of the banks
when allocating their asset portfolios 3.The decision of the banks in relation
to the sources of their funds. As a result of these factors, capital regulations
would be affecting the efficiency of the banks. The capital regulations specify
the amount of capital that a bank must have at risk. If the bank is required to
be holding more capital at risk, then the gains made from the high risk-taking
would be countervailed by the potential downside loss of their capital.
Risk Taking
Capital acts as a buffer against loss, and hence failure with limited liability
(Wang, 2014). The proclivity for commercial banks to engage in high-risk ac-
tivities is curtailed when greater amounts of capital are at risk. Generally, it is
expected that the capital adequacy ratio exhibits a positive relationship with a
bank’s value(Wang, 2014).This allows the banks carry out careful surveillance
of the risks arising from environmental uncertainty and economic volatility.
Numerous researchers have found that a higher capital adequacy ratio would
result in smaller tax deduction or lower risk by having a higher proportion of
equity to debt, which contributes towards the higher risk-taking behaviour.
By having a higher capital adequacy ratio in place,it would give the depositors
more confidence in a bank’s security and forms a type of internal fund re-
source.Additionally, it is witnessed that the large banks tend to hold capital in
excess of the most stringent regulatory requirements as a response to perceived
risk exposures and in some instances, with an aim of maintaining their future
profit streams(Chortareas et al., 2011). If the banks are required to have more
capital, the upside gains they would enjoy from the greater risk-taking would
be countervailed by the potential downside loss of their capital. Therefore,
it is significant to align the capital adequacy regulations with the incentives
of banks with its depositors and other creditors. This would be contributing
to more careful lending and better bank performance. However, this belief
is based on the public interest view and tends to ignore possible regulatory
costs which would be in the form of a high barrier to entry and greater rent
extraction by the governments that result from higher capital requirements.
Barth et al. (2013b) found that the capital adequacy regulations have a sig-
nificant role in relation to the incentives of the bank with depositors and other
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creditors. This would be contributing to more careful lending practices and
better bank performance. The capital regulations influence the decision of the
banks regarding the mix of deposits and equity.The deposits and equity bears
different costs for the bank.It is costly to raise the equity for the banks.By
raising the equity, the bank will face permanently higher funding costs, which
in turn will permanently reduce the supply of lending.Furthermore, they found
that greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associ-
ated with bank efficiency.They suggest this is due to the dominant effect on
bank efficiency may be actual capital rather than the stringency of the capital
regulations. VanHoose (2007) investigated the effects of capital regulations
on the banks. He found that by having stricter capital regulations in place,
the efficiency of the banks would be improving only if the regulatory screen-
ing ability is low. Additionally, if the regulatory screening ability is high,
the efficiency would improve if there are loose capital regulations. When the
capital regulations are placed, the banks are looking to substitute the loans
with alternative forms of assets. The banks look for different asset portfolios
which would generate better returns and require the different resources to be
managed. Therefore, the capital regulations raise questions about the bank’s
management of its portfolio of different assets efficiently.
Moral hazard is defined as excessive risk-taking when another party is bear-
ing part of the risk and could not be changed easily for or prevented from that
risk-taking. Most of the empirical research has found that high capital ratios
would prevent the moral hazard from taking place between shareholders and
managers. This contributes to improving the efficiency of the banks. This
research has investigated the conflicts between shareholders and managers.
Usually, they support the notion that both efficiency and capital are relevant
determinants of a bank’s risk-taking and more hazard incentives.Berger and
DeYoung (1997)found that the banks with less capital would respond to the
moral hazard incentives by taking higher portfolio risks. As a result, there is a
decrease in the capital ratio of the banks before an increase in non-performing
loans for banks with low capital ratios. This would cause a decline in the
efficiency levels of the banks.
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Financial Stability
Barth et al. (2013b) investigated the efficiency of the banks in 72 countries
for the period 1999 to 2007 using worldwide surveys on bank regulation.Using
DEA, they found that tighter regulations on banking activities have a negative
impact on bank efficiency. While greater capital restrictions are marginally
and positively associated with bank efficiency. These findings imply that there
are potential trade-offs between bank soundness and efficiency. This means
that stricter capital regulations have a weak relationship with bank efficiency.
The stricter capital regulations would contribute to reducing the bank risk,
but not be a highly significant benefit for the efficiency gains. Pasiouras et
al. (2009)investigated the impact of the banking regulations on bank’s cost
and profit efficiency for banks operating in 74 countries during the period
2000-2004. They found that the stricter capital requirements would improve
the cost efficiency and reduce profit efficiency. This would explain by having
stricter capital requirements, the likelihood of financial distress reduces.The
lower profit efficiency is explained by the bank’s balance sheet getting more
inclined towards liquid and lower return assets.
Chiu et al. (2008) investigated the efficiency of Taiwan banks for three years
from 2000 to 2002 using DEA. They found that the average efficiency scores of
banks with high capital adequacy are significantly higher than those of banks
with lower capital adequacy. They suggest that the banks with a better finan-
cial status and lower relative risk operate with more efficiency.Furthermore,they
conclude that banks with high capital adequacy have no intention to engage
in business with high risks. Therefore, the probabilities of defaults and losses
are relatively low, which lead to the high efficiency of the banks in the long
run.
Asset Quality
Bitar et al. (2016) investigated the impact of capital ratios on risk, efficiency,
and profitability in the Middle East and North Africa region using risk-based
regulatory ratios and non-risk-based traditional capital ratios for the period
1999 to 2013. They found that banks with higher capital ratios have higher
loan loss reserves and are more efficient. They found that higher proportions
of net loans in bank total assets improve bank efficiency. This is because
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banks with higher capital ratios have higher loan loss reserves to be commen-
surate with the amount of risk taken.Additionally,capital provides the bank
with an ability to absorb losses as well as its role in reflecting bank asset
quality. Barth et al. (2013a) investigated the relationship between capital
regulations and non-performing loans. There are less non-performing loans
when rigorous capital regulations are in place.This is because rigorous capi-
tal regulations makes the bank become more active in the credit management
of their portfolio. Bitar et al. (2018)analysed the impact of the capital on
risk, efficiency, and profitability of banks in 39 OECD countries during the
period 1999-2013.They found that risk-based and non-risk-based capital ra-
tios increase bank efficiency. Their findings show that requiring highly liquid
banks to hold higher capital may hinder their efficiency. The asset growth is
positively associated with bank efficiency. Their results show the bank size
to have a positive relationship with bank efficiency. This suggests that larger
banks benefit from economies of scale. Additionally, they found that GDP
growth is positively correlated with bank efficiency. The banks in countries
with higher GDP growth are more efficient and more profitable. These banks
tend to hold smaller loan loss reserves that reflect favourable economic condi-
tions. These studies show the significance of bank-specific, industry-specific,
and macroeconomic variables on bank efficiency.
Macroeconomic Conditions
By controlling for bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic vari-
ables, which are supposed to influence the efficiency, capital and risk relation-
ship, Tan and Floros (2013) examined the relationship between efficiency, risk,
and capital in the Chinese banking industry. They found that bigger banks (in
terms of total assets) have higher technical efficiency. Furthermore, in a higher
concentrated banking market, the technical efficiencies of Chinese banks are
lower. Also, they found GDP growth rates have a positive impact on efficiency.
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) using the micro-level historical data to examine
the causes of bank failure. The results indicate that increasing inefficiency
increases the probability of bank failure. The probability of failure would be
higher for a bank that was less efficient at transforming labour, capital, and
financial inputs into earning assets and demand deposits.The lower a bank’s
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capital/assets or cash/deposits ratios, the more likely it was to fail.Färe et al.
(2004)investigated the effect of the regulatory constraint such as risk-based
capital constraint and leverage constraint on the efficiency. Using a sample of
banks from 1990,1992, and 1994 Call Reports, they found that relaxing the reg-
ulatory constraints leads to greater technical inefficiency. The results showed
the significance of the regulatory constraints on the technical inefficiency.
2.2.4 Data Envelopment Analysis and Efficiency
The non-parametric method in productivity evaluation was found by Farrell
in 1957. This method was developed in 1978 by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes
based on mathematical programming models. It was entitled Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA). This technique was introduced as an efficient method
for evaluating decision-making units function. Following the development of
DEA, in 1984, the returns to scale concept in DEA models were considered
by Banker, Charnz, and Cooper. DEA has been widely used for measuring
the efficiency in the banks. DEA is a linear program in the form of a piece-
wise linear combination that presents a set of best practice observations and
evaluates the performance by relating the input and outputs relating to the
common efficiency frontier(Xu et al., 2015).
DEA measures the relative efficiency in situations in which there are mul-
tiple inputs and outputs and there is no obvious objective way to aggregate
either inputs or outputs into a meaningful index of productive efficiency (Holod
and Lewis, 2011). In its basic form, DEA considers a collection of decision-
making units (DMU) each of which consumes DMU-specific levels of selected
inputs to produce DMU-specific levels of selected outputs (Holod and Lewis,
2011).DEA makes no assumptions regarding how a DMU converts inputs into
outputs. DEA establishes an efficiency frontier based on observed best per-
formances and evaluates the efficiency of each DMU relative to this frontier.
DMU that lie on the frontier is considered as efficient. When DEA is applied
in evaluating the performances of a set of banks, it is possible to form two
groups such as one that comprises an efficient frontier and the other with the
banks lying below the frontier(Titko et al., 2014). When DEA is applied, the
efficiency score is estimated as the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs
(Titko et al., 2014). The weights are selected for each variable of every anal-
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ysed unit to maximise its efficiency score.DEA has been widely used because
of the advantages it has over traditional parametric methods. DEA makes
each DMU look as favourable as possible to its peers by allowing each DMU
to choose its own variable inputs. This feature makes DEA a better option
when assigning numerical values to the variables that are qualitative in nature.
Additionally, DEA has the ability to identify a reference unit for each DMU.
This proves to be a very useful managerial tool because it helps in determin-
ing the potential causes and remedies for the identified inefficiencies(LaPlante
and Paradi, 2015). Furthermore, DEA does not require to make any prior
assumptions of the observation’s distribution. Using DEA allows comparing
the banks of different sizes in different countries with respect to one EU-wide
frontier without imposing any specific parametric functional form (Casu and
Girardone, 2010).In literature, the estimations of profit efficiency using DEA is
limited. This is because of the difficulty in collecting reliable and transparent
information for the output prices (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). Moreover, it
is not straightforward to decompose profit efficiency into technical efficiency
and allocative efficiency. Färe et al. (2004)proposed the solution of two sets of
linear programming. In the first case, a profit maximising DEA is solved for
measuring the profit efficiency. In the second case, technical efficiency is mea-
sured based on a directional distance function, which allows the simultaneous
adjustment of inputs and outputs. Additionally, the DEA model is often used
in measuring bank efficiency is because the managers have higher control over
the inputs rather than over outputs (Titko et al., 2014).
In DEA related research papers, the determination of the model variables
i.e., the combination of inputs and outputs is the most discussed topic. Pri-
marily, the selection is based on three basic approaches to banking: - the
intermediation approach, the production approach, and the profitability ap-
proach. The intermediation approach emphases the intermediary role played
by the bank. Loans and Securities are treated as outputs, whereas deposits,
labour, and capital as inputs. The production approach assumes that banks
use capital and labour to produce different kinds of banking products such
as loans and deposits. The profitability approach is similar to the production
approach. However, the outputs of the profitability approach are more profit-
oriented such as interest income and non-interest income. The choice of a
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model specification has a significant impact on the results of the research. It is
well known that DEA is sensitive to the variable selection. When selecting the
model’s variables, statistically rigorous methods should be applied. The choice
of the number of variables selected is significant because the greater numbers
of variables a DEA model has, the more efficient DMUs will be. Therefore, it
contributes to an increase in the number of efficient banks. Additionally, the
application of the DEA should be done with caution and the factors such as
country-specific and industry-specific should be taken into consideration.
For ensuring the validity of the DEA model specification, an isotonicity test
should be conducted. An insotonicity test involves the calculation of all the
inter-correlations between inputs and outputs for identifying whether increas-
ing the amounts of inputs leads to greater outputs (Tsolas and Charles,2015).
If the inter-correlation between inputs and outputs is observed positive, the
insotonicity test is passed. Therefore, the inclusion of inputs and outputs is
justified. The deepening of the recent crisis and continued banking fragility
led to banks requiring state support arrangements. This contributed to cre-
ating the need for a reassessment of the banking systems’ performances. The
research on the performances of the financial institutions focuses especially on
frontier efficiency (Andries and Ursu,2016). This involves measuring the per-
formance deviations of some institutions from the efficiency frontiers which is
already built based on the best practices. This technique allows us to measure
how efficient the institution is in comparison to the most efficient institution
in the market. The results obtained from the frontier efficiency could be used
for the formulation and guidance of the regulation. This would be done by
assessing the effects of deregulation, mergers, or market structure on the effi-
ciency by identifying the best and worst practices associated with high and low
measured efficiency. For the banks, efficiency means improved profits, greater
amounts of funds channelling in, better prices and services quality for the con-
sumers, and greater safety in relation to improved capital buffers for absorbing
the risk. Additionally, the frontier techniques could be used for measuring the
impact of the major economic events such as crisis, on the performance of the
banks.
Pasiouras et al. (2006) used the country-level data and bank-level data
from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regula-
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tions, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual
bank ratings. Pasiouras (2008a) using DEA investigated the Greek commer-
cial banks for the Greek commercial banks over the period 2000-2004. He
found that there is a positive relationship between capital requirements and
technical efficiency. However, this is not statistically significant in the differ-
ent combinations of inputs and outputs used in the DEA model. Defung et al.
(2016) investigated the technical efficiency of the banks in Indonesia for the
period 1993-2011 by employing DEA. They found that the strengthening of
the banking system with higher capital to asset ratios, higher minimum reserve
requirements, and enhanced supervision led to lower efficiency in the interme-
diation approach. However, these reforms have led to an increase in revenue
efficiency.Santos (1999) used an intermediation model to study the efficiency
and welfare implications of the banks’ minimum required capital–asset ratio.
The results reveal that a bank’s stability and efficiency would improve if there
are capital regulations in place.
2.3 Data Envelopment Analysis
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been widely used in measuring the
efficiency in banks. DEA is a linear program in the form of piecewise linear
combination which presents a set of best practice observation and evaluates
the performance by relating the input and outputs relating to the common
efficiency frontier (Xu et al., 2015). DEA measures the relative efficiency in
situations in which there are multiple inputs and outputs and there is no obvi-
ous objective way to aggregate either inputs or outputs into a meaningful index
of productive efficiency(Holod and Lewis, 2011). In its basic form, it considers
a collection of decision-making units (DMU) each of which consumes DMU-
specific levels of selected inputs to produce DMU-specific levels of selected
outputs(Holod and Lewis, 2011). DEA makes no assumptions regarding how
a DMU converts inputs into outputs. DEA establishes an efficiency frontier
based on observed best performances and evaluates the efficiency of each DMU
relative to this frontier. DMU that lie on the frontier is considered as efficient.
When applying DEA in evaluating the performances of a set of banks, it is
possible to form two groups such as one that comprises an efficient frontier and
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the other with the banks lying below the frontier (Titko et al., 2014). When
DEA is applied, the efficiency score is estimated as the ratio of weighted out-
puts to weighted inputs (Titko et al., 2014). The weights are selected for each
variable of every analysed unit to maximise its efficiency score. The efficiency
rate for each unit of the reference set of j = 1,. . . .,n banks, is evaluated in
relation to the other set members. Each DMU is assigned an efficiency score
which ranges between 0 and 1. The score equal to 1 indicates an efficient DMU
with respect to the rest of the DMUs in the sample. The maximum efficiency
score is 1 and the lower values indicate the relative inefficiency of the analysed
objects.
Efficiency =
Weighted sum of Outputs
Weighted sum of inputs
(2.1)
Accordingly, the mathematical equation to find the maximum efficiency of










≤ 1; j = 1, 2, ...n. (2.3)
ur, vr ≥ 0; r = 1, 2, . . . .s; i = 1, 2, . . . .m. (2.4)
In this formulation, ”o” denotes a focal DMU (i.e., each bank, in turn,
becomes a focal bank when its efficiency score is being computed). xij is the
observed amount of the ith input of the jth DMU, yrj is the observed amount
of the rth output of the jth DMU. ur and vi are non-negative weights which
are determined by the above linear programming. However, one may find
out an infinite number of solutions by solving such programming approach, if
(u∗, v∗) is a solution, then (αu∗, αv∗) is another solution for any non-negative α.
Charnes et al.(1978) imposed the constraint Σmi=1(vixi0) = 1 , which provides :
Max z0 = Σ
s
r=1(uryr0) (2.5)
s.t.Σsr=1(uryr)− Σmi=1(vixi) ≤ 0; j = 1, 2, . . . ., n. (2.6)
Σmi=1(vixi) = 1 (2.7)
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ur, vi ≥ 0; r = 1, 2, . . . .s; i = 1, 2, . . . .m. (2.8)
In order to derive an equivalent envelopment form, the duality in linear
programming is used:
Min z0 = θ0 (2.9)
s.t. Σnj=1λjxij ≤ θoxio; i = 1, 2, . . . .,m. (2.10)
Σsj=1λjyrj ≥ θoyro; r = 1, 2, . . . ., s. (2.11)
θj ≥ 0 (2.12)
The objective function tries to minimise the efficiency θ0 subject to the
constraints such that the weighted sum of the inputs of the other DMUs is
less than or equal to the inputs of the DMU being evaluated and the weighted
sum of the outputs of the other DMUs is larger than or equal to the DMU
being evaluated. The weights λ are non-negative values. The λj is an jx1
vector of the bank-specific weight that conveys information on the benchmark
comparators for bank0.Optimal solutions (θ, λ) are obtained by solving above
linear programming N times, once for each DMU. The value of θ is called
technical efficiency. The value of θ is always less than or equal to 1 based on
the constraints and the efficiency score θ computed for each DMU is relative
to other DMUs. Accordingly, DMU for which θ = 1 is considered as techni-
cally efficient firm and their input-output mix lies on the efficient institutions
and their input-output mix lies on the efficient frontier. The optimal λ iden-
tify benchmarking points (best performers) which are located on the efficient
frontier when the problem seeks the reduction of inputs. The target DMU is
technically efficiency if and only if the value of θ at the optimality is equal to
1 and so it is not possible to make improvement without worsening any other
input or output. If θ = 1 the bank is efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas
if θ < 1 the bank is inefficient and needs a 1− θ reduction in the inputs levels
to reach the frontier. The linear programming is solved j times, once for each
DMU in sample, and a value of θ is obtained for each DMU representing its
efficiency score. Moreover, λ can identify the shape of the DEA frontier. Dif-
ferent constraints on λ could lead to different DEA models. The assumption
of this model is a constant return to scale, which means that all DMUs are
operating at an optimal scale. Therefore, this model is called the CRS model.
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The first version of DEA assumes constant returns to scales (CRS) which
means that a change in the inputs is followed by a change in the same propor-
tion of the outputs (Charnes et al., 1978). CRS means that a condition when
there is a proportionate increase or decrease of input or output causing the
DMU to be moved along the frontier line or above it, and provide a meaning-
ful measurement of technical efficiency. The output of this model is a score
indicating the overall technical efficiency (OTE) of each DMU under CRS.
For measuring the bank efficiency, the input-oriented DEA models are most
frequently used. The possible reason is that the bank managers have higher
control over inputs rather than over outputs (Fethi, Pasiouras 2010). The
input-oriented DEA model objects to maximise the proportional reduction
in inputs as much as possible to achieve relative efficiency, given the same
output level. The input-oriented model’s target is to minimise the inputs
while adequately satisfying the given output level. The input-oriented DEA
model allows reducing inputs without changing outputs to achieve efficiency.
These inputs reduction or savings are defined as input slacks. The input slacks
can be seen as an important indicator to help bank managers to improve their
banks’ performances.
In the following years,Banker et al. (1984)employed a DEA model with
variable returns to scale (VRS). This means VRS relaxes the constant returns
to scale assumption and allows for the possibility that the bank’s production
technology might exhibit increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale.
This model decomposes OTE into a product of two-component. The first is
the technical efficiency under VRS or pure technical efficiency (PTE). This
relates to the ability of the managers to utilise the firm’s given resources. The
second is scale efficiency (SE). This relates to exploiting the scale of economies
by operating at a point where the production frontier exhibits CRS. The CRS
linear programming is modified to consider VRS by adding the convexity by
N1′λ = 1, where N1 is a N1 vector of ones. The technical efficiency scores
obtained under VRS are higher than or equal to those obtained under CRS
and SE could be obtained by dividing OTE with PTE. The VRS efficiency
scores are higher or equal to the CRS efficiency scores because of the scale size
of each DMUs.
In more technical terms, let us assume that there is data on K inputs and
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M outputs on each of N DMUs. For the ith DMU, these are represented by
the vectors xi and yi respectively. The K x N input matrix , X , and the M x
N output matrix , Y , represent the data for all N DMUs. The input oriented
measure of a particular DMU , under CRS , is calculated as
Minθ, λθ (2.13)
s.t.− yi + Y λ ≥ 0 (2.14)
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0 (2.15)
λ ≥ 0 (2.16)
where θ ≥ 1 is the scalar efficient score and λ is Nx1 vector of constants.
If θ = 1 the bank is efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas if θ < 1 the
bank is inefficient and needs a 1 - θ reduction in the inputs levels to reach the
frontier. The linear programming is solved N times, once for each DMU in the
sample, and a value of θ is obtained for each DMU representing its efficiency
score.
DEA has been used for measuring the efficiency at the level of the bank
branch, at the country level, and multi-country level. Schaffnit et al. (1997)
investigated the efficiency of Ontario based branches of a large Canadian bank.
The results indicated that the most efficient branches tend to be more prof-
itable and deliver better quality service. They found a strong effect of the
branch’s neighbourhood density on its performance. The efficiency at the level
of the bank branch is useful for the bank management to improve their service
quality and utilize the available resources more efficiently (Paradi and Zhu,
2013). The efficiency at the country level is important for the development of
financial regulation and financial regulators (Staub et al., 2010). Jemric and
Vujcic (2002) investigated the efficiency of Croatia banks. They found that the
decision of the regulators to privatize and for the entry of foreign banks was the
correct decision. This contributed to an increase in efficiency and improving
the operation of the market participants. Pasiouras (2008b) investigated the
impact of regulations and supervision on the bank’s technical efficiency using
a sample of 715 banks from 95 countries. This analysis provides a comprehen-
sive analysis of the relationship between bank efficiency and regulation and
supervision approaches around the world. The cross-country analysis provides
international evidence. Therefore, this study adopts a cross-country approach
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to provide international evidence for the role of the EBA’s capital exercise on
technical efficiency.
DEA has different limitations. The most significant drawback is that
DEA has no statistical properties.As a result, it tends to generate biased es-
timates.This major constraint limits the DEA’s usefulness to decision makers
(Ferrier and Hirschberg, 1997).This is because estimates of inefficiency offers
no discussion of uncertainty surrounding the estimates due to sampling vari-
ations (Simar and Wilson, 2000).To correct the problems associated with the
sampling noise in the resulting efficiency DEA estimators, and within the first
stage initiated with the DEA, we use the procedure proposed by Simar and
Wilson (2000) for bootstrapping the initial efficiency scores and obtaining bias-
corrected efficiency estimations θ̂.The DEA bootstrap technique proposed by
Simar and Wilson (2000) which provides statistical properties to DEA estima-
tors and allows to obtain bias corrected efficiency scores.
Assuming n bank bank-year observations (xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n that use mul-
tiple inputs x to produce multiple outputs y, a summary of the Simar and
Wilson (2000) procedure to estimate pure technical efficiency of the sample
observations is as follows:
1. For each bank-year observation (xk, yk)k = 1, . . . , n compute θ̂k using
the following linear program formula:









λi = 1;λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, ...n}
(2.17)
where λ is a vector of constant.
2. Draw with replacement from θ̂1, ..., θ̂n to generate β
∗
1 , ..., β
∗
n,











2− β∗i − hε∗i otherwise
(2.18)
where h is the bandwidth of a standard normal kernel density and ε∗i
is a random error drawn randomly from the standard normal distribu-
tion.The cross-validation method can be used to determine the band-
width parameter Simar and Wilson (2000).
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is the sample variance of
θ̂1, ..., θ̂n.










6. Calculate the bootstrap estimate of ˆθ∗k,b for k = 1,. . . ,n by solving:











λi = 1;λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, ...n}
(2.20)
7. Repeat the steps 2-6 with b = 2000 times to provide for k = 1,. . . ,n a
set of estimates {θ̂∗k,b, b = 1, ...B}.
For measuring the bank efficiency, the input-oriented DEA models are most
frequently used. The possible reason is that the bank managers have higher
control over inputs rather than over outputs (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). The
input-oriented DEA model objects to maximise the proportional reduction
in inputs as much as possible to achieve relative efficiency, given the same
output level. The input-oriented model’s target is to minimise the inputs
while adequately satisfying the given output level. The input-oriented DEA
model allows reducing inputs without changing outputs to achieve efficiency.
These inputs reduction or savings are defined as input slacks. The input slacks
can be seen as an important indicator to help bank managers to improve their
banks’ performances.
The present study would be reporting the efficiency estimates obtained
under CRS. The efficiency scores obtained under CRS have been used by many
earlier studies (Pasiouras, 2008a; Drake and Hall, 2003). The CRS assumption
allows comparing large banks with smaller ones. The present study would be
reporting the efficiency estimates obtained under CRS with input-orientation.
34
2. EBA’s Capital Exercise and Technical Efficiency of the banks.
2.4 Variables
2.4.1 Inputs and Outputs
There is an on-going debate in the banking literature relative to the proper def-
inition of input and output.Berger and Humphrey (1997) identified two main
approaches for the selection of inputs and outputs. These are the ‘produc-
tion approach ‘and the ‘intermediation approach’. The production approach
assumes that the banks produce loans and deposits account services by using
labour and capital as inputs and that the number and type of transactions mea-
sure the outputs. The intermediation approach perceives the banks as financial
intermediaries between savers and investors.Berger and DeYoung (1997)argues
that neither of these two approaches is perfect because they cannot fully cap-
ture the dual role of financial institutions as providers of transactions and also
being financial intermediaries. Moreover, they point out that the production
approach is better for evaluating the efficiencies of bank branches and the in-
termediation approach is more appropriate for evaluating financial institutions
as a whole. For the production approach, there are difficulties in collecting de-
tailed transaction flow information. Therefore, the intermediation approach
is more preferred in the literature. Recently, Drake, Hall et al. (2006) pro-
posed a ‘profit-oriented approach’. This approach defines revenue components
as outputs and cost components as inputs. They point out that their results
are suited to capture the diversity of strategic responses by financial firms in
the face of dynamic changes in competitive and environmental conditions.
Generally, inputs are those which are desirable to be minimal and outputs
are those which are desired to be maximised. In DEA, both input orien-
tation and output orientation could be used for solving the problem. In the
input-oriented model, the inputs are minimised whereas, in the output-oriented
model, the outputs are maximised.
The review of the cross-country studies indicates that the intermediation
approach is the most commonly used. This is consistent with the modern
empirical literature of studies that examine individual countries. Following
these studies, the intermediation approach is adopted. The model is estimated
using 3 inputs and 3 outputs. The inputs are total deposits, total costs which
consist of interest expenses and non-interest expenses and equity. Equity is
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used to control for the differences in risk preferences. The outputs are loans,
other earning assets, and non-interest income. For maximising profits, the
minimisation of the total cost is needed (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). Conse-
quently, the total cost is used. Equity is used to control for the differences
in risk preferences (Pasiouras, 2008a) (Drake and Hall, 2003). The outputs
are loans, other earning assets, and non-interest income. In the study, To-
tal Loans produced by the bank is used as an output because this activity is
highly resource-consuming, with substantial value-added (Berg et al., 1993).
Numerous studies have used non-interest income as a proxy for off-balance
sheet activities (Pasiouras, 2008). Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for
the inputs and outputs.
Table 2.1: Description of Inputs and Outputs variables used for DEA.These variables are
used in DEA for calculating efficiency scores.
Inputs Outputs
1.Total Deposits 1.Loans





In this study, five bank-specific and one country-specific control variables have
been used. The country-specific variable account for the macroeconomic con-
ditions.
The bank-specific variables are: LOGTA is the logarithm of bank’s assets
and controls for bank’s size; NPL is loan loss provisions over total loans and
is a measure of Asset Quality; ROE is the pre-tax profit divided by equity;
EQASS is equity to assets ratios and is the measure for the capital strength
of the bank and LOANTA is total loans over total assets and is a measure of
loan activity. These variable have been used in the past studies to reveal the
bank-specific characteristics which have an impact on the efficiency (Pasiouras
et al., 2006; Pasiouras, 2008b).
Earlier studies have used different variables for controlling the macroe-
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conomic conditions. In this study, the annual growth in GDP is used for
controlling the macroeconomic condition. Earlier studies have found that the
favourable conditions would be affecting positively the demand for the supply
of banking services and would possibly contribute towards an improvement in
the bank’s efficiency.Maudos et al. (2002) found that the banks operating in
expanding markets proxy by the real growth rate of GDP present higher levels
of profit efficiency. However, under expansive demand conditions, banks would
feel less pressurised to control their costs and could be less cost-efficient.
Numerous studies have found that overall financial development, measured
by banking market size and levels of monetarization contributes to higher ef-
ficiency. In this study, these two variables are used for controlling for the
development of the financial sector. These measures have been used in the
studies of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999),Pasiouras (2008b) and Barth et
al. (2008). The banking market size is calculated by dividing Assets of deposit
money banks with GDP. Kasman and Yildirim (2006) found that market size
has a positive relation with the bank efficiency.With a bigger market, a bank
has more opportunities to generate better returns.Also, presents an opportu-
nity to diversify its operations.The monetarization is calculated by dividing
Bank claims to the private sector with GDP.
These variables reflect the bank development(Barth et al., 2013b).A lower
bank development reduces the efficiency of financial intermediation (Barth et
al., 2008).As the requirements are introduced, it restricts the bank’s activi-
ties.As a result,it lowers the banking sector efficiency.
The study also controls for differences in the market structure among coun-
tries. This is done by using the degree of concentration. Earlier studies have
found that less concentrated markets have higher efficiency. This measure has
been used in the studies of Beck et al. (2006) and Pasiouras (2008b). This
is measured as the percentage of assets held by the three largest commer-
cial banks in the country. A highly concentrated commercial banking sector
might result in lack of competitive pressure to attract savings and channel
them efficiently to investors.A highly fragmented market might be evidence
for undercapitalized banks. Furthermore, the degree of concentration acts as
a measurement for the systemic risk (Nicoló et al., 2004).
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2.4.3 Double Bootstrap truncated regression
Numerous studies have used Tobit regression in the second stage of the anal-
ysis.However, Simar and Wilson (2007) has criticised the use of Tobit regres-
sion.In their studies with Monte Carlo experiments, Simar and Wilson (2007)
demonstrated that the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term
as input and output variables are correlated with explanatory variables. More-
over, they pointed out that DEA efficiency estimates are serially correlated.
As a result,they consequently yield inconsistent and biased estimates in the
second-stage. To address this issue, Simar and Wilson (2002) proposed an
alternative double bootstrapped procedure that permits the valid inference
while simultaneously generating standard errors and confidence intervals for
the efficiency estimates.Therefore,the study adopts Simar and Wilson (2007)’s
double bootstrap method where the bias-corrected efficiency scores θ̂∗i yielded
in the first-stage are regressed on a set of explanatory variables(zi) using the
following specification:
θ̂∗i = α + ziβ + εi, i = 1, .., n (2.21)
where α is a constant term, β is a vector of parameters and εi is the statistical
noise.
The bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) is described
in the following steps :-
1. Calculate the DEA input-orientated efficiency score for each bank, using
the linear programming problem in (2.17). :









λi = 1;λi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, 2, ...n}
(2.22)
2. Use the Maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression
of θ̂ on zi, to provide and estimate β̂ of β and an estimate σ̂ of σε.
3. For each bank i = 1, . . . , n, repeat the next four steps (a–d) B times to
yield a set of bootstrap estimates {θ̂∗i,b, b = 1, ...B}
(a) Draw εi from the N(0, σ̂
2
ε) distribution with left truncation at (1−
β̂zi).
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(b) Compute θ∗i = β̂zi + εi.
(c) Construct a pseudo data set (x∗i , y
∗
i ) , where x
∗











and X are replace by Y ∗ = {y∗i , i = 1, ...n.} and X∗ = {x∗i , i =
1, ...n.}.
4. For each bank, compute the bias corrected estimate
ˆ̂
θi = θ̂i− ˆbiasi,where








5. Use the Maximum likelihood method to estimate the truncated regression
of
ˆ̂
θi on zi, providing estimates of (β, σε).
6. Repeat the next three steps (a–c) B2 times to obtain a set of bootstrap
estimates {(ˆ̂θ∗b , ˆ̂σ∗b , b = 1, ...B2)}.
(a) For i = 1, . . . , n, εi is drawn from N(0, ˆ̂σ with left truncation at
(1− ˆ̂βzi).
(b) For i = 1, . . . , n, compute θ∗∗i =
ˆ̂
βzi + εi.
(c) The Maximum likelihood method is again used to estimate the trun-
cated regression of θ∗∗i on zi, providing estimates (
ˆ̂
β∗, ˆ̂σ∗).
7. Use the bootstrap results to construct confidence intervals and standard
errors.
In this study, the bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, financial
development and market structure would be used.
θ̂∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit
+ β4ROEit + β5LOANTAit + εit
(2.23)
where θ̂∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t
using Simar and Wilson (2007) Bootstrap.The first model would be using bank
characteristics. The bank specific variables are: LOGTA is the logarithm of
bank’s assets and controls for bank’s size; NPL is loan loss provisions over total
loans and is a measure of Asset Quality; ROE is the pre-tax profit divided by
equity; EQASS is equity to assets ratios and is measure for the capital strength
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of the bank and LOANTA is total loans over total assets and is a measure of
loan activity. These variable have been used in the past studies to reveal the
bank specific characteristics which have an impact on the efficiency (Pasiouras,
2008b; Pasiouras et al., 2006).
θ̂∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit
+ β4ROEit + β5LOANTAit + β6GDPGRit + εit
(2.24)
where θ̂∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t
using Simar and Wilson (2007) Bootstrap. The second model would be using
bank characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Earlier studies have used
different variables for controlling the macroeconomic conditions. In this study,
for annual growth in GDP is used for controlling the macroeconomic condition.
Earlier studies have found that the favourable conditions would be affecting
positively the demand of supply of banking services and would possibly con-
tribute towards an improvement in the bank’s efficiency.Maudos et al. (2002)
found that the banks operating in expanding markets proxy by the real growth
rate of GDP present higher levels of profit efficiency. However, under expansive
demand conditions, banks would feel less pressurised to control their costs and
could be less cost efficient.Boyd et al. (2001) found that that countries with
high inflation have underdeveloped financial systems and banks. Moreover,
Grigorian and Manole (2006) and Pasiouras (2008b) found that inflation has
no significant relationship between inflation and bank efficiency.
θ̂∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + β4ROEit
+ β5LOANTAit + β6ASSGDPit + β7CLAIMSit + εit
(2.25)
where θ̂∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t using
Simar and Wilson (2007) Bootstrap.The third model would be incorporating
both bank characteristics and financial development. Numerous studies have
found that overall financial development, measured by banking market size
and levels of monetarization contributes to higher efficiency. In this study,
these two variables are used for controlling for the development of the financial
sector. These measures have been used in the studies of Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999) ,Pasiouras (2008b) and Caprio et al. (2008). The banking
market size is calculated by dividing Assets of deposit money banks with GDP.
The monetarization is calculated by dividing Bank claims to the private sector
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with GDP.
θ̂∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit
+ β4ROEit + β5LOANTAit + β6CONCit + εit
(2.26)
where θ̂∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t
using Simar and Wilson (2007) Bootstrap. Model 4 would be including bank
characteristics and market structure.The study also controls for differences in
the market structure among countries. This is done by using the degree of
concentration. Earlier studies have found that less concentrated markets have
a higher efficiency.Nicoló et al. (2004) found that highly concentrated banking
systems exhibit levels of systemic risk potential higher than less concentrated
systems during the period 1993–2000,and this relationship strengthened during
the 1997–2003 period.This measure has been used in the studies of Pasiouras
(2008b) and Beck et al. (2006). This is measured as the percentage of assets
held by the three largest commercial banks in the country.
θ̂∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + +β4ROEit
+ β5LOANTAit + β6GDPGRit + β7ASSGDPit
+ β8CLAIMSit + β9CONCit + εit
(2.27)
Model 5 would be incorporating bank characteristics, macroeconomic con-
ditions, financial development, and market structure.
This model would be incorporating bank characteristics, macroeconomic
conditions, financial development, and market structure.
2.4.4 Data
The focus is on the commercial banks because it would allow us to exam-
ine a more homogeneous sample in terms of services and consequently inputs
and outputs enhancing further the comparability among countries. The study
concentrates on the banks in 15 countries in Europe with the financial data
available from Market Intelligence for the period 2008-2015. The banks were
excluded from the sample for one of the following reasons: - (i) they had no
data available for any of the years, (ii) they had missing or negative values for
the required inputs/outputs, and (iii) they had missing values for the bank-
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specific control variables. By following this procedure,we have 194 banks in 15
countries in Europe for the period 2008-2015 in the final sample.
The EBA capital exercise was implemented across Europe.The EBA dis-
closed the results of the capital exercise for only 61 banks.In this study, we
have 46 banks out of 61 banks from EU-15 countries who’s results were dis-
closed by the EBA. The results of the banks announced by EBA have been
classified as CEB (Capital Exercise Bank) and the others have been classified
as Non-CEB.The sample of 194 banks is divided into 2 sub-samples based on
the above classification.The sample of CEB has 46 banks and the sample of
Non-CEB has 148 banks.
During the above procedure, we select the consolidated data only. The
reports prepared under International Financial Reporting Standards are used
where available, but if only reports prepared under local generally accepted
accounting principles are available, then it is used. All the data was converted
to the Euro before downloading, using the official exchange rates available




Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs. From
2008 to 2015, the deposits and the equity are increasing. Both are increasing
over the time. However, the interest expenses and the non-interest expenses
are both decreasing. But, the interest expenses have decreased tremendously
over the time while the non-interest expenses have decreased but not as much
as compared to the interest expenses. Loans and Non-interest income have
increased over the time. However, the other earning assets have decreased
from 2008 to 2015.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 shows the descriptive statistics for the bank characteris-
tics, macroeconomic conditions, financial development and market structure.
From 2008 to 2015, EQASS which measures capital strength has increased.
Moreover, ROE has increased tremendously over time, which shows that prof-
itability of the bank. However, NPL, LOANTA and LOGTA have diminished
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from 2008 to 2015. ASSGDP has diminished from 2008 to 2015. Additionally,
CONC has increased slightly from 2008 to 2015. The financial development
variables have negligible change from 2008 to 2015.
43
2. EBA’s Capital Exercise and Technical Efficiency of the banks.





LOGTA Logarithm of total as-
sets
Size
NPL Loan loss provisions
over total loans
Asset Quality
ROE Pre-tax profit divided
by equity
Profitability
EQASS Equity to Assets Capital Strength









ASSGDP Assets of deposit money
banks/GDP
Size of the bank-
ing system





CONC Percentage of assets
held by the three
largest commercial
banks in the country
Concentration
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2. EBA’s Capital Exercise and Technical Efficiency of the banks.
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for the control variables before the Capital Exercise.The
sample period is 2008- 2011.The sample consists of 194 banks for each year.Statistics of
mean,standard deviation, minimum and maximum are reported.
VARIABLE MEAN S.D. MIN MAX
LOGTA 16.28 2.623 10.28 21.53
EQASS 0.079 0.090 -0.305 0.976
NPL 7.725 8.455 0.821 37.81
LOANTA 0.647 0.192 0.000 0.889
ROE -13.70 220.9 -2956.6 41.15
GDPGR 1.826 1.719 -0.356 9.512
ASSGDP 88.75 48.97 47.02 380.3
CLAIMS 110.2 34.81 51.36 247.9
CONC 65.26 13.11 34.70 90.79
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for the control variables after the Capital Exercise.The
sample period is 2012- 2015.The sample consists of 194 banks for each year.Statistics of
mean,standard deviation, minimum and maximum are reported.
VARIABLE MEAN S.D. MIN MAX
LOGTA 15.83 2.720 10.43 21.58
EQASS 0.087 0.043 -0.019 0.272
NPL 7.616 8.117 0.82 37.81
LOANTA 1.453 0.212 1.17 1.845
ROE 0.628 0.186 0.036 0.921
GDPGR 2.880 22.80 -162.2 185.7
ASSGDP 88.57 47.28 53.42 380.3
CONC 110.2 34.05 51.36 247.9
CONC 65.95 12.96 34.70 90.79
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics of banks based on their country for the control variables
used in Simar and Wilson (2007)’s Double Bootstrap Truncated regression model before the
Capital Exercise.The sample period is 2008- 2011.The sample consists of 194 banks for each
year in 15 EU countries.Statistics of mean,standard deviation, minimum and maximum are
reported.
Country LOGTAEQASSLOANTA NPL ROE ASSGDPCLAIMSCONCGDPGR
Austria MEAN 14.34 0.058 0.830 5.558 2.408 78.400 84.694 60.418 1.100
S.D 0.803 0.017 0.050 2.361 3.745 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 12.9 0.049 0.740 2.190 0.060 78.400 84.694 60.418 1.100
MAX 14.72 0.089 0.857 7.630 7.970 78.400 84.694 60.418 1.100
Belgium MEAN 21.37 0.022 0.174 2.390 4.193 108.403 59.308 61.882 1.430
S.D 0.176 0.005 0.038 0.753 10.747 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 21.12 0.014 0.122 1.540 -10.940 108.403 59.308 61.882 1.430
MAX 21.51 0.026 0.213 3.310 14.190 108.403 59.308 61.882 1.430
Cyprus MEAN 17.72 0.061 0.691 5.445 3.785 175.044 247.982 75.387 1.960
S.D 0.053 0.001 0.017 1.588 4.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 17.68 0.06 0.676 3.660 1.450 175.044 247.982 75.387 1.960
MAX 17.79 0.064 0.715 7.460 10.360 175.044 247.982 75.387 1.960
Denmark MEAN 19.79 0.04 0.615 4.932 6.850 53.486 170.751 81.455 2.340
S.D 1.409 0.012 0.141 2.173 5.886 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 16.95 0.022 0.369 2.020 -5.850 53.486 170.751 81.455 2.340
MAX 21.53 0.064 0.825 8.180 15.980 53.486 170.751 81.455 2.340
France MEAN 16.05 0.11 0.812 8.105 6.041 76.788 93.580 57.467 1.030
S.D 1.166 0.017 0.059 10.085 2.233 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 12.53 0.069 0.664 1.060 -3.380 76.788 93.580 57.467 1.030
MAX 17.32 0.147 0.889 43.210 8.410 76.788 93.580 57.467 1.030
Germany MEAN 13.25 0.079 0.655 20.821 1.519 82.788 114.850 76.735 -0.350
S.D 1.43 0.045 0.089 15.025 3.875 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 10.28 0.036 0.487 3.430 -9.430 82.788 114.850 76.735 -0.350
MAX 15.46 0.226 0.803 45.760 7.860 82.788 114.850 76.735 -0.350
Italy MEAN 18.24 0.057 0.537 4.661 4.297 78.029 87.415 62.911 0.800
S.D 2.704 0.015 0.188 4.618 14.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 14.09 0.028 0.261 1.640 -23.660 78.029 87.415 62.911 0.800
MAX 21.45 0.089 0.865 15.300 29.030 78.029 87.415 62.911 0.800
Luxembourg MEAN 17.45 0.069 0.408 4.538 6.428 380.388 91.237 34.709 3.930
S.D 0.027 0.006 0.056 1.556 2.462 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 17.43 0.06 0.339 2.440 4.180 380.388 91.237 34.709 3.930
MAX 17.49 0.074 0.465 6.120 9.080 380.388 91.237 34.709 3.930
Malta MEAN 13.17 0.075 0.591 6.885 4.727 142.993 88.432 90.790 9.510
S.D 0.03 0.002 0.014 0.276 1.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 13.14 0.072 0.575 6.560 3.240 142.993 88.432 90.790 9.510
MAX 13.21 0.078 0.606 7.230 5.570 142.993 88.432 90.790 9.510
Netherlands MEAN 18.94 0.04 0.612 6.520 0.436 101.371 114.604 85.506 1.960
S.D 1.593 0.007 0.143 1.826 8.622 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 16.64 0.031 0.433 3.380 -19.960 101.371 114.604 85.506 1.960
MAX 20.55 0.052 0.787 7.920 8.520 101.371 114.604 85.506 1.960
Poland MEAN 14.29 0.12 0.569 4.790 7.943 53.597 51.926 41.977 3.840
S.D 1.469 0.054 0.075 1.029 3.918 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 12.81 0.063 0.491 3.860 3.760 53.597 51.926 41.977 3.840
MAX 15.7 0.18 0.690 5.740 14.160 53.597 51.926 41.977 3.840
Portugal MEAN 17.1 0.068 0.749 2.668 3.757 80.182 122.345 88.426 1.820
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Country LOGTAEQASSLOANTA NPL ROE ASSGDPCLAIMSCONCGDPGR
S.D 0.864 0.029 0.026 0.381 1.742 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 16.37 0.027 0.718 2.190 1.120 80.182 122.345 88.426 1.820
MAX 18.15 0.094 0.796 3.120 5.910 80.182 122.345 88.426 1.820
Slovakia MEAN 15.27 0.074 0.732 8.598 -6.045 51.828 56.525 55.711 2.638
S.D 0.077 0.014 0.036 6.378 20.967 3.203 10.318 1.145 0.405
MIN 15.17 0.054 0.708 2.410 -37.270 47.024 51.366 53.993 2.030
MAX 15.33 0.086 0.787 16.380 6.350 53.429 72.001 56.283 2.840
Spain MEAN 15.51 0.086 0.504 9.665 -115.718 95.604 121.581 58.389 3.650
S.D 2.13 0.234 0.287 9.205 592.351 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 12.12 -0.305 0.000 2.560 -2956.670 95.604 121.581 58.389 3.650
MAX 19.42 0.976 0.744 36.410 41.150 95.604 121.581 58.389 3.650
United KingdomMEAN 15.99 0.069 0.674 5.341 -28.606 132.976 132.976 51.449 2.350
S.D 2.694 0.029 0.028 1.115 82.890 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 13.41 -0.002 0.639 3.860 -231.400 132.976 132.976 51.449 2.350
MAX 18.6 0.09 0.737 6.810 18.860 132.976 132.976 51.449 2.350
Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of banks based on their country for the control variables
used in Simar and Wilson (2007)’s Double Bootstrap Truncated regression model after the
Capital Exercise.The sample period is 2012- 2015.The sample consists of 194 banks for each
year in 15 EU countries.Statistics of mean,standard deviation, minimum and maximum are
reported.
Country LOGTAEQASSLOANTA NPL ROE ASSGDPCLAIMSCONCGDPGR
Austria MEAN 13.769 0.062 0.817 4.404 5.241 78.400 84.694 60.418 1.100
S.D 0.847 0.012 0.086 1.750 6.939 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 12.876 0.053 0.732 2.190 -7.030 78.400 84.694 60.418 1.100
MAX 14.707 0.094 0.921 7.460 12.230 78.400 84.694 60.418 1.100
Belgium MEAN 21.273 0.036 0.233 1.125 -1.300 108.403 59.308 61.882 1.430
S.D 0.103 0.007 0.027 0.417 5.615 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 21.200 0.027 0.197 0.830 -9.620 108.403 59.308 61.882 1.430
MAX 21.423 0.043 0.263 1.420 2.640 108.403 59.308 61.882 1.430
Cyprus MEAN 17.604 0.071 0.677 1.188 -9.955 175.044 247.982 75.387 1.960
S.D 0.086 0.013 0.069 0.253 9.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 17.539 0.059 0.576 0.840 -22.800 175.044 247.982 75.387 1.960
MAX 17.728 0.089 0.725 1.420 -1.740 175.044 247.982 75.387 1.960
Denmark MEAN 20.172 0.053 0.584 16.509 6.202 54.135 173.325 81.381 1.887
S.D 1.036 0.014 0.129 15.303 5.462 2.595 10.293 0.296 1.813
MIN 19.014 0.034 0.379 1.760 -3.130 53.486 170.751 80.271 -4.910
MAX 21.590 0.082 0.761 43.210 14.130 63.867 211.922 81.455 2.340
France MEAN 16.176 0.127 0.801 7.646 5.010 76.783 93.638 57.566 1.015
S.D 1.164 0.018 0.067 10.734 1.435 0.037 0.382 0.652 0.098
MIN 12.798 0.075 0.618 1.060 0.580 76.545 93.580 57.467 0.380
MAX 17.441 0.162 0.879 45.760 8.410 76.788 96.114 61.791 1.030
Germany MEAN 13.655 0.069 0.675 10.476 2.316 83.022 114.915 76.730 -0.325
S.D 1.141 0.036 0.095 9.347 8.101 1.574 0.437 0.031 0.168
MIN 10.908 0.037 0.454 1.760 -39.450 82.788 114.850 76.527 -0.350
MAX 15.009 0.267 0.813 36.410 10.560 93.346 117.780 76.735 0.780
Italy MEAN 16.974 0.101 0.374 5.769 0.199 77.909 87.707 62.904 0.673
S.D 4.053 0.069 0.198 1.268 34.699 0.541 1.303 0.031 0.570
48
2. EBA’s Capital Exercise and Technical Efficiency of the banks.
Table 2.7 – Continued from previous page
Country LOGTAEQASSLOANTA NPL ROE ASSGDPCLAIMSCONCGDPGR
MIN 10.434 0.045 0.036 4.220 -119.380 75.610 87.415 62.771 -1.750
MAX 21.455 0.272 0.661 7.630 38.950 78.029 93.244 62.911 0.800
Luxembourg MEAN 17.536 0.093 0.476 6.048 6.905 380.388 91.237 34.709 3.930
S.D 0.025 0.007 0.016 0.755 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 17.517 0.084 0.455 4.950 6.610 380.388 91.237 34.709 3.930
MAX 17.572 0.101 0.492 6.610 7.320 380.388 91.237 34.709 3.930
Malta MEAN 13.274 0.093 0.616 3.473 8.830 142.993 88.432 90.790 9.510
S.D 0.060 0.008 0.022 0.332 10.564 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 13.207 0.082 0.595 3.110 2.610 142.993 88.432 90.790 9.510
MAX 13.348 0.100 0.641 3.760 24.540 142.993 88.432 90.790 9.510
Netherlands MEAN 17.057 0.071 0.593 4.323 -8.908 101.208 114.778 85.653 1.916
S.D 2.908 0.037 0.138 2.223 17.756 0.564 0.605 0.508 0.153
MIN 13.374 0.037 0.400 1.540 -42.960 99.419 114.604 85.506 1.430
MAX 20.271 0.126 0.720 7.570 4.820 101.371 116.698 87.268 1.960
Poland MEAN 14.647 0.115 0.463 6.138 8.470 53.597 51.926 41.977 3.840
S.D 1.357 0.045 0.077 1.979 5.470 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 12.988 0.068 0.347 3.270 2.070 53.597 51.926 41.977 3.840
MAX 16.108 0.178 0.577 7.810 14.930 53.597 51.926 41.977 3.840
Portugal MEAN 16.362 0.097 0.790 8.053 0.700 80.914 130.643 87.447 1.840
S.D 0.027 0.003 0.029 4.158 1.947 1.464 16.597 1.958 0.040
MIN 16.335 0.095 0.750 1.980 -1.570 80.182 122.345 84.511 1.820
MAX 16.396 0.102 0.817 11.290 2.930 83.110 155.539 88.426 1.900
Slovakia MEAN 15.117 0.094 0.564 5.987 -63.440 53.429 51.366 56.283 2.840
S.D 0.145 0.044 0.110 0.441 71.637 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 14.930 0.046 0.460 5.530 -162.270 53.429 51.366 56.283 2.840
MAX 15.277 0.144 0.702 6.410 7.930 53.429 51.366 56.283 2.840
Spain MEAN 15.523 0.097 0.467 18.124 9.954 95.704 124.621 58.405 3.423
S.D 2.656 0.047 0.200 16.661 12.892 0.401 12.163 0.066 0.908
MIN 12.480 0.060 0.094 2.190 -3.880 95.604 121.581 58.389 0.020
MAX 19.668 0.181 0.727 38.400 35.230 97.206 170.231 58.651 3.650
United KingdomMEAN 14.832 0.066 0.653 5.134 16.404 132.976 132.976 51.449 2.350
S.D 2.325 0.034 0.087 2.221 52.264 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIN 12.870 -0.019 0.408 2.220 -25.710 132.976 132.976 51.449 2.350
MAX 18.562 0.114 0.802 7.530 185.710 132.976 132.976 51.449 2.350
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provides the descriptive statistics for the bank character-
istics, macroeconomic conditions, financial development and market structure
for the EU 15 countries. On average, EQASS for the majority of the countries
has declined after the announcement. However, EQASS for Germany, Poland,
and the United Kingdom has increased. On average, LOGTA has increased for
the majority of countries. The banks have increased in size when measured by
the total assets. LOANTA has increased after the capital exercise announce-
ment. The banks have increased their loan activity after the announcement.
This has contributed to an increase in NPL on average for half of the countries.
Germany has the highest NPL on average. This has doubled after the capital
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exercise announcement. However, after the capital exercise announcement, the
NPL of Spain has reduced by almost half. ROE on average has a mixed effect
on the profitability of the banks after capital exercise. The majority of the
countries have witnessed ROE of the bank’s increase. However, the banks in
Spain have suffered the most. They have a very high negative ROE. Addition-
ally, the banks in the United Kingdom and Slovakia have a negative return.
But, in the case of Slovakia, ROE has improved when compared before the
capital announcement.
2.5.2 First Stage Bootstrap DEA Results
Table 2.8: Bootstrap DEA Results for banks under Constant Returns to Scale before the
Capital Exercise and after Capital Exercise.Simar and Wilson (2000) Bootstrap DEA is used
to calculating efficiency scores.The sample period for before the Capital Exercise is 2008-
2011.The sample period for after the Capital Exercise is 2012-2015.The sample consists of
194 banks for each year in 15 EU countries.The reported Efficiency score is the average
during the sample period in the country.















United Kingdom 0.414 0.464
Average 0.494 0.475
The observations for each specific bank, for each country and year, are
pooled together in two samples:- 2008-2011 and 2012-2015. This is followed by
running two DEA models, one for each sample. Each sample consists of 194
banks each year. In total, each sample has 776 banks. The minimum number
of the banks in each country in the sample for each year is 4 and the maximum
number for each year is 33.
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Table 2.8 presents the results of the DEA. The panel shows the average
Technical Efficiency scores of the banks that are experiencing constant returns
to scale. The mean of the Technical Efficiency for the banks in the sample equal
.494 and .476 for before and after the capital exercise announcement was made
by the EBA respectively. Before the announcement, the average bank could
improve its technical efficiency by 50.6%. But, after the announcement, the
average bank could be improving its technical efficiency by 52.47%. In other
words, if the average bank was producing on the frontier instead of its current
location, only 40.4% of the inputs currently being used would be necessary
to produce the same output vector. However, after the announcement, only
47.53% of the inputs currently being used would be necessary to produce the
same output vector.
Before the Capital Exercise was announced, the most efficient countries
appeared to be Austria and Poland. After the Capital Exercise is announced,
the most efficient countries appeared to be Belgium and Austria. In general,
the efficiency scores of the banks have changed after the announcement of the
capital exercise. The efficiency scores of the banks in most of the countries
have changed after the announcement. The efficiency of the banks in most of
the banks has declined. Only the efficiency of the banks in Belgium, Germany,
Malta, Denmark, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom have improved. However,
the efficiency of the banks in Denmark after the announcement is negligible.
The efficiency of the banks in Portugal has the worst efficiency scores after the
capital announcement. The efficiency of the banks got worse because of the
financial crisis in Portugal. The debt of Portugal kept on rising. It was only
in 2014, Portugal left the EU bailout mechanism without requiring any more
support.
Figure 2.1 shows the average efficiency of the banks from 2008 to 2015. The
efficiency of the bank was increasing and decreasing till 2011. This could be
explained by the changes in the inputs and output over the years. The inputs
such as Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Expenses have been increasing and
decreasing over time until 2011. The outputs are increasing and decreasing
as well during this time. However, after 2011, the efficiency of the banks is
decreasing until 2013. During this time, inputs such as Deposits and Costs are
decreasing while the outputs such Loan and Other earning assets are decreasing
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Figure 2.1: Efficiency of the banks in 15 EU countries over time under Constant Returns
to Scale.Simar and Wilson (2000) Bootstrap DEA is used for calculating the efficiency
scores.The sample consists of 194 banks for each year in 15 EU countries.The sample period
is 2008-2015.The reported is the average Efficiency scores in the sample period.
as well. However, the efficiency scores increase from 2013. The inputs such
as deposit, equity, and interest expenses are increasing whereas the outputs
such as Other Earning Assets and Loans are increasing. The efficiency of the
banks becomes steady from 2014 onwards. The changes in the inputs and
the outputs while increasing and decreasing are not drastic. The EBA capital
exercise made the banks to reconsider their activities. As a result, there was
a decrease in the efficiency of the banks which lasted till 2013. However, after
2014, the efficiency of the banks has become steady which reflects the activity
of the bank is steady in terms of the inputs and outputs. But, this was not
the case before the 2011 capital exercise announcement.
The Global Financial Crisis hit Europe in 2008. The efficiency of the
banks fell to the lowest level during this time. In the following year, the
efficiency of the banks started improving. However, in 2010, the Sovereign
Debt Crisis hits Europe. This has resulted in the efficiency of the banks to
decrease again. After the capital exercise is announced, the efficiency of the
banks has fallen. This is because the banks have to restructure their balance
sheets and maintain the required targets which have been set by the EBA. The
efficiency of the banks continues to fall because of the crisis in Ireland. But,
in the following years, it starts to improve. This is helped by an improvement
in the stock market. The EBA capital exercise requirements have helped the
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bans maintain their efficiency levels in the following years. During these years,
Europe was once again on the brink of recession. With Greece starting to
cause panic. Furthermore, this was accompanied by inflation falling to record
lows in the Eurozone and the collapse of the oil price. The EBA capital
exercise requirements have contributed to allowing the banks to maintain their
efficiency levels during the years of turmoil. Additionally, the inputs and
outputs of the banks became steady because of the capital exercise.
2.5.3 Double Bootstrap Truncated Regression Analysis
In the second stage of the the analysis, we investigate the determinants of
the technical efficiency of the banks by employing Simar and Wilson (2007)’s
Bootstrap Truncated regression.This technique allows to obtain consistent and
unbiased estimates in the second-stage.In Simar and Wilson (2007) Bootstrap
truncated regression,the bias-corrected efficiency scores θ̂∗i yielded in the first-
stage are regressed on a set of explanatory variables.F-test has been used in
the study for measuring the significance of the model. The p-value of F-test is
less than 5% in all the models. This shows the model is a better fit. Following
Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Pasiouras (2008b), QML (Huber/White) standard
errors and covariates are calculated. This is because heteroskedasticity can
emerge when estimated parameters are used as dependent variables in the
second stage analysis.
Controlling for bank-specific characteristics
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 presents the regression results when controlling only for
bank-specific characteristics. The results provide evidence in favour of the cap-
ital exercise used by the EBA to promote the efficiency of the banks using the
determinants of efficiency. Before the announcement, ROE is not having an
impact on the inefficiency of the bank. After the announcement, ROE is hav-
ing a negatively significant impact on the efficiency of the bank. This finding
indicates that the more profitable banks have lower inefficiency. This corrob-
orates with similar findings of the other studies (Pastor et al., 1997; Das and
Ghosh, 2006). Banks that are reporting higher profitability ratios are usually
preferred by the clients. Therefore, they attract the biggest share of deposits
along with the best potential creditworthy borrowers. Moreover, this implies
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Table 2.9: Double Bootstrap Truncated Regression results before capital exercise. Model 1
controls for the bank characteristics. Model 2 controls for bank characteristics and Macroe-
conomic Conditions. Model 3 controls for bank characteristics and financial development.
Model 4 controls for bank characteristics and Market structure. Model 5 controls for bank
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, financial development and market structure.The
sample consists of 194 banks for each year for the period 2008-2011. QML (Huber/White)
standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity, (***statis-
tically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level, *Statistically significant
at 10% level)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
BANK CHARACTERISTICS
LOGTA
-0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002
(1.78)* (1.86)* (1.02) (2.00)** (1.12)
EQASS
-0.401 -0.502 -0.621 -0.644 -0.745
(1.81)* (1.82)* (1.88)* (2.17)** (2.31)**
LOANTA
0.008 0.046 0.034 0.003 0.070
(0.20) (1.10) (0.74) (0.10) (.55)
NPL
-0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(2.62)*** (2.17)** (3.04)*** (2.54)** (2.44)**
ROE
0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006

















0.662 0.607 0.710 0.740 0.763
(7.76)*** (7.29)*** (7.98)*** (7.81)*** (6.55)***
R2 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.21
LOGLIKELIHOOD 136.31 139.281 141.132 133.215 148.831
OBSERVATIONS 776 776 776 776 776
that the banks might be having a higher ROE by either having higher leverage
(debt) or higher risk-taking. The capital exercise has aimed to reduce these
activities of the banks. As a result, these conditions create a favourable envi-
ronment for profitable banks to be more efficient from the point of view of their
intermediation activities. Before and after the capital exercise, NPL is having
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Table 2.10: Double Bootstrap Truncated Regression results after capital exercise. Model 1
controls for the bank characteristics. Model 2 controls for bank characteristics and Macroe-
conomic Conditions. Model 3 controls for bank characteristics and financial development.
Model 4 controls for bank characteristics and Market structure. Model 5 controls for bank
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, financial development and market structure.The
sample consists of 194 banks for each year for the period 2012-2015. QML (Huber/White)
standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity (***Statis-
tically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level, *Statistically significant
at 10% level)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
BANK CHARACTERISTICS
LOGTA
0.001 0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.003
(0.16) (0.5) (2.28)** (0.07) (0.248)
EQASS
0.754 0.582 0.394 0.495 -0.249
(2.84)*** (2.45)** (1.14) (1.53) (0.59)
LOANTA
-0.661 -0.581 -0.542 -0.650 -0.628
(8.25)*** (6.82)*** (7.18)*** (7.17)*** (6.89)***
NPL
-0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(3.18)*** (3.15)*** (0.28) (2.40)** (1.14)
ROE
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002

















0.838 0.747 0.500 0.809 0.987
(7.50)*** (7.43)*** (3.40)*** (6.42)*** (5.10)***
R2 0.380 0.375 0.411 0.323 0.381
LOGLIKELIHOOD 113.21 121.29 124.34 129.31 139.37
OBSERVATIONS 776 776 776 776 776
a highly negative significant impact on inefficiency. This is consistent with the
earlier finding by among other, Kwan et al. (1995); Resti (1997). These results
imply that the banks should be focusing on credit risk management, which
has been proven to be problematic in the past. Serious banking problems have
arisen from the failure of the banks to recognise impaired assets and create
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reserves for writing off these assets.
Before the announcement, EQASS exhibits a negative relationship with
bank efficiency. The findings imply that the more efficient banks, use less
equity compared to its peers. The results seem to suggest that the less efficient
banks could have been involved in riskier operations and the process tends to
hold more equity, voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e., the reason might be banks’
deliberate efforts to increase safety cushions and in turn decrease the cost of
funds or perhaps regulatory pressures that mandate riskier banks to carry more
equity. However, after EQASS has a significant positive impact on efficiency.
By having a higher capital, the EBA has aimed in improving the confidence
of depositors in the bank’s security. Additionally, it would be creating an
environment for careful lending and better bank performances. It would be
reducing the likelihood of financial distress faced by the banks (Pasiouras et al.,
2009).LOANTA has a significantly negative impact on the technical efficiency
of the bank. This is in line with the findings of Havrylchyk (2006)who found a
negative relationship between LOANTA and efficiency. This ratio is considered
as a proxy for Liquidity risk. Therefore, a negative relationship could indicate
that less efficient banks are also less liquid.
Before the capital exercise occurred, EQASS and NPL have a negative
correlation with the efficiency of the bank. A 1% increase in bank efficiency
would require the bank’s EQASS to reduce by 1.31%.Similarly, a 1% increase
in bank efficiency would require the bank’s NPL to reduce by 4.72%.After the
Capital Exercise, EQASS has a positive correlation with efficiency. This means
that to increase bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would be required to improve
EQASS by 1.28%. This reflects the significance of the contribution of capital
strength towards bank efficiency. Furthermore, a 2.84% decrease in NPL would
be contributing to a 1% increase in efficiency. LOANTA is having a negative
impact after the capital exercise on bank efficiency. These results indicate that
the capital exercise is influencing the quantity and quality of lending made by
the banks and the decision of the banks when allocating their asset portfolios.
Therefore, Capital Exercise would be affecting the efficiency of the bank. These
findings are in line with the findings of Barth et al. (2013b) who found that the
capital regulations have a significant role to play in relation to the incentives of
the banks with depositors and other creditors. Additionally, capital regulation
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would be contributing to having less non-performing loans. Moreover, the
capital requirements by the EBA would be reducing the likelihood of financial
distress. As the balance sheet of the bank is getting more inclined towards
liquidity than lower return assets (Pasiouras et al., 2009).
The EBA announcement has contributed towards the bank getting engaged
in more profitable activities. As a result, they would be able to attract the
best potential creditworthy borrowers who would be able to meet the obliga-
tions. This could be resulting in banks having less loan loss. Moreover, these
conditions would be creating an environment for the banks to become more
profitable and efficient.
Controlling for Macroeconomic Conditions
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 shows the regression results when controlling for the
macroeconomic conditions. The growth of the GDP in the model affects the
other bank-specific variables. Before the announcement of the capital exercise
was made, GDPGR does have a significant impact on the technical efficiency
of the banks.
However, after the capital exercise announcement, GDPGR has a statisti-
cally significant impact on technical efficiency. This indicates that favourable
economic conditions affect the extent, depth, and quality of financial interme-
diation and banking services. This contributes to making financial institutions
more efficient. Furthermore, by having a higher growth rate, it would be eas-
ier for the debtors to meet their obligations. The other variables having a
significant impact on the efficiency are EQASS, LOANTA, NPL, and ROE.
Before the capital exercise, GDPGR was positively correlated with effi-
ciency. This meant that to increase the bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would
be required to reduce GDPGR by .68%. After the Capital Exercise, the mag-
nitude of GDPGR is positive. This means that to increase bank efficiency by
1%, the bank would be required to improve GDPGR by .55%. This reflects
the significance of the contribution of the real GDP growth towards bank effi-
ciency. After capital exercise, there is a marginal decrease in the contribution of
GDPGR towards bank efficiency. However, the results reflect the significance
of favourable economic conditions towards the banking activity (Chortareas et
al., 2011). This would be making the bank more efficient.
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Controlling for financial development
The regression results indicate that after controlling for financial development
before the capital announcement, CLAIMS and ASSGDP are having a signif-
icant impact on the efficiency. Both CLAIMS and ASSGDP continue to have
a significant impact after the capital exercise. The results show that both the
activity in the market and the size of the market have an impact on efficiency.
CLAIMS has a negative impact while ASSGDP has a positive impact on effi-
ciency. The capital regulations influence the decision of the banks regarding
the mix of deposits and equity. The deposits and equity bears different costs for
the bank. Furthermore, the capital requirements would be leading to careful
lending and better performance. The results indicate that the capital require-
ments would be reducing the bank risk, but not be a highly significant benefit
for the efficiency gains. When the capital regulations are placed, the banks
are looking to substitute the loans with alternative forms of assets. The banks
are looking for different asset portfolios which would be generating better re-
turns and requires the different resources to be managed. Additionally, the
capital requirement of the EBA would be preventing the banks from excessive
risk-taking. It would be requiring the banks for different asset portfolios which
would be generating better returns and require the different resources to be
managed. Furthermore, it would be contributing towards the banks having a
decline in non-performing loans(Berger and DeYoung, 1997). The EBA capi-
tal announcement has made the banks consider their activity in the banking
sector and to manage their portfolios. As a result, the banks would be having
less likelihood of having financial distress.
Controlling for market structure
The results when controlling for the market structure are quite similar to the
results when controlling for financial development. CONC does not have any
significant impact on the efficiency of the bank before and after the capital
announcement. However, after the announcement, LOANTA and NPL have a
negatively significant impact while ROE has a positive significant impact on
the efficiency of the bank.
Before the capital exercise, the CONC was negatively correlated with the
efficiency of the bank. This meant that to increase the bank efficiency by
58
2. EBA’s Capital Exercise and Technical Efficiency of the banks.
1%, the bank would be required to reduce CONC by 8%. After the Capital
Exercise, CONC is still negatively correlated with the efficiency of the bank.
This means that to increase bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would be required
to improve CONC by 3.78%. This reflects the contribution of the EBA capital
exercise towards the efficiency of the bank. Additionally, less concentrated
markets are associated with an increase in efficiency.
Controlling for all the variables
When controlling for Bank characteristics, Macroeconomic conditions, Finan-
cial Development, and Market Structure, the results before the announcement
are quite similar to the results of controlling for market structure. However,
the results changes after the announcement. GDPGR, ASSGDP, and CLAIMS
are statistically significant and positively related to the technical efficiency
of the bank. ROE is negatively significant to the technical efficiency of the
bank.However, LOANTA and CONC have a significantly negative impact on
the efficiency of the bank. LOANTA is a proxy for liquidity. If the bank is
having a higher loan to assets ratio, then it would be having less liquidity.
Also, less concentrated markets are associated with higher efficiency. The re-
gression results indicate that CONC is statistically significant and negatively
related to technical efficiency. This shows that the less concentrated markets
are associated with increased efficiency. This is consistent with the results of
(Pasiouras, 2008a). The high concentrated banking systems exhibit levels of
systemic risk potential higher than the less concentrated systems during the
period 1993-2000 and this relationship was strengthened during the 1997-2003
period (Nicoló et al., 2004).Pasiouras et al. (2006) reported a negative rela-
tionship between concentration and bank’s overall performance and soundness
as measured by Fitch ratings.
Before the capital exercise, the magnitude of EQASS was negative. This
meant that to increase the bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would be required
to reduce EQASS by 1.28%. The bank efficiency would be improved by 1% if
the bank reduces NPL by 4.48%. GDPGR, CLAIMS, and CONC have eco-
nomic significance on the efficiency of the bank. After the Capital Exercise,
the magnitude of EQASS is positive. But, it is not having economic signifi-
cance on the efficiency of the bank. LOANTA, NPL, and CONC are negatively
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economic significant on the efficiency of the bank while CLAIMS is positively
economic significant. The results indicate that the capital exercise would be
creating favourable economic conditions. The banks would be becoming more
involved in more careful lending. Additionally, the decision of the banks would
be influenced when allocating their asset portfolios. The banks would be look-
ing at different asset portfolios which would be generating better returns and
requiring different resources to be managed. Capital regulation would be con-
tributing to banks having fewer non-performing loans. The results indicate
that the capital exercise would be preventing banks from moral hazard incen-
tives. This is in line with the findings of Berger and DeYoung (1997) who
found that the banks with more capital would be involved in lower portfolio
risk-taking. This shows higher capital requirements would be contributing to-
wards lower non-performing loans. This would be leading towards an increase
in the efficiency of the bank.
The EBA’s capital announcement has aimed to make the banking market
less concentrated. This would be contributing to having banks less prone to
potential systemic risk. Furthermore, it would be improving the overall perfor-
mance of the banks and the soundness of the banks The EBA announcement
has contributed towards the banks to increase their efficiency by careful lend-
ing practices. This would be improving their overall performance and prevent
the banks from potential systemic risk.
2.6 Results - Bank level
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 shows the descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs
for Non- CEB, and CEB before the capital exercise took place. For Non-CEB
and CEB, the inputs and outputs are constantly increasing and decreasing
over the years. The EBA selected the banks for the exercise based on their
size. From the table, before the capital exercise took place. The inputs and
outputs of the CEB are larger than the Non- CEB.
Tables 2.13 and 2.14 shows the descriptive statistics for the inputs and
outputs for Non- CEB, and CEB after the capital exercise took place. For
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Table 2.11: Descriptive Statistics for Inputs and outputs used in Bootstrap DEA for Non-
CEB before the Capital Exercise.Bootstrap DEA is used for calculating efficiency scores.The
input variables are :-Deposit,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Expenses.The out-
put variables are :- Loan,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The sample period
is 2008-2011.The sample consist of 148 banks in each year.Statistics of mean and standard
deviation are reported.The figures are reported in emillions.
Variables 2008 2009 2010 2011
NON-CEB Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Deposits 20900 37800 20800 37800 20600 37200 20900 39400
Equity 2516.232 2612.444 2435.469 2585.349 2350.805 2447.930 2409.876 2852.173
Interest Expenses 0.930 2170.977 1091.201 2836.997 0.965 2304.012 852.822 2201.917
Non-Interest Expenses 0.494 0.653 0.474 0.623 499.635 0.688 0.491 0.706
Non-Interest Income 0.370 0.507 294.139 0.455 0.290 0.436 0.308 0.513
Other Earning Assets 13100 23500 13200 23800 13600 25400 12800 24300
Loans 78900 179000 98200 219000 97000 220000 93200 219000
Table 2.12: Descriptive Statistics for Inputs and outputs used in Bootstrap DEA for CEB
before the Capital Exercise.Bootstrap DEA is used for calculating efficency scores.The in-
put variables are :-Deposit,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Expenses.The output
variables are :- Loan,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The sample period is
2008-2011.The sample consist of 46 banks in each year.Statistics of mean and standard
deviation are reported.The figures are reported in emillions.
Variables 2008 2009 2010 2011
CEB Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Deposits 190000 250000 188000 239000 194000 228000 209000 261000
Equity 24500 30400 26900 33700 27400 30700 27600 34400
Interest Expenses 4259.338 5146.766 4245.831 4995.816 4964.245 4836.266 4083.917 5211.230
Non-Interest Expenses 8180.886 11500 7954.054 11000 8288.351 10800 8222.749 11100
Non-Interest Income 4658.644 7325.528 4921.052 7466.418 4861.012 7345.391 4991.677 7442.210
Other Earning Assets 454000 772000 484000 819000 480000 817000 485000 819000
Loans 173000 298000 162000 276000 148000 246000 151000 247000
Table 2.13: Descriptive Statistics for Inputs and outputs used in Bootstrap DEA for Non-
CEB after the Capital Exercise.Bootstrap DEA is used for calculating Efficiency scores.The
input variables are :-Deposit,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Expenses.The out-
put variables are :- Loan,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The sample period
is 2012-2015.The sample consist of 148 banks in each year.Statistics of mean and standard
deviation are reported.The figures are reported in emillions.
Variables 2012 2013 2014 2015
NON-CEB Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Deposits 22200 44600 21600 38000 22300 38500 20100 35800
Equity 2619.223 3340.412 2471.095 2493.578 2521.247 2505.462 2381.160 2668.032
Interest Expenses 0.834 2023.811 1139.211 2841.089 0.974 2400.068 1158.160 3453.613
Non-Interest Expenses 466.023 0.688 0.485 0.592 0.455 0.641 0.475 0.615
Non-Interest Income 0.290 0.384 0.314 0.435 0.235 0.293 0.315 0.541
Other Earning Assets 12400 22700 13900 24400 14400 26300 13600 26500
Loans 79200 202000 73800 191000 77300 197000 71100 187000
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Table 2.14: Descriptive Statistics for Inputs and outputs used in Bootstrap DEA for CEB
after the Capital Exercise.Bootstrap DEA is used for calculating Efficiency scores.The in-
put variables are :-Deposit,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Expenses.The output
variables are :- Loan,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The sample period is
2012-2015.The sample consist of 46 banks in each year.Statistics of mean and standard
deviation are reported.The figures are reported in emillions.
Variables 2012 2013 2014 2015
CEB Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Deposits 102000 164000 201000 241000 183000 237000 192000 254000
Equity 14600 25500 26300 28600 25200 32400 21800 26000
Interest Expenses 2364.670 4079.081 4843.556 4663.578 4468.848 5526.594 5519.338 7268.101
Non-Interest Expenses 3439.542 5184.077 8510.531 11200 8020.842 11100 8040.886 11200
Non-Interest Income 1774.127 2507.695 4805.569 7210.758 5196.193 7502.364 4758.644 7543.122
Other Earning Assets 126000 215000 458000 768000 482000 819000 544000 969000
Loans 119000 214000 94300 179000 95300 179000 92100 169000
Non-CEB and CEB, the inputs and outputs are constantly increasing and
decreasing over the years. The inputs such as deposits and equity are larger
for the CEB. However, costs for both CEB and Non- CEB declined in the
following year of the capital exercise. Before it started to rise again. The
outputs for non-CEB have been lesser than CEB in the following years. The
capital exercise reduced the inputs and outputs for CEB when compared with
the Non-CEB.
Table 2.15 shows the descriptive statistics for the bank characteristics
for Non-CEB. Initially, LOGTA was increasing. After the capital exercise,
LOGTA has decreased and is lesser than the initial position. EQASS which
is a measure of the capital strength has increased over the years. LOANTA
and NPL had been increasing until the capital exercise took place. After the
capital exercise, it has been declining. On average, ROE has been increasing
and decreasing over the years.
Table 2.16 shows the descriptive statistics for the bank characteristics for
CEB. Over the years, the average LOGTA and EQASS have remained almost
the same. After the capital exercise, the other bank characteristics variables
such as LOANTA, NPL, and ROE have witnessed either an increase or a
decrease. On average, LOANTA has decreased from 2008 till 2011. In 2012,
it increased for a couple of years before starting to decrease again. In 2015,
LOANTA is lesser than it was before the capital exercise. NPL was lower
on average before the capital exercise took place. However, after the capital
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Table 2.15: Descriptive Statistics for Bank Characteristics variables for Non-CEB.Bank
Characteristics variables are :-Size,Capital Strength,Loan Activity,Asset Quality and Prof-
itability.The sample period is 2008-2015.The sample consists of 148 banks in 15 EU coun-
tries.Statistics of mean,standard deviation, minimum and maximum are reported.
Variable NON-CEB LOGTA EQASS LOANTA NPL ROE
2008 Mean 16.16 0.083 0.633 6.897 3.957
Std. Dev. 2.810 0.045 0.218 7.307 6.407
Min 10.28 0.014 0.051 0.825 -11.63
Max 21.52 0.226 0.869 28.86 18.86
2009 Mean 16.26 0.087 0.635 7.356 4.185
Std. Dev. 2.807 0.040 0.198 6.810 8.424
Min 10.51 0.024 0.080 0.992 -21.71
Max 21.45 0.182 0.857 26.29 22.94
2010 Mean 16.21 0.084 0.640 8.050 5.169
Std. Dev. 2.732 0.037 0.185 9.904 7.432
Min 10.71 0.025 0.047 0.952 -18.15
Max 21.49 0.176 0.881 37.81 29.03
2011 Mean 16.10 0.079 0.636 8.213 -3.883
Std. Dev. 2.791 0.038 0.177 9.636 40.72
Min 10.83 -0.002 0.190 1.016 -231.4
Max 21.53 0.180 0.889 34.52 19.89
2012 Mean 15.76 0.085 0.618 7.297 6.139
Std. Dev. 2.840 0.049 0.193 8.033 33.23
Min 10.43 -0.019 0.101 0.831 -40.84
Max 21.58 0.272 0.878 37.81 185.7
2013 Mean 15.75 0.086 0.624 5.604 -2.797
Std. Dev. 2.735 0.042 0.196 5.971 34.96
Min 10.47 0.034 0.093 0.955 -162.2
Max 21.58 0.227 0.875 32.44 31.03
2014 Mean 15.78 0.092 0.620 6.876 3.334
Std. Dev. 2.710 0.045 0.199 6.382 12.55
Min 10.51 0.037 0.094 1.221 -58.58
Max 21.56 0.228 0.862 34.52 35.23
2015 Mean 15.73 0.097 0.606 7.113 3.687
Std. Dev. 2.711 0.049 0.207 6.120 9.956
Min 10.90 0.037 0.036 0.821 -36.88
Max 21.47 0.266 0.871 28.84 27.71
exercise, NPL reached its highest value. Since then, it has been constantly
decreasing. ROE has been constantly varying over the years. It is increasing
for a few years and it starts decreasing.
On average LOGTA for CEB has been greater than Non-CEB over the
years. EQASS for Non-CEB has been greater than CEB over the years.
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Table 2.16: Descriptive Statistics for Bank Characteristics variables for CEB.Bank Charac-
teristics variables are :-Size,Capital Strength,Loan Activity,Asset Quality and Profitabil-
ity.The sample period is 2008-2015.The sample consists of 46 banks in 15 EU coun-
tries.Statistics of mean,standard deviation, minimum and maximum are reported.
Variable CEB LOGTA EQASS LOANTA NPL ROE
2008 Mean 16.85 0.007 0.680 3.526 14.75
Std. Dev. 3.343 0.117 0.053 2.203 15.49
Min 12.06 -0.198 0.620 1.882 3.581
Max 20.76 0.094 0.737 6.036 41.15
2009 Mean 16.87 -0.004 0.695 3.441 7.568
Std. Dev. 3.213 0.148 0.037 2.825 4.559
Min 12.33 -0.268 0.638 0.831 3.368
Max 20.64 0.092 0.739 6.448 12.92
2010 Mean 16.89 -0.012 0.626 3.453 6.114
Std. Dev. 3.179 0.165 0.115 2.825 4.561
Min 12.45 -0.305 0.453 1.427 1.121
Max 20.65 0.088 0.737 6.686 12.61
2011 Mean 16.84 0.027 0.678 10.23 2.612
Std. Dev. 3.214 0.077 0.058 4.440 10.34
Min 12.54 -0.102 0.619 7.091 -14.44
Max 20.64 0.092 0.756 13.37 13.34
2012 Mean 16.43 0.086 0.667 14.26 6.602
Std. Dev. 2.947 0.026 0.087 17.18 7.469
Min 13.42 0.043 0.579 2.115 -1.578
Max 20.64 0.118 0.816 26.41 14.13
2013 Mean 15.99 0.077 0.663 17.07 1.355
Std. Dev. 2.944 0.028 0.086 20.40 11.32
Min 13.06 0.044 0.544 2.641 -22.24
Max 20.53 0.119 0.789 31.54 13.17
2014 Mean 16.07 0.078 0.627 11.10 5.074
Std. Dev. 2.915 0.029 0.093 15.11 4.556
Min 13.41 0.045 0.522 1.526 0.314
Max 20.55 0.118 0.804 28.53 12.72
2015 Mean 16.13 0.078 0.647 9.407 4.902
Std. Dev. 2.857 0.030 0.118 11.29 4.454
Min 13.37 0.047 0.453 2.423 -0.073
Max 20.57 0.125 0.760 26.29 12.72
EQASS for CEB was decreasing at a greater rate before the capital exer-
cise took place. However, after the capital exercise took place. EQASS has
increased for both CEB and Non- CEB. In 2012, EQASS for CEB was greater
than Non- CEB. But, in the following years, it was overtaken by Non-CEB.
LOANTA has been greater for CEB in comparison to the Non-CEB. After the
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capital exercise, it has been declining for both. Additionally, after the capi-
tal exercise, NPL has been decreasing for the CEB while it is increasing for
the Non-CEB. For both CEB and Non-CEB, ROE has been increasing and
decreasing over the years.
2.6.2 Boostrap DEA - Bank level analysis
Table 2.17: Average Technical Efficiency before and after Capital Exercise for CEB and
Non-CEB.Bootstrap DEA is used for calculating efficiency scores.The sample period for
before the Capital Exercise is 2008-2011.The sample period for after the Capital Exercise is
2012-2015.CEB consists for 46 banks for each year.Non-CEB consists of 148 banks for each
year.Reported is the Efficiency score in the sample period in sample group.
Before Capital Exercise After Capital Exercise
Non-CEB 0.502 0.479
CEB 0.367 0.375
Table 2.17 presents the results of the Bootstrap DEA for both Non-CEB
and CEB. The average efficiency score of the non-CEB before the capital ex-
ercise was .502 and after the capital exercise is .479. Before the exercise, the
average non-CEB could improve its technical efficiency by 49.8%. But, after
the exercise, it would be improving by 52.1%. In other words, if the average
bank was producing on the frontier instead of its current location, only 50.2%
of the inputs currently being used would be necessary to produce the same
output vector, However, after the exercise, only 47.9% of the inputs currently
being used would be necessary to produce the same output vector.
For CEB, before capital exercise, it was .367 and after the exercise, it is .375.
Before the exercise, the average CEB could improve its technical efficiency by
63.3%. But, after the exercise, it would be improving by 62.5%. In other
words, if the average bank was producing on the frontier instead of its current
location, only 36.7% of the inputs currently being used would be necessary to
produce the same output vector, However, after the exercise, only 37.5% of the
inputs currently being used would be necessary to produce the same output
vector.
After the capital exercise took place, for the non- CEB banks, there is a
2.3% drop in the average technical efficiency. However, the CEB banks have
an increase of about 1% in the average technical efficiency. This could be
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Figure 2.2: Efficiency of the banks over time for CEB and Non-CEB.Bootstrap DEA is
used for calculating the efficiency scores.CEB consists for 46 banks for each year.Non-CEB
consists of 148 banks for each year.Reported is the average Efficiency score in the sample
period in the sample group.
explained by the changes in the inputs and the outputs before and after the
capital exercise for both Non- CEB, and CEB. For the Non-CEB, the inputs
such as deposit and costs decrease while equity increases. But, the outputs
decrease as well. However, for the CEB, all the inputs decrease. But, the
outputs such as non-interest income and other earning assets decline. Only,
the loan as an output increase. This explains that the CEB has been able to
use their resources better than the Non-CEB.
Figure 2.2 shows the average efficiency of the capital exercise banks and the
non-capital exercise banks. Over the years, the average efficiency of the capital
exercise banks has been lower than the non-capital exercise banks. After the
Capital Exercise, the capital exercise banks had a drop in their efficiency from
2011 to 2014. This has been because of the impact of the capital exercise as
these banks had to adjust their balance sheets according to the new capital
requirements. Before the capital exercise took place, the capital exercise bank
from 2008 to 2011 witnessed an increase in the average efficiency. This is
because they were able to use their inputs such as deposits, costs, and equity
much better to get the outputs non-interest income, loans, and other earning
assets. The deposits and equity increase and costs fell. The outputs’ non-
interest income, other earning assets, and loans increased as well. But, after
the exercise took place, the efficiency of the capital exercise banks dropped.
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These banks had to readjust their balance sheet. The costs were increased
and loans decreased. These banks were not able to utilise their inputs much
efficiently to produce the outputs much quickly.
The Global financial crisis hit Europe in 2008. The GDP growth of the
Euro area was falling till mid-2009 before it started rising. The effect of the rise
in GDP growth could be seen in the mean efficiency of the CEB. During the
crisis, the largest banks were hit the worst. As a result, it is more noticeable
to see the impact on their mean efficiency. The efficiency of the CEB does not
increase despite the increase in GDP growth. This is because of the Eurozone
Debt Crisis hitting Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Since, the study has
CEB from these countries, despite a growth in the GDP. The efficiency of
the CEB does not increase. The bailouts and government intervention has
helped in improving the efficiency of CEB. In October 2011, the capital exercise
has been announced. The efficiency of the CEB witnessed a decline in 2012.
This is accompanied by negative GDP growth. In 2013, Ireland has been hit
with a crisis. In 2014, Greece started causing panic among the policymakers.
This was accompanied by inflation falling to record lows in the Eurozone and
the collapse of the oil price. The efficiency of the CEB suffers s because of
these events. The banks started adjusting to the drop in oil prices. The
investors welcomed the announcement of Quantitative Easing by the European
Central Bank. Furthermore, the EU was able to address the issue of deflation.
These contributed to improving the efficiency of the CEB. However, for Non-
CEB, uncertainty regarding the Brexit and terms of a bailout for Greece has
contributed to a slight decline in the efficiency. Moreover, the non-CEB was
not much efficient in handling the issue of deflation. Moreover, the CEB is
still working on maintaining its liquidity after the years of crisis and working
to meet the requirements of the EBA.
Table 2.18 shows the trend of the efficiency in the capital exercise banks
and non-capital exercise banks pre-treatment and post-treatment. There has
been a significant change in the efficiency between the capital exercise bank
and non-capital exercise banks. After the capital exercise, the banks to adjust
their balance sheets and their business model. The difference between the
efficiency between the capital exercise banks and non- capital exercise banks
is because of the inputs and the outputs. After 2011, there was a drop in the
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Table 2.18: This table presents the mean difference change in the efficiency for the capital
exercise banks and non-capital exercise banks pre-treatment and post-treatment.Bootstrap
DEA is used for calculating efficiency scores.Pre-treatment period is 2008-2011.Post-
treatment period is 2012-2015.CEB consists for 46 banks.Non-CEB consists of 148 banks
.The delta is efficiency in difference between Non-CEB and CEB (***statistically significant
at 1% level, **statistically significant at 5% level, *statistically significant at 10% level).
Efficiency Non-CEB CEB Delta
2008-2011 -0.034 -0.037 0.003
2009-2011 0.009 0.078 -0.069
2010-2011 0.024 -0.162 0.184*
2011-2012 0.007 -0.118 0.125**
2011-2013 -0.036 0.037 -0.073**
2011-2014 0.029 -0.024 0.053*
2011-2015 0.002 -0.074 0.076
inputs and outputs for the capital exercise which contributed towards the mean
difference of the capital exercise banks to be lower than non-capital exercise
banks. Furthermore, the other bank characteristics fell for the capital exercise
banks. ROE and NPL for the capital exercise bank reduced while capital
strength increased for the capital exercise bank.
Table 2.18 allows to make comparison with the mean difference change in
the efficiency for capital exercise banks and non-capital exercise banks pre-
treatment and post-treatment. The Global financial crisis hit Europe in 2008.
This crisis hit the CEB banks in terms of efficiency more than the Non-CEB.
The CEB includes the banks with the largest assets. During the crisis, these
banks were hit worse than the Non-CEB. The efficiency of the bank started
improving in the following years for both CEB and Non-CEB. In 2010, the
Sovereign Debt Crisis hits Europe. The CEB suffers badly in terms of efficiency
while the Non-CEB doesn’t suffer. After the capital exercise took place, there
is a change in the efficiency of both CEB and Non-CEB. The mean difference
change in efficiency for the Non-CEB has got worse than it was before the
capital exercise and for the CEB, there was a slight improvement. However,
in the following year, the Non-CEB continues to do worse than the CEB.
In 2014, Greece started causing a panic among the policymakers. Moreover,
inflation had fallen to record lows. This affected the efficiency of the CEB
badly. Furthermore, the EU rebuffed Greece’s Demand for Austerity Relief.
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This led to the efficiency of the CEB suffering more.
2.6.3 Double Bootstrap Truncated Regression Results
– Bank-Level Analysis
Table 2.19: The Double Bootstrap Truncated regression results for the Non-CEB and CEB
before the capital exercise took place. The model controls for bank characteristics.CEB
consists for 46 banks.Non-CEB consists of 148 banks.The period is 2008-2011. QML (Hu-
ber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedac-
ity (***statistically significant at 1% level, **statistically significant at 5% level, *statisti-





















Maximum Likelihood 67.89 40.23
Observations 592 184
Table 2.19 represents the Simar and Wilson (2007)’s Truncated regression
results for Non-CEB and CEB banks before the capital exercise took place.
R- Square is used as one of the indicators for measuring the goodness of fit
for the model. A low R-square shows significant variables and explains little
about the variability. It has been found that a low R-square does not mean
poor explanatory power. The regression model includes both cross-sectional
and time data. If time data is dominant in the panel, R-squared is higher, if
the cross-sectional are dominant in the panel R-squared is low. In this model,
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cross-sectional data is dominant. The number of banks is 148 and the number
of years is 4. Furthermore, this is the time of the period of the financial
crisis. The variability in the data is very high during this period. Therefore,
the R-square is low. Additionally, R-Square could not determine whether the
model is adequate or not. In this study, we conducted the F-test to check the
significance of the model. For the table, the model for Non-CEB, the F-test
has a p-value of .003. This is less than 5%. This shows the model is a better
fit. The model for CEB, the F-test has a p-value of 0.0000. This is less than
5%. This shows that the model is a better fit. Following Pasiouras (2006)
and Pasiouras (2008), QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates
are calculated. This is because heteroskedasticity can emerge when estimated
parameters are used as dependent variables in the second stage analysis.
The regression model for both CEB and Non-CEB fits the data well for
this study. NPL has a negative significant relationship with the efficiency of
both Non- CEB, and CEB. This finding suggests that if the bank is having
a higher non-performing loan, it would be problematic for the banks. In the
past, it has been witnessed that serious banking problems have arisen from the
failure of the banks to recognize impaired assets and create reserves for writing
off these assets. For CEB banks, EQASS exhibits a negative relationship
with bank efficiency. The findings imply that the more efficient banks, use
less equity compared to its peers. The results seem to suggest that the less
efficient banks could have been involved in riskier operations and the process
tends to hold more equity, voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e., the reason might
be banks’ deliberate efforts to increase safety cushions and in turn decrease
the cost of funds or perhaps regulatory pressures that mandate riskier banks
to carry more equity. LOANTA has a significantly negative impact on the
technical efficiency of the bank. This is in line with the findings of Havrylchyk
(2006) who found a negative relationship between LOANTA and efficiency.
This ratio is considered as a proxy for Liquidity risk. Therefore, a negative
relationship could indicate that less efficient banks are also less liquid. ROE
is having a negatively significant impact on the efficiency of the bank. This
finding indicates that the more profitable banks have lower inefficiency. This
corroborates with similar findings of the other studies(Pastor et al., 1997; Das
and Ghosh, 2006). Banks that are reporting higher profitability ratios are
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usually preferred by the clients. Therefore, they attract the biggest share of
deposits along with the best potential creditworthy borrowers. Moreover, this
implies that the banks might be having a higher ROE by either having higher
leverage (debt) or higher risk-taking.
Before Capital Exercise took place, EQASS, NPL, and LOANTA are neg-
atively economic significant on the efficiency for Non-CEB. For CEB, the effi-
ciency could be improved by 1% if NPL is reduced by 0.130%. However, it is
not economically significant. The results indicate that banks were not involved
in careful lending. As careful lending would impacting on the better perfor-
mance of the bank. The efficiency of the banks could have been improved
by getting involved in less risky activities. The results show that the banks
have got involved in riskier activities. Furthermore, the results indicate the
need for the banks to be focusing on credit risk management, which has been
a problematic issue in the past (Kwan et al., 1995; Resti, 1997). The capital
regulations have a significant role to play towards the incentives of the banks
with depositors and other creditors. Additionally, capital regulation would
be contributing to having less non-performing loans. These results reflect the
significance of the need for the introduction of capital exercise.
Table 2.20 represents the regression results after the capital exercise took
place. In this study, the F-test has been used to check the significance of the
model. For the table, the model for Non-CEB, the F-test has a p-value of
0.00000. This is less than 5%. This shows the model is a better fit. The
model for CEB, the F-test has a p-value of 0.0000. This is less than 5%. This
shows that the model is a better fit. The regression model for both CEB and
Non-CEB fits the data well for this study. After the capital exercise, LOGTA
exhibits a significant positive relationship with the technical efficiency of the
bank for CEB. This finding is in line with the findings of Chortareas et al.
(2011). As the size of the bank grows, the bank would be able to have a bigger
portfolio and loan diversification and gain from size advantages. The large
banks would be able more efficient because of the economies of scale. This
would be because two reasons explained by Hauner (2005). Firstly, if it relates
to market power, large banks should pay less for their inputs. Second, there
may be increasing returns to scale through the allocation of fixed costs over a
higher volume of services or from efficiency gains from a specialised workforce.
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Table 2.20: The Truncated regression results for the Non-CEB and CEB after the capital
exercise took place.CEB consists for 46 banks.Non-CEB consists of 148 banks.The period
is 2012-2015.QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to
control for heteroscedacity .(***Statistically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant





















Log Likelihood 98.10 61.32
Observations 592 184
LOANTA has a positive relationship with efficiency for CEB while it has a
negative relationship for Non-CEB. The findings imply that the CEB with
higher loans to asset ratios tend to have higher efficiency scores. The EBA
looks to have made the CEB value loans more highly valued than alternative
bank outputs, i.e. Investments and securities. For non-CEB, the EBA looks
to be trying to make the non-CEB banks be more liquid and trying to be
careful in their lending practices. NPL and ROE have a significant negative
relationship on the technical efficiency for both CEB and Non-CEB. EQASS
exhibits a negative relationship with technical efficiency only for the CEB.
After capital exercise, EQASS and NPL are negatively economic significant
on the efficiency of Non-CEB. For CEB, the efficiency could be improved by
1% if NPL is reduced by 1.23%. This shows NPL is economically significant.
LOANTA is positively economic significant on the efficiency of the banks for
CEB. While ROE is negatively significant on the efficiency of the CEB. The
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results show that capital exercise is influencing the quantity and quality of
lending made by the banks and the decision of the banks when allocating
their asset portfolios. The balance sheet of the bank is getting more inclined
towards liquidity than lower returns portfolios. The capital requirement would
be creating an incentive for the banks to have fewer non-performing loans. The
results are consistent with the findings of Kwan et al. (1995) and Resti (1997)).
Additionally, the results show that the capital exercise has contributed towards
the banks’ incentives of the banks with depositors and other creditors (Barth
et al., 2013b). Furthermore, the results show that capital exercise has been
aimed at reducing higher risk-taking and leverage (debt). The results imply
that the higher capital requirements have contributed to preventing the banks
from getting involved in higher risk-taking. Moreover, the capital requirements
by the EBA would be reducing the likelihood of financial distress.
The bank characteristics have a significant impact on the technical effi-
ciency of the banks.The EBA capital announcement has made the banks con-
sider their activity in the banking sector and to manage their portfolios. As
a result, the banks would be having less likelihood of having financial dis-
tress. The EBA has looked to prevent the banks from potential systemic risk.
The EBA’s capital announcement has contributed towards the banks getting
involved in careful lending practices which would be improving the overall per-
formance and soundness of the banks. Furthermore, The EBA announcement
has contributed towards the bank getting engaged in more profitable activi-
ties. As a result, they would be able to attract the best potential creditworthy
borrowers who would be able to meet the obligations. This could be resulting
in banks having less loan loss. Moreover, these conditions would be creating
an environment for the banks to become more profitable and efficient.
2.7 Conclusion
This study employs Bootstrap data envelopment analysis and Simar and Wil-
son (2007) Truncated regression to examine the impact of the EBA’s capital
exercise on the bank’s technical efficiency. The sample consists of 194 com-
mercials banks operating in 15 European countries from 2008-2015.The results
of the Bootstrap DEA indicate that the average bank in the sample could
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improve its technical efficiency by 49.4%. But, before the announcement, it
was 47.53%. The results indicate that the capital exercise has contributed to
a slight increase in the average bank in the sample for improving its technical
efficiency.
Following the Bootstrap DEA results, Simar and Wilson (2007)’s Bootstrap
Truncated model is used while controlling for the bank-specific characteristics
and country-level characteristics accounting for macroeconomic conditions, fi-
nancial development, and market structure. The capital exercise announce-
ment has led to a change in the bank-specific characteristics which determine
the technical efficiency of the bank. The study found that profitability has a
significant effect on the efficiency of the bank. Banks that are reporting higher
profitability ratios are usually preferred by the clients. Therefore, they attract
the biggest share of deposits along with the best potential creditworthy bor-
rowers. Capital has a significant positive impact on efficiency. By having a
higher capital, the EBA has aimed in improving the confidence of depositors
in the bank’s security. Additionally, it would be creating an environment for
careful lending and better bank performances.
While controlling for the macroeconomic conditions, real GDP growth has
a positive significant impact on the technical efficiency of the bank. As the
economy grows, the debtors would be able to meet their obligations. Also,
the capital, Non-performing loans, ROE, and Loan Activity have a significant
impact on technical efficiency. The banks would be required to hold more
capital than before and have a higher regulatory screening than before.
When controlling for financial development, the activity in the banking
sector and banking market size have a significant and positive relationship
with the efficiency. While Loan Activity and ROE has a negative impact. This
indicates that the activity in the banking sector and its size are significant for
efficiency. The EBA capital announcement has made the banks consider their
activity in the banking sector and to manage their portfolios. As a result, the
banks would be having less likelihood of having financial distress.
While controlling for the market structure, LOANTA, ROE, and NPL has a
negatively significant impact on the efficiency of the bank. The EBA’s capital
announcement has aimed to make the banking market less concentrated. This
would be contributing to having banks less prone to potential systemic risk.
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Furthermore, it would be improving the overall performance of the banks and
the soundness of the banks.
Finally, when controlling for all the factors, GDP growth, activity in the
market, and the market size are affecting the efficiency of the bank positively.
However, LOANTA and CONC have a significantly negative impact on the
efficiency of the bank. The results indicate that the stability of the banks
would improve and the banks would be under less distress. It would be making
them sounder.
For the bank-level analysis, the average efficiency of the capital exercise
banks has been lower than the non-capital exercise banks. After the Capital
Exercise, the capital exercise banks had a drop in their efficiency from 2011 to
2014. This has been because of the impact of the capital exercise as these banks
had to adjust their balance sheets according to the new capital requirements.
After the capital exercise, LOGTA exhibits a significant positive relationship
with the technical efficiency of the bank for CEB. LOANTA has a positive
relationship with efficiency for CEB while it has a negative relationship for
Non-CEB. NPL and ROE have a significant negative relationship with the
technical efficiency for both CEB and Non-CEB. EQASS exhibits a negative
relationship with technical efficiency only for the CEB.
The stricter capital regulations by the EBA would only be improving the
efficiency of the banks if the regulatory screening ability is low. When the cap-
ital regulations are placed, the banks are looking to substitute the loans with
alternative forms of assets. The banks are looking for different asset portfolios
which would be generating better returns and requires the different resources
to be managed. The results indicate that the capital requirement by the EBA
which came as a shock for the banks would be contributing towards making
the banks more stable. It would be preventing banks from excessive risk-taking
activities. Furthermore, it would be allowing the banks to withstand financial
distress. Although, the capital requirements would not be a highly significant
benefit for the efficiency gains. But, it would be creating favourable economic
conditions which would affect the extent, depth, and quality of financial inter-
mediation and banking services.
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Chapter 3
An analysis of Risk measures on
the Cost Efficiency of the Banks.
3.1 Introduction
The financial crisis revealed the problems in the banking sector for supervisors
and other stakeholders in identifying and comparing the bank’s information
across different jurisdictions.The Basel Committee found that there are no
consistent international standards for categorising problem loans.Banks used
different methodologies and assumptions for valuations, provisioning and risk
weightings, increasing opacity, and reducing comparability for end-users (BIS,
2016).At the height of the crisis, this inconsistency increased the uncertainty
in the banking sector.Furthermore,it frustrated supervisors and investors who
tried to compare and assess the bank’s performance and risk.As a result,the
regulators,supervisors,and macroprudential authorities have made joint efforts
for addressing the issue of having enhanced comparability of this terminol-
ogy.This would result in increased harmonisation of practice enabling super-
visors and market participants to have a better understanding of the asset
quality issues.
The definition of Non-Performing Exposures (NPEs) introduces harmonised
criteria for categorising loans and debt securities that are centred on delin-
quency status (90 days past due) or the unlikeliness of repayment (BIS, 2016).It
clarifies the consideration of collateral in categorising assets as non-performing.
This new definition will provide an internationally consistent reference point
for supervisors and banks’ management in identifying levels of NPEs in ab-
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solute and relative terms and facilitate timely action to address rising asset
quality problems.NPEs ratio is defined as the sum of outstanding nonperform-
ing loans, advances, and debt securities divided by all gross carrying amounts
of loans, advances, and debt securities.NPEs is the widest concept as it in-
cludes loans, debt securities, and certain off-balance sheet exposures,but may
exclude certain asset classes, such as foreclosed collateral.
NPEs are considered to be a problem at multiple levels: at the micropru-
dential level, high levels of NPEs are associated with lower profitability and
lower efficiency; at the macroprudential level, high levels of NPEs are connected
with stagnant growth, as capital is tied up in NPEs and there is decreased new
lending into the real economy (EBA, 2017).The high levels of NPEs negatively
affect the resilience of the banking sector to shocks and hence increase systemic
risk.For consumers, an inability to meet the obligations of the credit contract
could have a detrimental impact on their financial situation and social cir-
cumstances.All of these effects must be tackled comprehensively.As a result,
policymakers have increasingly focused on NPEs and aimed at developing a
plan to foster new solutions and tools for addressing this issue.
In the recent crisis, liquidity crunches became too apparent.As a result,
bank liquidity has become an important focus of the financial regulatory re-
forms.Liquidity risk has been recognised as a significant threat to financial
institutions’ management and financial system stability.Generally, banks are
required to maintain a liquidity buffer for managing liquidity risk and to insure
against liquidity shocks.Hong et al. (2014) showed that systematic liquidity risk
was an important contributor to bank failures occurring over 2009–2010 in the
aftermath of the crisis. Furthermore, they found that liquidity risk could lead
to bank failures through systematic and idiosyncratic channels. The theo-
retical predictions of Acharya and Naqvi (2012) and Wagner (2007) on the
implications of short-term liquidity for bank risk-taking and bank stability
suggest that the high levels of asset liquidity could potentially increase bank
risk. Also, it requires further attention because of the significant welfare costs
which risky banks may pose as witnessed in the recent crisis. Deposits shields
the banks from bank run risk. Banks with higher deposits have less funding
liquidity risk which reduces market discipline and leads to higher risk-taking
by banks.Keeley (1990) found that deposit insurance creates a moral hazard
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for excessive risk-taking by banks in response to increase in deposits at the
cost of the deposit insurer.Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013) defined funding
liquidity risk as to the banks’ failure to settle obligations immediately and
measure funding liquidity risk based on banks’ aggressive bidding at central
bank auctions to secure liquidity. Following Khan et al. (2017), this study con-
siders that banks with higher deposits have lower funding liquidity risk because
these banks will have an adequate amount of funds to settle their obligations.
Furthermore, there is a lesser probability of a bank run risk in the presence of
deposit insurance.
This study attempts to fill in the gap by providing evidence on how the
NPEs and Funding Liquidity risk impact on the cost efficiency of the banks.
Using data for banks in 6 different global regions from 2010 to 2018, this study
investigates the impact of the NPEs and Funding Liquidity Risk on the Cost
Efficiency of the banks. NPEs are measured as the sum of outstanding non-
performing loans, advances, and debt securities divided by the gross carrying
amount of loans, advances, and debt securities. Following Acharya and Naqvi
(2012),and Khan et al. (2017),this study consider the amount of deposits rela-
tive to total assets as our proxy for banks’ funding liquidity risk.This is because
deposits protect the banks from run risk. Liquidity Risk is measured as the
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. To conduct a comprehensive analysis of
the effects of NPEs, Funding Liquidity Risk, and Liquidity Risk on the effi-
ciency of the banks. To analyze the role of NPEs and Funding Liquidity Risk
on cost efficiency, the study adopts a heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model
in the estimation. This allows us to specify both the mean and variance of the
inefficiency instability and investigate the non-monotonic effects on efficiency.
This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of NPEs,
Funding Liquidity Risk, and Liquidity Risk on the efficiency of the banks. The
study uses a sample of 2630 banks from 163 countries, which is comprehen-
sive in terms of geographical coverage. Furthermore, this study looks into the
marginal effects of the risk measures on cost efficiency. In addition, the study
investigates the marginal effects on risk measures on cost efficiency over time
and across different regions.
The study focuses on how risk measures affect the level and variability
of the inefficiency effect. The results indicate Funding Liquidity Risk has a
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positive effect on the mean and the variance on the inefficiency effect. This
means a bank with a higher Funding Liquidity Risk will have a lower and more
varied cost efficiency. Liquidity Risk has a significantly positive effect on the
inefficiency effect. This indicates that an increase in Liquidity Risk lowers the
profitability of the bank, which pushes down the cost efficiency of the bank
and increases the fluctuation of the cost efficiency. Additionally, NPEs have a
significantly positive effect on the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect.
The study compares average cost efficiency and marginal effects of the risk
measures on the mean and variance across the groups sorted by the criteria
variables. The criteria variables are risk measures such as Funding Liquidity
Risk, Liquidity Risk, and NPEs. The results indicate that there are non-linear
effects of some of the risk factors such as Funding Liquidity Risk and NPEs on
the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect. However, for Liquidity Risk,
the marginal effects indicate a non-monotonic effect.
The study investigates the effects of the time trends of cost and average
marginal effects on mean and variance over the sample period. The effects of
the risk measures are not consistent over time. For Funding Liquidity Risk, the
marginal effect on the mean is very high in 2011. After 2011, the effect starts
declining until 2016. However, from 2017 onwards, the effect has again started
increasing. The marginal effect shows the negative effect on cost efficiency.
The marginal effect on variance has both a negative and positive effect on cost
efficiency over the years. For Non-Performing Exposures, The marginal effect
on mean has a positive effect on the cost efficiency and the marginal effect on
variance shows inverse U-shape like pattern. For Liquidity Risk, the marginal
effect on mean shows U-shape pattern and on variance has a negative effect
on the cost efficiency.
The study compares the trend pattern of each region’s cost efficiency. The
Cost Efficiency of Africa and Latin America and Caribbean have been lower
than in other regions over time. The average cost efficiency in the United
States and Canada has been declining since 2011. Over the years, the cost
efficiency in the Middle East has deteriorated. Global cost Efficiency has been
decreasing until 2018. The events across the different regions have contributed
to this decline in efficiency. However, in 2018, the global cost efficiency has
increased along with most of the regions witnessing an increase in efficiency.
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To test the endogeneity problem, this study adopts a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test. Funding Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Risk, and Non-Performing Exposures
are treated as endogenous. The identification requires at least three instru-
mental variables, the study selects Deposits, Wholesale Funding, and Non-
Performing Assets. The result of Durbin–Wu–Hausman test does not indicate
that the endogeneity problem is a concern in this study.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an
overview of Non-Performing Exposures, determinants of Non-performing loans,
and a review of studies of bank efficiency using Non-performing loans. Section
3.3 provides an overview of Funding Liquidity Risk. Section 3.4 outlines a
review of cost efficiency, a review of studies that investigate risk and bank effi-
ciency, and a review of studies which analysed Cost Efficiency using Stochastic
Frontier Analysis. Section 3.5 presents the sampling methodology used in this
study. Section 3.6 discusses the results and Section 3.7 concludes the study.
3.2 Non-Performing Exposures
3.2.1 Background
The global financial crisis revealed difficulties for supervisors and other stake-
holders in identifying and comparing the bank’s information across different
jurisdictions. Banks used different methodologies and assumptions for valu-
ations, provisioning, and risk weightings(BIS, 2016). This increased opacity
and reduced comparability for the end-users. At the height of the crisis, this
inconsistency increased which frustrated supervisors and investors who tried
to compare and assess banks’ performance and risk(BIS, 2015). This impeded
the assessment of risks and implementation of solving strategies by the regu-
lators. Furthermore, it contributed to creating concerns in markets about the
asset quality in the banks.
The overall level remains high by historic standards, even though the joint
efforts of banks, supervisors, and macro-prudential authorities have led to a
slow improvement in NPEs ratios over recent years. Among EU member states,
the stock of NPEs is spread unevenly (EBA, 2017). European Banking Au-
thority (EBA) found that the member states experienced above-average NPE
ratios (EBA, 2017). The effects of high levels of NPEs in bank balance sheets
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on funding costs and capital and efficiency among others can seriously jeopar-
dise institutions’ ability to run a viable and sustainable business model. NPEs
are a problem at multiple levels: at micro-prudential level, high levels of NPEs
are associated with lower profitability and lower efficiency; at macro-prudential
level, high levels of NPEs are connected with stagnant growth, as capital is tied
up in NPEs and there is decreased new lending into the real economy (EBA,
2017). In addition, high stocks of NPEs negatively affect the resilience of the
banking sector to shocks and hence increase systemic risk. Finally, for con-
sumers, an inability to meet the obligations of the credit contract could have a
detrimental impact on their financial situation and social circumstances(EBA,
2018). All of these effects must be tackled in a comprehensive manner.
3.2.2 Definition
In particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognised that
there might be significant differences in how banks identify and report their
asset quality (BIS, 2015). There were no consistent international standards
for categorising problem loans. To respond to this issue, the Basel Committee
issued guidelines for non-performing exposures. The definition is built on the
commonalities in the existing definitions of many countries. This would help
to harmonise the quantitative and qualitative criteria used for credit categori-
sation and provide the starting point for countries with no existing definitions
to develop them(BIS, 2015). Furthermore, the definition is designed for su-
pervisory purposes and is not intended to undermine accounting standards,
which drives the accuracy of loan impairments and associated s in published
financial statements (BIS, 2016).
The definition of non-performing exposures introduces harmonised criteria
for categorising loans and debt securities that are centred on delinquency status
(90 days past due) or the unlikeliness of repayment (BIS, 2016). It also clarifies
the consideration of collateral in categorising assets as non-performing. The
definition focuses on a debtor basis but allows the categorisation of exposures
as non-performing on a transaction basis for retail exposures (BIS, 2016). It
introduces clear rules regarding the upgrading of a non-performing exposure
to performing and the interaction between forbearance and non-performing
status. According to the Basel Committee, NPEs should always be categorised
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for the whole exposure, including when non-performance relates to only a part
of the exposure, for instance, unpaid interest (BIS, 2016).
The use of this new definition would allow drawing the same line for all
the institutions between performing and non-performing exposures. Also, it
would compare asset quality homogeneously and comparably across the banks
in different jurisdictions (BIS, 2016). This new definition would be to pro-
vide a key foundation for those countries currently without definition NPEs.
By disclosing the information, it would play a significant role in influencing
market discipline through transparency. NPEs might be used reference points
for regulatory and accounting concepts for promoting comparability for risk-
weighting, provisioning, and credit loss recognition (BIS, 2016). It will improve
discussions about risks and risks tackling strategies in colleges because risk as-
sets will be identified similarly. It will improve the starting point data of the
stress tests.
In practice, Non-performing loans (NPLs) is used as a synonym for NPEs.
The EBA’s definition of NPLs includes nonperforming loans and advances,
while NPEs include debt securities in addition to loans and advances. The term
non-performing assets are frequently used to also include foreclosed assets.
Moreover, off-balance-sheet items are not included in either the NPL ratio or
the NPE ratio. The NPL ratio is defined as the sum of nonperforming loans
and advances divided by total gross loans and advances. The NPE ratio is
defined as the sum of outstanding nonperforming loans, advances, and debt
securities divided by all gross carrying amounts of loans, advances, and debt
securities. NPEs is the widest concept as it includes loans, debt securities,
and certain off-balance sheet exposures, but may exclude certain asset classes,
such as foreclosed collateral.
3.2.3 Determinants of Non-Performing Loans
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) are significant because they reflect the credit
quality of the loan portfolio of the banks. In aggregate terms, NPLs reflect the
credit quality of the loan portfolio of the banking sector in a country. Prior
to the Global Financial Crisis, NPLs were relatively low. However, during
and after the crisis, NPLs increased significantly. This has ignited an interest
in understanding the determinants of NPLs in different regions of the world.
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The studies have ranged from cross-country analysis to country-specific case
studies. The empirical literature on the determinants of NPLs is based on the
theoretical model, which deals with the business cycle with an explicit role for
financial intermediation.
The problems in the banks do not arise from the liability side, but a pro-
longed deterioration in asset quality. This may be from a collapse in real estate
prices or increased bankruptcies in the non-financial sector. In such instances,
a large increase in NPLs would better mark the onset of the crisis. However,
the indicators of NPLs are available only sporadically and made less informa-
tive by bank’s desire to hide their problems for as long as possible.Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010) showed that often banking crises either precede or coincide
with a sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, they found that banking crises are
importantly preceded by rapidly rising private indebtedness.
Macroeconomic Conditions
Nkusu (2011) investigated NPL determinants across 26 developed countries
from 1998 to 2009 period and found that deteriorating macroeconomic condi-
tions such as economic growth and higher unemployment contributed towards
higher NPLs. Further, her results confirmed that adverse macroeconomic de-
velopments especially a contraction of real GDP, a higher unemployment rate,
and higher interest rates are associated with higher levels of NPL. Interest
rates increase can weaken the repayment capacity of the borrower, especially
in the case of a variable contract. Increased debt burden caused by increased
interest rates would lead to higher NPLs. Klein (2013) investigated 16 Cen-
tral, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE) countries over 1998 to 2011
period and found that aggregate NPLs are negatively associated with credit
growth, unemployment, gross domestic product growth rate, and inflation.
Higher inflation can make debt servicing easier by reducing the real value of
the loans. However, it can also reduce the income real income of the borrower
when wages are sticky. Louzis et al. (2012) investigated NPL determinants
in the Greek banking sector and found that NPLs are significantly influenced
by management quality, GDP, unemployment, interest rates, and public debt.
According to the bad management concept, low cost efficiency is considered as
a signal of poor management practices. As a result of poor loan underwriting,
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monitoring, and control, NPLs are likely to increase.Škarica (2014) investi-
gated the NPL determinants for seven countries in the Central and Eastern
European (CEE) region during the third-quarters of 2007 and 2012. She found
that economic slowdown, inflation, and unemployment rate are positively asso-
ciated with NPLs. The convergence of adverse responses in GDP growth and
unemployment leads to a vicious spiral in which the banking system problems
and fall in the economic activity reinforce each other.
Jakub́ık et al. (2013) investigated the determinants of NPLS in 9 CESSE
countries. Using GMM estimations with quarterly data from 2004 to 2012,
they found that real GDP growth and national stock price index are nega-
tively associated with NPLs. Further, they found that a nation’s exchange
rate, private credit-to-GDP and past NPLs contributed towards an increase in
the current period’s NPLs.Beck et al. (2015) investigate the macroeconomic de-
terminants of NPLs across 91 countries and found that NPLs are significantly
affected by real GDP growth, share prices, exchange rate, and lending interest
rate. In normal times, local currency depreciation has a positive income effect
through an increase in net exports. Therefore, it affects the repayment ca-
pacity of the borrowers in an open economy. Currency depreciation can cause
unfavourable effects, in a case; there is a large share of foreign currency in
loans in total loans. The currency depreciation increases the debt servicing
costs for the borrowers who have loans denominated in the foreign currency.
This is because the incomes of the borrowers are in the local currency and they
face more difficulties in paying back their debts.
Dimitrios et al. (2016) focus on the euro-area banking system during the
1990 to 2015 period and found that income tax and output gap significantly
influence NPLs. If a borrower has to pay a higher income tax, his disposable
income will reduce. The output gap has been theorised to incorporate the
potential growth of an economy. As a result, an increase in the output gap
would affect NPLs negatively.Messai and Jouini (2013) investigated the deter-
minants of NPLs in Italy, Greece, and Spain for 2004-2008. They found that
economic growth and bank profitability contributed to the reduction of NPLs
while unemployment rates, real interest rates, and poor credit quality are pos-
itively associated with NPLs. Credit quality reflects the overall attitude of the
banking system to control risks. With poor credit quality, banks have more
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moral hazard incentives by increasing the riskiness of their loan portfolio. This
results in higher NPLS. When a bank increases its real interest rates, imme-
diately, it leads to an increase in NPLs especially for loans with floating rates.
This is because of the impact on the ability of the borrowers to meet their
obligations.Salas and Saurina (2002) investigated the determinants of NPLs in
Spanish Commercial and saving banks. They found loans are more sensitive
to the business cycle in commercial banks than in saving banks. The different
determinants of commercial banks and saving bank NPLs can be explained by
the historical differences between customers of commercial banks and saving
bank and geographical presence of the bank.
Capital
Regarding bank-specific NPL determinants, (Klein, 2013) found that capital
adequacy measured as the equity-to-asset ratio is negatively correlated with
NPLs, implying that banks with relatively low capital have incentives to en-
gage in risky lending behaviour which increases the incidence of NPLs. The
banks with relatively low capital respond to moral hard incentives by increas-
ing the riskiness of their portfolio. This results in higher NPLs. On the other
hand,Boudriga et al. (2009)investigate the cross-country determinants of NPLs
while controlling for the impact of banking supervision and institutional fac-
tors on credit risk exposure. They show that banking sectors with higher
capital adequacy ratios and prudent loan loss provisioning report fewer NPLs.
They showed that countries’ higher NPLs exhibit lower levels of loan loss pro-
visions. This may reflect the attitude toward risk in the banking industry in
the country. Ozili and Thankom (2018) show that European systemic banks,
on average, have fewer NPLs than non-systemic banks because systemic banks
have superior credit risk management systems to mitigate NPLs compared
to non-systemic banks. They also find a negative relationship between bank
provisioning and NPLs for both systemic and non-systemic banks in Europe.
Additionally, Klein (2013) shows that profitable banks have fewer NPLs be-
cause lower NPLs lead to higher interest income which subsequently improves
overall Financial development profitability. Ozili and Outa (2018)investigates
the determinants of banking stability, using NPLs as a stability indicator. Us-
ing data for 48 African countries, Ozili (2018) found that bank efficiency, bank
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concentration, foreign bank presence, unemployment rate and the size of the
banking sector are significant predictors of aggregate NPLs; however, higher
government effectiveness, high competition, and strong legal systems reduced
the persistence of NPLs in the post-financial crisis period. Efficient banks tend
to report fewer NPLs compared to inefficient banks. This implies the countries
with efficient banking systems have fewer NPLs.
Loans
Foos et al. (2010) investigated the U.S., Canada, Japan, and European banks
during 1997-2007. They showed that loan growth contributes to an increase
in loan losses during the next subsequent years. This causes a decline in
both interest income and capital ratio. This is because the borrowers do not
immediately default after they have received a bank loan. If the new loans are
granted at lower rates, the average outstanding loan volumes generate a lower
relative interest income. Additionally, an increase in loan losses may force
a bank to reduce loan growth in the future. Demirgüç-Kunt (1989),Berger
and Udell (1994) and Gorton and Rosen (1995) have further investigated the
relationship between loan growth, non-performing loans and the risk-taking of
banks.
Bank Risk Behaviour
Saunders et al. (1990) found that shareholder controlled banks are inclined
to take greater risks than managerially controlled banks. They find a posi-
tive relationship between managerial stock ownership and risk-taking. This
is because bank managers may be more risk-averse than bank owners. Dem-
setz and Strahan (1997) report a positive and nonlinear relationship between
market risk measures and managerial shareholdings. They also report that
large bank holding companies offset the potential benefits of diversification
through adopting more risky loan portfolios and operating with more leverage.
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) concluded that large banks are internally more
diversified and can reduce idiosyncratic risk. But, they offset these gains by
undertaking riskier activities commercial and industrial lending and increased
leverage. Zhou (2014) shows that the diversification of the income structure
of China’s commercial banks has not significantly reduced banks’ overall risk.
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Diversification of bank income can bring huge profits but it will also bring new
business risk. Non-interest income businesses may bring new operational, mar-
ket, credit, liquidity, and legal risk. When the non-interest income business is
wider, the bank’s operational risk is higher.
According to the bank’s risk preference, Bernanke and Gertler (1986) pointed
out that the impaired loans of banks might induce different bank behaviour.
Jia (2009) shows that lending by joint-equity banks has been more prudent
than lending by state-owned banks in China. This is because the joint-equity
banks tend to have higher excess reserves, higher deposit/loan ratios, and lower
loan/asset ratios. Prudential banks tend to be more cautious when they face
increasing levels of NPLs. As a result, efficient reforms have been carried out
by state-owned banks to become more prudent. However, when the NPL ratio
is too high, both the shareholders and bank managers have incentives to shift
the risk.
Moral hazard is defined as excessive risk-taking when another party is bear-
ing part of the risk and could not be charged easily for or prevented from that
risk-taking.Eisdorfer (2008) reported that the financially distressed firms have
greater risk-shifting behaviour.Koudstaal and van Wijnbergen (2012) exam-
ined the US banks and found that the banks with more troubled loan portfolio
had the greater inclination for banks to take risks.Bruche et al. (2011) showed
that when the banks are facing the threat of bankruptcy, they tend to roll over
the bad loans. This is done in order to increase their chances of recovery. The
regulatory attitude is considered significant as well.Boyd and Graham (1998)
and Nier and Baumann (2006)) argued that the moral hazard problem becomes
more acute when the banks either feel too big to fail due to their big market
power or when they expect to be bailed out in case of insolvency. Soedarmono
and Tarazi (2016) showed that greater market power in the banking industry
could immediately contribute towards higher instability in the banking system
in Asia-Pacific countries. This is because the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation in loan markets worsens entrepreneurial moral hazard to undertake
risky projects to offset higher interest rates charged by banks with higher mar-
ket power. Higher borrower’s risk can in turn negatively affect bank stability
through the risk-shifting mechanism. Also, Kim et al. (2016) showed that an
increase in the market power for the large banks led to an increase in small
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bank’s financial instability in the Asian economies. These studies point out
that the level of NPLs can be an important determinant of bank behaviour,
which can cause them to act differently when facing a higher level of NPLs.
3.2.4 Bank Efficiency using Non-Performing Loans
Banks’ asset quality is considered a significant determinant for bank stability
and efficiency. Numerous researchers have opened about the research question
about the significance of NPLs in bank efficiency analysis. Several studies
support the hypothesis that NPLs have an impact, not only on bank efficiency
but also on bank stability in terms of solvency.Barros et al. (2012) pointed out
that despite knowing the effect of NPLs on bank efficiency, the empirical and
methodological research has been limited in comparison to other fields such as
environmental and energy research. In research, there are studies, which have
treated NPLs as a control variable and then analysed the impact of NPLs on
bank efficiency using a second-stage regression. While there are studies which
have included NPLs as a bad output directly into the production process.
Non-Performing Loans as control variable
Mester (1996) used NPLs as a control variable in a cost function involving a
sample of US banks. This is because a large proportion of NPLs may signal
that banks use fewer resources than usual in their credit evaluation and loan
monitoring process. Besides, NPL is an endogenous risk, which has the biggest
influence on bank efficiency estimates. Their results showed that NPLs have
a significant negative impact on total cost.Berger and Humphrey (1997, p13)
have also found that an increase “in nonperforming loans tend to be followed by
decreases in measured cost efficiency, suggesting that high levels of problem
loans cause banks to increase spending on monitoring, working out, and/or
selling off these loans, and possibly become more diligent in administering the
portion of their existing loan portfolio that is currently performing”. These
findings have been confirmed by the other researchers (Fries and Taci, 2005;
Podpiera and Weill, 2008). NPLs measure management behaviour through
bad luck or bad management hypotheses introduced by Berger and Humphrey
(1997) and Williams (2004).
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Non-Performing Loans in production process
The main limitation of these studies is that they use NPLs as a control variable
instead of an undesirable output that directly affects the production process.
Berg et al. (1992) used the variable ‘loan losses’ as an undesirable output in
the model that measures the quality of loan evaluations. They measure bank
productivity in the Norwegian banking sector by applying the Malmquist in-
dex. The quality of loan evaluations is measured through loan losses that are
used as an additional output in the model.Park and Weber (2006) followed the
same approach and included NPLs directly in the production process. They
used a directional technology distance function on a sample of Korean banks
and treated NPLs as an undesirable by-product output arising from the pro-
duction of loans.Fukuyama and Weber (2008)investigated the efficiency and
shadow prices for NPLs, using a sample of Japanese banks for the period
from 2002 to 2004. They estimated the directional output distance function
by applying DEA and a parametric linear method. They argued that NPLs
should be treated as fixed input because NPLs are a by-product of the loan
production process. They concluded that NPLs should not be ignored in the
efficiency analysis of Japanese banks. Finally,Barros et al. (2012) also showed
that including NPLs in the production process provides bank managers and
regulators with an additional dimension in their decision process. They esti-
mated the technical efficiency by using the Russell directional distance function
that takes into consideration not only desirable outputs but also an undesir-
able output that is represented by NPLs. They found that NPLs caused an
overall increase in inefficiency levels.
Assaf et al. (2013) shows that NPLs have to be incorporated in the produc-
tion process, otherwise the results are biased. For example, when a standard
estimation of bank performance is considered, i.e. without including NPLs
directly in the model, then a high performing bank is not necessarily better
than other banks, as it might be doing that at the expense of producing a high
percentage of undesirable outputs. Thus, a production process must be clearly
defined based on both desirable and undesirable outputs; using only desirable
outputs will fail to credit a bank for its effort to reduce undesirable outputs
Guevara and Maudos (2002). Furthermore, Fujii et al. (2014) used an innova-
tive methodological approach introduced by Chen et al. (2014) and Barros et
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al. (2012), who use a weighted Russell directional distance model (WRDDM)
to measure the technical inefficiency of Indian banks by incorporating NPLs
as an undesirable output. They modify and extend the model by measuring
total factor productivity change. They showed that NPLs cause technological
regress. This is because of the traditional problems faced by Indian banks,
which affect their efficiency and productivity. This includes factors such as
high levels of NPLs, poor restructuring, management failing, and the lack of
market power.
3.3 Bank Liquidity
3.3.1 Role of Liquidity
Banks create liquidity on both sides of their balance sheets by financing long-
term projects with relatively liquid liabilities such as transaction deposits and
short-term funding. The associated exposure to liquidity risk is an essential
characteristic of the bank, which serves as a discipline device and supports
efficiency in the financial intermediation (Vazquez and Federico, 2015). This
means that bank capital entails a cost in terms of liquidity creation. But, it
provides a buffer against changes in the value of bank assets. As a result, in-
creasing the bank’s survival probabilities during distressed market conditions.
The recent crisis has led to the role of bank liquidity greater attention. The
banks were highly reliant on the short-term wholesale funding to finance the
expansion of their balance sheets in the run-up to the crisis. Berger and Bouw-
man (2008) showed that the banking crisis in the U.S. had preceded by periods
of abnormal liquidity creation. Liquidity creation exposes the bank to risk- the
greater the liquidity created, the greater are likelihood and severity of losses
associated with having to dispose of illiquid assets to meet customers’ liquidity
demand. There is evidence, which shows that the banks’ reliance on wholesale
funding had a negative effect on the performance of their stock prices after
the outbreak of the crisis (Vazquez and Federico, 2015). Furthermore, this
contributed to increasing the financial fragility of the banks. This because
of the volatility of bank stock returns or by the likelihood of receiving public
assistance.
90
3. An analysis of Risk measures on the Cost Efficiency of the Banks.
3.3.2 Types of Liquidity Risk
Liquidity risk has been considered as a significant threat to financial institu-
tions and financial system stability. Generally, banks are advised to maintain
a liquidity buffer to protect themselves from liquidity risk and small liquidity
shocks. The academic literature distinguishes the liquidity risks of the finan-
cial system between three types, namely funding liquidity risk, market liquidity
risk, and central bank liquidity risk (Nikolaou, 2009). Funding liquidity risk
refers to the possibility when a bank will be unable to face its current and
future financial obligations because it is unable to get access to the funding.
Therefore, daily operations are negatively impacted. Market liquidity risk
refers to the danger that a bank will be unable to perform a large operation
on the market without influencing the price of the assets sold.If manifested,
the prices of the assets sold by the bank drop rapidly, making the bank in
the end insolvent. Central bank liquidity risk represents the inability of this
institution to supply the liquidity needed to the financial system.
Hong et al. (2014) using the data for U.S. commercial banks over the period
2001-2011 showed that the systematic liquidity risk was a significant contribu-
tor for the bank failures occurring over 2009-2010 in the aftermath of the Global
Financial Crisis. Furthermore, they showed that liquidity risk could contribute
to bank failures through systematic and idiosyncratic channels.Vazquez and
Federico (2015) found that higher funding stability as measured by Net Stable
Funding Ratio(NSFR) featured in the Basel III would be reducing the proba-
bility of bank failures. NSFR reflects the proportion of long long-term illiquid
assets that are funded with liabilities that are either long-term or deemed to
be stable. A higher NSFR is associated with lower liquidity risk because large
weights are assigned to less liquid assets and liabilities. Further, King (2013)
showed that to maintain a higher NSFR, banks would have to pay higher
interest expenses for borrowing more long-term funds. NSFR is designed to
encourage banks to hold more high quality, unencumbered, liquid assets, and
to increase funding from stable sources such as deposits, longer maturity debt,
and equity. This would be to increase the resilience of the banks during a
stressful period. The banks would be having lower profitability during normal
times because holding fewer illiquid assets and more high-quality assets that
cannot be pledged as collateral will lower interest income. Funding assets with
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longer maturity liabilities will increase interest expense. The resulting decline
in net interest income combined with the increase in interest-earning assets
will cause Net Interest Margins to decline.
Funding Liquidity Risk
Funding liquidity risk is negatively related to market liquidity (Drehmann and
Nikolaou, 2013). A drying up of market liquidity depresses the value of assets,
which can be sold to raise funds. This raises the funding liquidity risk of the
banks. Banks are required to hold a certain amount of deposits as their liquid-
ity reserve with the central bank in the form of high-quality liquid assets. Over
time, the funding liquidity levels fluctuate for the banks. Therefore, there are
concerns that high liquidity levels might contribute to the financial crisis(Khan
et al., 2017). In analysing aggregate financial sector liquidity,Adrian and Shin
(2010) noted that to utilise the excess capacity which comes from balance sheet
growth, financial intermediaries will look for potential borrowers even if the
borrowers are not having the resources to repay the loan. Aggregate liquid-
ity can be interpreted as the rate of growth of the aggregate financial sector
balance sheet. Generally, when asset prices increase, financial intermediaries’
balance sheets become stronger and their leverage tends to be low. As a result,
the financial intermediaries hold surplus capital and attempt to find ways to
employ their surplus capital. For utilising this surplus capacity, the balance
sheet must expand. On the liability side, banks take on more short-term debt.
On the asset side, they search for potential borrowers. Aggregate liquidity
is intimately tied to how hard the financial intermediaries search for borrow-
ers (Adrian and Shin, 2010). The sub-prime mortgage crisis is an example
of how aggregate liquidity could cause a crisis.Therefore, the higher levels of
aggregate liquidity could be the cause of the financial crisis.Wagner (2007)
used theoretical models for investigating the relationship between the liquid-
ity of bank assets and banking stability. He found that increased liquidity of
the bank assets reduces banking stability during the financial crisis. However,
this does not take place during normal times. An increase in liquidity within
the banking sector could result from increases in interest rates by changes in
the monetary policy.Lucchetta (2007) showed that the banks took more risk
when risk-free interest rates increased because of greater investment in risk-
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free bonds. This contributes to an increase in liquidity supply in the interbank
market and encouraging more interbank lending. Additionally, the increased
liquidity supply boosts other bank’s investment in risk assets. Therefore, both
the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that banks’ funding liquidity
risk is closely related to bank risk-taking.
Diamond and Rajan (2005) building on the model developed in Diamond
and Rajan (2001) explained that if there are too many distressed economic
projects funded by loans the bank cannot meet the depositor’s demand. If
these assets deteriorate in value, more and more deposits will start claiming
their money. The main result is that higher credit risk accompanies higher liq-
uidity risk through depositors’ demand. Rollover risk arises when pre-existing
debt obligations become due and the resulting liquidity needs are potentially
unmet. The reliance on short-term liabilities by requiring a continuous rollover
of expiring debt is by itself responsible for exposing financial institutions to
higher default risk.Acharya and Viswanathan’s(2011) model is based on the
assumption that the financial firms raise debt that has to be rolled over con-
stantly. This is used to finance assets. They showed that more debt in the
banking system results in higher bank run risk. During the crisis, when asset
prices deteriorate, the banks find it very difficult to roll over the debt because
of the liquidity problem.He and Xiong (2012) focussed on the debt rollover
risk. They stated that the debt maturities of lenders on short-term debt are
spread across time and rolled over to avoid bank-run risk if all debt contracts
expire at the same time. They derived an equilibrium in which each lender
will not roll over the debt contract if the fundamental asset value falls below a
certain threshold. They found that lenders are more likely to run if the asset
values decrease. During the crisis, the asset price volatility tends to spike; the
rising volatility is an important source of instability in the financial firms.
The Global Financial Crisis showed the distrust between banks, which was
largely driven by credit, risks in their portfolio. This could cause a freeze
in the market for liquidity. Therefore, regulators and central banks had to
intervene to prevent the collapsing of the financial system.Imbierowicz and
Rauch (2014) using US commercial banks data during the period 1998-2010 to
investigate the relationship between Liquidity Risk and Credit Risk and how
this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default. They found that
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both Liquidity Risk and Credit Risk have a strong influence on the bank’s
default risk. They showed that joint management of liquidity risk and credit
risk in a bank could increase bank stability. A bank facing a default has two
options: First, to continue running the failed business model until the point of
default is reached or second, to engage in a high-risk business, which carries
great rewards but also great risks. The risks are negligible because without the
high-risk business activity the bank would very likely face elimination anyway.
The only thing saving the bank from failure is an improbable but potentially
very high payoff from the risky business. As a result, banks increase their
liquidity risks and credit risks jointly in a last effort to avoid default. During
the recent crisis, distressed banks might have engaged in this practice.
Ghenimi et al. (2017) using a sample of 49 banks operating in the MENA
region over the period 2006-2013 to analyse the relationship between credit risk
and liquidity risk and its impact on bank stability. They found both liquidity
risk and credit risk separately influence bank stability and their interaction
contributes towards the bank instability. Especially, the effect of liquidity risk
is harmful to the stability of banks when the credit risk is high, and vice
versa. Also, banks with lower liquidity risk relative to the ones with higher
liquidity risk charge higher banking stability as their credit risk increases. This
is because sufficient liquidity enables these banks to maintain their stability. If
the interaction between liquidity risk and credit risk were negative, this would
decrease the banking stability during the financial and economic crisis because,
during the crisis, banks are subject to higher loan rates. Therefore, exposed to
larger credit risk.Gorton and Metrick (2012)showed how a bank run based on
the investor panic happened in modern-day securitized banking, as opposed
to bank runs in traditional banking. Their evidence suggested that in the
recent Global Financial Crisis perceived credit risk in the form of subprime
loans caused refinancing rates and funding haircuts in the interbank market
to increase substantially.
94
3. An analysis of Risk measures on the Cost Efficiency of the Banks.
3.4 Efficiency
3.4.1 Cost Efficiency
According to Andries and Ursu (2016), the term efficiency for banks means im-
proved profitability, the greater amount of funds channelled in, better prices
and services quality for consumers, and greater safety in terms of improved
capital buffer in absorbing risk. Bank efficiency is measured by a bank’s abil-
ity to convert its inputs into output while maximising profits or minimizing
costs (Belke et al., 2016). A bank would be considered inefficient if it is using
numerous inputs or allocating inputs in the wrong proportions. This mea-
surement of efficiency is least affected by endogeneity criticism than financial
volume measures due to the bank’s ability to covert its inputs should influence
growth independently of whether the economy is growing fast or slowly (Belke
et al., 2016). An efficient bank should be looking to support the growth of an
economy by carefully choosing the optimal projects for funding and assigning
the optimal costs with the risks at the same time (Belke et al., 2016). It is
significant for banks to prove their efficiency and increase their performance
to remain competitive in today’s competitive environment. Improving effi-
ciency is significant for the banks because efficiency has a direct impact on the
performance and profitability of the bank( (Xu et al., 2015).
The deepening of the recent crisis and continued banking fragilities led to
banks requiring state support arrangements. This contributed to creating the
need for a reassessment of the banking systems’ performances. The research
on the performance of the financial institutions has focused especially on the
frontier efficiency (Andries and Ursu, 2016). The frontier efficiency measures
the performance deviations of some companies from the efficiency frontier,
which is already, made using the best practices. Additionally, it measures how
efficient the financial institution is compared to the most efficient institutions
on the market. The frontier efficiency quantifies the cost efficiency of finan-
cial institutions with greater precision than financial rates(Andries and Ursu,
2016). The information obtained can be used to guide the government policy
by assessing the effects of deregulation, mergers, or market structure on effi-
ciency, and to improve managerial performance by identifying best and worst
practices associated with high and low measured efficiency. For banks, effi-
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ciency implies improved profitability, the greater amount of funds channelled
in, better prices and services quality for consumers and greater safety in terms
of improved capital buffer in absorbing risk.
Allocative efficiency refers to the ability of the bank to use the optimum
mix of inputs given their respective prices. Cost Efficiency is the product
of Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency. Cost Efficiency shows the
ability of the bank to provide services by optimum use of the resources at
its disposal. Allocative Efficiency or Technical Efficiency provides guidance
for the bank to become more cost efficient and helps in reducing the wastage
of the resources. Cost Efficiency helps in indicating how close a bank’s cost
is to that a best practice bank’s cost would be producing the same outputs
under the same conditions (Pasiouras et al., 2009). Therefore, Cost efficiency
is considered as a wider concept than technical efficiency. Cost Efficiency refers
to both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.
3.4.2 Risk and Efficiency
A risk-averse bank may choose to fund its loans with a higher ratio of financial
capital-to-deposits than a risk-neutral bank. This is because financial capital is
usually more expensive than deposits. This could make one conclude that risk-
averse bank produces its output in an allocative inefficient manner (Sun and
Chang, 2011). However, it is actually the risk-preferences, which differ. For
controlling these differences in the risk-preferences,Mester (1996) asserts that
the level of financial capital to be included in the cost function. This is because
the risk-averse bank could still be characterised as minimising cost, given the
level of financial capital. Also, the financial capital should be accounted for in
the cost function because the cost-minimisation does not fully explain a bank’s
capital level. For example, the regulators set minimum capital-to assets ratios,
and banks may be risk-averse.
Altunbas et al. (2000) investigated the impact of risk and quality factors on
bank efficiency for the banks in Japan between 1993 and 1996. For controlling
the risk, they use loan loss provisions and financial capital. They found that
the optimal bank size is considerably smaller when risk and quality factors
are taken into account when modelling for the cost characteristics of Japanese
banks. Further, they found that the level of financial capital has the largest in-
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fluence on the scale efficiency estimates. During the period of study, Japanese
banks experienced a decline in their capital strength whereas the changes in
loan loss provisions were modest. The financial capital has the biggest in-
fluence on determining optimal bank size.Iannotta et al. (2007) compare the
performance and risk of a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European coun-
tries over the 1999-2004 period and evaluate the impact of ownership models
on their profitability, cost efficiency, and risk. They show that the public sec-
tor banks are less profitable and have higher insolvency risk than privately
owned banks. The public sector banks poorer loan quality. This result is
consistent with the existence of conjectural or explicit government guarantees
which allow these banks to avoid indirect costs – in terms of capital markets
effects – of their poorer asset quality and less profitable intermediation activ-
ity. Furthermore, they showed that mutual banks have better loan quality and
lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks. The mutual banks
enjoy more favourable customer relationships which also explains their lower
operating costs.
Gonzalez (2005) investigated the impact of bank regulation on bank char-
ter value and risk-taking for 36 counties over 1995-1999. He used the ratio
of non-performing loans to total bank loans as a measure for the credit risk
and measures overall risk with the standard deviation of daily bank stock
returns. He found that regulatory restrictions increase banks’ risk-taking in-
centives by reducing their charter value. The higher charter value of banks in
countries with fewer regulations may increase the incentives for these banks to
act more prudently. Therefore, more lax regulation could be associated with
greater stability of the banking system.Chiu and Chen (2009) investigated the
bank efficiency in Taiwan for 29 banks from 2002 to 2004. They not only
incorporate credit risk but also, market and operational risk factors such as
the foreign exchange rate, the interest rate, and the economic growth. They
found that the influence of external environmental risk to be the largest for the
privately-owned banks when compared with the publicly-owned banks. The
performance of the publicly-owned bank is better than privately owned banks
because publicly-owned banks have operated over a long period of time and
have more trust from their customers.
In the existing literature, there are only a few studies which examined
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how ROA’s(Return on Asset’s) volatility affects the bank efficiency.Berger and
Humphrey (1997) using the data on the US banks for the period 1990-1995.
They found that the standard deviation of ROA is negatively associated with
the cost efficiency of the bank. Furthermore, they found a similar relation-
ship between the standard deviation of Return on Equity (ROE) and the cost
efficiency of the bank. This may provide evidence on the extent to which
the measured cost inefficiencies incorporate the differences in product quality.
In a competitive market, the differences in product quality are rewarded with
higher revenues which covers the costs, the alternative profit inefficiency essen-
tially just improves on cost efficiency by offsetting the extra costs of producing
higher quality with higher revenues. However, some of the recent studies us-
ing the international data found some contradicting results than the earlier
findings for the U.S. Isik and Hassan (2002) using the data on the banks in
Turkey over 1988-1996 period found that the standard deviation of ROE to be
positively related to the cost efficiency of banks. Similarly,Havrylchyk (2006)
investigated the efficiency of the Polish banking industry between 1997 and
2001. She showed that the volatility of ROA significantly affects the cost ef-
ficiency of the bank positively. Furthermore, she found a positive correlation
between ROA and the variance of ROA. This indicates that riskier banks to
be not only more efficient but also more profitable on average. If there is a
trade-off between risk and efficiency, then banks that are poor at operations
might also be poor at risk management. Also, inefficient banks tend to hold
higher risk in stock returns. This means that the inefficient bank’s stock tends
to underperform than their more efficient counterparts.
Fiordelisi et al. (2011) investigated the intertemporal relationship between
bank efficiency, capital, and risk in a sample of European commercial banks for
the period 1995 to 2007. They found that bank capital precedes cost efficiency
improvements. Further, they suggest that moral hazard incentives are reduced
for the banks because of an increase in the bank capital. This indicates that
better-capitalized banks are more likely to reduce their costs compared to less-
capitalized banks.Chortareas et al. (2011) examined the dynamics between
financial frictions, efficiency, and risk for Eurozone’s commercial banks from
1999 to 2004. They found that deposit insurance schemes could contribute to
reducing bank risk and promote competition among banks. Therefore, it would
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be improving the efficiency in the banking industry. This is consistent with
the agency cost hypothesis that higher capital ratios and deposit insurance
coverage are associated with higher efficiency. The higher levels of capital
ratios may prevent moral hazard and alleviate informational frictions, leading
to more efficient financial institutions. The higher capital creates an incentive
for the shareholders to monitor the managers. The higher deposit coverage
limit protects small depositors who lack the resources to evaluate the soundness
of banks and enhance rivalry by allowing small banks to compete for depositors
with their larger counterparts. As a result, a higher deposit coverage limit
would stabilize the banking sector by reducing the risk of bank runs. This
would enhance the efficiency of the banks.
3.4.3 Bank Cost Efficiency using Stochastic Frontier Anal-
ysis
For measuring the efficiency in the banking sector, there are two prevailing
techniques:- the Non-parametric method and the parametric method. Data
Envelopment Analysis(DEA ) is one of the non-parametric techniques. Stochas-
tic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is a parametric method. In the Banking sector,
Stochastic Frontier Analysis(SFA) is used to estimate the cost efficiency of the
banks.
Yeh (2011) investigated the cost efficiency of the banks in Taiwan using
SFA over the period 1999-2000. The results showed the average cost efficiency
was 72.69%, which is inefficient. It was found that the banks in Taiwan en-
gaged in mergers to improve their efficiency. In addition, it was found that
the main positive determinants were debt ratio.Shamsuddin and Xiang (2012)
investigated the efficiency of the Australian Banks using SFA for the period
1995-2008. They found that the cost efficiency improved in large and small
banks. Additionally, the larger banks were found to be more cost efficient than
smaller banks.
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) investigated the cost efficiency in the bank-
ing sectors of Central and Eastern Europe for the period 1993-2000. The sam-
ple consisted of 325 banks. Using SFA, they found the cost efficiency to be
77%. According to cost efficiency’s determinants, size, capitalisation, loans,
foreign ownership and GDP supported efficiency positively and significantly
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whereas, loan loss reserves decreased efficiency.Fries and Taci (2005) investi-
gated the cost efficiency of banks in 15 Eastern European countries during
the period 1994-2001. Using SFA, their results indicated that the overall cost
efficiency of the banks was low. The highest average cost efficiency was found
to be in Estonian banks and the lowest in Romanian banks. Also, they found
the private banks to be more efficient than state-owned banks due to deregula-
tion. They concluded that for improving the efficiency, the banks had to take
a position of competition against the European Union countries and the banks
to reduce their costs and raise their profits through planned strategies and
policies. Turk Ariss (2008) explored the cost efficiency of Lebanese commer-
cial banks during the period 1990-2001 using SFA. He found that from 1996
to 2001 banks were more efficient because of more liberalisation such as dereg-
ulation. The average cost efficiency for the period of 1996-2001 was 97.06% ,
whereas, for 1990-1995, it was 85.33%. This shows that banks improved their
cost efficiency during the period of the study. The average cost efficiency was
found to be relatively low due to the war in the country.
Using SFA,Vu and Turnell (2011) analysed the cost efficiency of Australian
banks for the period 1997-2009. They divided their study into two periods, pre-
global financial crisis from 1997-2006 and during the global financial crisis from
2007-2009. They found major banks to be more cost efficient than the regional
banks. Before the global financial crisis, the major banks’ cost efficiency score
was 69.1% whereas regional banks scored 72.3%. During the global financial
crisis, the cost efficiency score for major banks was 70.1% and for regional
banks was 68.6%. The results indicated that banks with lower size and capital
to be more efficient. They found that profitability ratios such as Return on
Equity and Net Interest Margins had a negative relation with the efficiency.
Additionally, non-interest expenses affected cost efficiency negatively.
Holló et al. (2006) investigated the cost efficiency of the banks in 25 EU
member states from 1999 till 2003. They reported the efficiency scores gener-
ated by both the controlled and uncontrolled models. The uncontrolled model
contains only inputs and outputs whereas the controlled model is expanded
with the country-specific variables such as inflation, depth of financial inter-
mediation, market concentration, level of liberalisation, and banking reform.
In the controlled model, the variation in average bank efficiency across the
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countries diminishes and efficiency scores are higher. However, the relative
efficiency rankings of the countries do not change much between the controlled
and the uncontrolled models.
Numerous studies have included the time effects in the estimation of the
cost efficiency frontier. These studies have found a positive and significant
increase in the efficiency over time for the overall sample of the banks. Weill
(2007) compared the efficiency of the bank from Western European countries
and Central and Eastern European countries to assess the performance gap
between both groups of banks. He measured the cost efficiency of a sample of
955 banks from 17 European countries with SFA. The results show that the
efficiency improved between 1996 and 2000 for the banks in Eastern European
countries. The efficiency improved for all the countries in the sample. However,
the increase in efficiency was higher for banks in Eastern European countries
than the banks in Western European countries. In addition, the efficiency gap
increased for the banks in Poland and Slovenia.Kasman and Yildirim (2006)
analysed the cost efficiency of commercial banks in eight Central and Eastern
European countries that became new members of the European Union over
the period 1995-2002. They found that the average estimated cost efficiency
scores do not fluctuate much during the sample period, reaching the minimum
in 2001 (18.5%) and the maximum in 1998 (21.7%). Additionally, there is not
any uniform trend in the evolution of efficiency in individuals. As the cost in-
efficiency seems to have upward trends in Hungary and Slovak Republic, while
it has a downward trend in Latvia. For the other countries there does not seem
to be any clear trend in the efficiency scores over the analysed period.Pasiouras
et al. (2009) used SFA to investigate the impact of regulatory and supervision
framework on the cost efficiency of banks in 74 countries during the period
2000-2004. They found the overall mean cost efficiency to be 0.8789. This
means that the average bank could reduce its costs by 12.11%. Over the esti-
mation period, the efficiency scores decreased each successive year from 0.8899
in 2000 to 0.8685 in 2004.
Goddard et al. (2014) analysed the cost efficiency for Latin American banks
between 1985 and 2010. The results indicate that the average cost efficiency
to have deteriorated between 1985-1993 and 1994-2004. This was noticeable,
especially for the state-owned banks. Prior to 2006, Latin America witnessed
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a widespread foreign bank expansion. This reflects an improved operating
environment. As a result, the cost efficiency improved throughout this pe-
riod. Using SFA, Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010) explored the relevance of
non-traditional activities in the estimation of the bank efficiency for 752 com-
mercial banks from 87 countries for the period 1999-2006. They found that
the inclusion of non-traditional activities does not significantly influence the
directional impact of environmental conditions on cost inefficiency. However,
environmental factors lead to higher efficiency when non-traditional activities
are taken into consideration. Also, they found that regulatory conditions that
enhance banking supervision and monitoring, and regulations that restrict
bank activities, generally contribute to improvement in bank efficiency.
Sun and Chang (2011) employed a heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model
for estimating the cost efficiency of banks in eight emerging Asian countries
for the period 1998-2008. Using the heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model
allows us to investigate the non-monotonic effects on efficiency. They found
the effect of interest rate volatility on the banks of Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand to have a non-monotonic pattern. Except for Indonesia and Taiwan,
they found an upward trend for the cost efficiency over the years for most
emerging Asian countries. This showed that these countries have gradually
reformed their banking sector since the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. The
most volatile cost efficiency among the eight countries was in Indonesia. This
may be the result of the highest interest rate change/volatility and exchange
rate change. Additionally, they found that the marginal effect of risk measures
such as Credit Risk, Market Risk, and Operation Risk is not consistent over
time. The marginal effect of credit risk maintained a high level for pre-2001
and presented a downturn in 2001-2006. After 2006, this effect increased again.
As a result, the negative effect on cost efficiency became a serious concern. The
other risk measures negatively affect cost efficiency.
3.5 Methodology
3.5.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
In this study, Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is deployed to measure the
efficiency of the banks. The possible reasons for choosing SFA over Data En-
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velopment Analysis (DEA) are many. Firstly, DEA does not assume statistical
noise. This means that the error term in the estimation is attributed to in-
efficiency. Hence, DEA accounts for the influence of factors such as regional
price differences, luck, bad data, and extreme observations such as inefficiency.
Secondly, the efficiency scores measured by DEA in small samples is sensitive
to the difference between the number of firms and the sum of inputs and out-
puts used. Another distinction between these two methods is the assumption
of some clearly defined production technology – i.e. a parametric production
function. In contrast to DEA, SFA relies on this assumption of the production
to be utilized in the analysis of the data, while DEA avoids defining an ex-
plicit production function. This contributes to a different interpretation of the
results from these methods. SFA estimates the parameters of the production
function itself, whereas DEA estimates the convex hull of the technology set
as the minimal enveloping frontier.
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977) independently
proposed the stochastic frontier approach. It modifies the traditional assump-
tion of a deterministic production frontier. Both these studies specified a com-
posed error with two components:- a one-sided error that measures the non-
negative inefficiency effects and random factors not controlled by the decision-
making unit (DMU). Some studies extend SFA to investigate the determinants
of inefficiency among DMUs. These studies assumed that inefficiency effects
are a function of some DMU-specific factors Battese and Coelli (1995). The re-
cent efforts modelling heteroscedasticity in inefficiency effects(µit) considered a
model flexible specification in two ways. Kumbhakar et al. (1991) assumes that
the mode of µjt (i.e.,µit) differs among DMUs.Caudill et al. (1995) assumed




The single equation stochastic model can be given as
TCit = f(Yit, Pit) + εit (3.1)
where observed total cost for the ith bank in year t is represented by TCit
, Yit is a vector of outputs, and Pit is an input price vector.
Following Aigner et al. (1977),we assume that the error of the cost function
is
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ε = µ+ ν (3.2)
where µ and ν are independently distributed.µ is usually assumed to be
distributed as half-normal, that is, a one-sided positive disturbance capturing
the effects of inefficiency, and ν is assumed to be distributed as two-sided
normal with zero mean and variance σ2, capturing the effects of the statistical
noise.
Wang (2002) combines the feature of the traditional models and those
extended models above and allows both µit and σit to be observation specific.
Suppose that total cost for the ith bank in year t are represented by TCit ,
Yit is a vector of outputs and Pit is an input price vector. The heteroscedastic
stochastic frontier model specification for the cost function can be presented
as below : -
TCit = f(Yit, Pit) + µit + νit (3.3)
νit ∼ N(0, σ2it) (3.4)
µit ∼ N+(µit, σ2it) (3.5)
µit = δ0 + Zitδ (3.6)
σ2it = exp(γ0 + Zitγ) (3.7)
where νit is the stochastic error term with i.i.d. normal distribution. This
model assumes µit has a truncated normal distribution with an observation-
specific mean (µit) and variance (σ
2
it) of its pre-truncated distribution. In this
setup, µitt is the inefficiency effect, which is a non-negative truncation of a
normal random variable. The variable vector Zit includes a constant of 1 and
some other exogenous variables associated with the inefficiency. The γ and δ
are the corresponding coefficient vectors.The heteroscedastic stochastic frontier
model assumes µit and σ
2
it are a function of some determinants(Zit).Lai and
Huang (2010) illustrated that this general setting in Wang’s(2002) model is
the best specification among eight well-known stochastic frontier models.
In this study, we specify a multi-product translog cost function and estimate
:
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+ ΣmΣnαmnIn ymitIn wnit + ΣmαmtIn ymitt
+ ΣnαntIn wnitt+ εit(νit + µit)
(3.8)
where Cit is the total cost of bank i, ymit is m-th output, wnit is the n-th
input price , t is the time trend and α0 is an intercept accounting for all other
cost determinants.. The components of composite error term, εit (νit + µit),
µit captures the cost inefficiency and νit is a random error.
The use of duality implies the necessity to impose the following homogene-
ity restrictions :
ΣNn=1βn = 1 (3.9)
As in Lang and Welzel (1996), in this study, we normalise total costs and
input prices by the price of labour. We estimate firm-specific efficiency scores
as the conditional expectation of µit given by εit (Jondrow et al., 1982).




It takes on the values between 0 and 1, where the latter indicates a fully
efficiency bank. The value indicates the percentage of observed costs that
would have been sufficient to produce the observed output if the bank was
fully efficient.
A special feature in Wang’s 2002 model is that it allows the determinants
(Zit) to have non-monotonic effects on the inefficiency effect (µit). By non-
monotonic effects, it means that Zit can have both positive and negative ef-
fects on the efficiency and that the sign of the effect depends on the values of
Zit. The traditional SFA models implicitly assume that the determinants have
strictly increasing or decreasing effects on the inefficiency effect. In Wang’s
(2002) model,Zit can positively(negatively) affect the mean and variance of the
inefficiency effect when values of Zit are within a certain range, and then turn
negative (positive) for values of Zit outside the range. Such non-monotonic
effects are measured by the marginal effects. The ability to accommodate
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non-monotonic effects is significant for models seeking to understand the rela-
tionships between efficiency and exogenous factors. This is because many of
the relationships between economic variables are indeed non-monotonic.
To demonstrate non-monotonicity, our strategy is to show that the marginal
effect of Z(k) on E(µit) and/or V(µit) can be both positive and negative in the
sample. If the signs can alternate in the sample, then this implies that the
impacts of Z(k) can go in both directions. The first two moments of the mean
and the variance of µit as follows :












where ∧ = µit
σit
, and φ and Φ are the probability and cumulative density
functions of a standard normal distribution, respectively.
Taking into account the parameterization functions (3.6)and (3.7), the non-
















where ∧ = muit
σit
, and φ and Φ are the probability and cumulative density
functions of a standard normal distribution, respectively.z[j] is the jth element
of Zit , and δ[j] and γ[j] are the corresponding coefficients in the equation
(3.6)and (3.7). The equation shows that the marginal effect is the sum of the
adjusted slope coefficients from the mean and the variance functions.























where m1 and m2 are the first two moments given in (3.11)and(3.12) ,
respectively. The marginal effect is the sum of the adjusted slope coefficients.
Based on a result from Barrow et al. (1954),Bera and Sharma (1999) state
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that m21−m2 > 0 . For the models with constant σ2it , the effect of z[j] is again
monotonic , and the effect can be non-monotonic when σ2it is parameterized.
3.5.2 Data and Variables
The recent financial crisis highlighted the problems in the banking system. The
commercial banks plays a significant role in the banking system. Furthermore,
the commercial banks are an important part of the economy.This is because
they not only do they provide consumers with an essential service, but they
also help create capital and liquidity in the market.Commercial banks play
a role in the creation of credit, which leads to an increase in production,
employment, and consumer spending.As a result, boosting the economy.The
commercial banks are heavily regulated by the regulators. Therefore,the focus
of this study is on commercial banks. This would allow examining a more
homogeneous sample in terms of services and consequently inputs and outputs
enhancing further the comparability among countries. Additionally, it will
allow to examine how the risk measures impact on the cost efficiency of the
banks because the efficiency of the commercial bank is essential for banks
stability.
The financial data for the banks is available from Market Intelligence for
the period 2010-2018.The banks are excluded from the sample if they had no
data available for any of the years.During the above procedure, we select the
consolidated data only. The reports prepared under International Financial
Reporting Standards are used where available, but if only reports prepared
under local generally accepted accounting principles are available, then it is
used. All the data was converted to the Euro prior to downloading, using
official exchange rates available in Market Intelligence. The sample consists of
2630 banks in 147 countries.
The sample is subdivided into six groups.The subdivision of the bank is
based on the geographical region of the bank. The six groups based on the
geographical region are - Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Middle
East, and the United States and Canada. This classification is done by Market
Intelligence based on the geographical region of the bank.In the final sample,the
study has 2630 banks from 147 countries across the six regions for the period
2010-2018.
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The review of the cross-country studies indicates that the intermediation
approach is most commonly used. This is consistent with the modern empiri-
cal literature of studies which examines individual countries. Following these
studies, the intermediation approach is adopted. The model is estimated us-
ing 4 outputs and 2 input prices. The output variables are specified as Total
Loans, Other Earning assets, Total Deposits, and Liquid Assets. The Other
Earning Assets comprises of advances to banks, derivatives, and other securi-
ties. In the literature, the quality of loans has received a lot of attention in
recent years. Therefore, loan loss provisions are subtracted from total loans
in order to ensure that this output entails comparable quality (Havrylchyk,
2006).Accordingly, input prices are defined as follows. Price of funds (PF)
defined by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits; the Price of labour
(PL) measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total employees. The
total costs of each bank consist of interest expenses and non-interest expenses.
These variables have been used in the previous literature, such as Berger et
al. (2009) ,Altunbas et al. (2001), Lensink et al. (2008) and Sun and Chang
(2011)Sun and Chang(2011).
Table 3.1: Description of Output ,Input Prices and Total Cost Variables.These variables are
used in SFA.Output variables are:-Loans,Other Earning Assets,Total Deposits and Liquid
Assets.Input Prices are Price of funds and Price of Labour.
Variables Description Remarks
Loans Gross Loans – Loan Loss Provisions Total Loans
OEA Advances to banks, Derivatives and other securities Other Earning Assets
TD Total Deposits Total Deposits
LA Total Liquid Assets Total Liquid Assets
PF Total interest expenses / Total deposits Price of Funds
PL Personnel Expenses / Total Employees Price of Labour
TC Interest Expenses + Non-Interest Expenses Total Costs
In this study, we look into the relationship between the bank’s cost ef-
ficiency and different risk sets such as Non-Performing Exposures, Liquid-
ity Risk, and Funding Liquidity Risk. The ratio of Non-Performing Expo-
sure(NPE) is measured as the sum of outstanding non-performing loans, ad-
vances, and debt securities divided by the gross carrying amount of loans,
advances, and debt securities. The Liquidity Risk(LIQ) is measured as the
ratio of the liquid assets to total assets. The Funding Liquidity Risk(FLIQ) is
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measured as the ratio of total deposits to total assets (Khan et al., 2017).
Table 3.2: Description of the Risk Variables.These variables are used in SFA.The risk vari-


















Table 3.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cost
function. On average, Asia-Pacific, and the United States and Canada have
the highest loans while Africa, and the Middle East have the lowest loans.
However, Europe has one of the maximum amounts of loans after Asia-Pacific.
On average, only Africa and Latin America have Other Earning Assets more
than the average of all the global regions combined. On average, only Asia-
Pacific and the United States and Canada have a maximum amount of Deposits
and Liquid Assets which is greater than the average of all the global regions
combined. The price of funds is highest in Latin America and the Caribbean
whereas Europe and Asia –Pacific have the least. This reflects the inflation
issue, which has been an on-going issue in Latin America. The United States
and Canada on average are most expensive in terms of labour. This is higher
than the average of all the global regions combined. While Africa and Latin
America and Pacific are least expensive in terms of labour on average. On
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used in the cost function.SFA is used for
calculating efficiency.Output variables are:-Loans,Other Earning Assets,Total Deposits and
Liquid Assets.Input Prices are Price of funds and Price of Labour.TC is Total Cost.The
sample period is 2010-2018.The sample consists of 2630 banks.Reported statisitcs are:-
mean,standard deviation,minimum and maximum. Reported figures are in emillions.
Global Region Variable Loans OEA TD LA PF PL TC
Africa Mean 2511.525 9857.054 2660.201 111000 0.000 0.005 4240.298
Std. Dev. 9367.182 63100 9118.062 484000 0.000 0.020 18500
Min 0.000 0.000 0.001 112.351 0.000 0.000 0.001
Max 65400 703000 71400 6610000 0.000 0.134 193000
Asia-Pacific Mean 27400 3265.144 35200 1730000 0.000 0.009 29200
Std. Dev. 112000 15500 145000 7520000 0.000 0.042 351000
Min 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 1410000 197000 2070000 80100000 0.000 0.465 9820000
Europe Mean 10500 3345.054 8880.119 678000 0.000 0.009 54200
Std. Dev. 50900 25800 47300 5280000 0.000 0.062 3430000
Min 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 873000 515000 778000 113000000 0.000 1541.114 266000000
Latin America and Caribbean Mean 8852.955 4026.052 13000 755000 0.000 0.004 3002.489
Std. Dev. 33900 25400 101000 6940000 3.277 0.012 21600
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 634000 416000 2340000 177000000 0.089 0.058 502000
Middle East Mean 7044.080 2397.713 8571.931 320000 0.000 0.006 15000
Std. Dev. 14100 7936.894 15700 531000 0.000 0.040 260000
Min 0.011 0.000 0.004 4930.093 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 138000 104000 134000 3450000 0.000 0.370 5960000
United States and Canada Mean 18700 3052.341 23200 990000 0.000 560.279 2934.354
Std. Dev. 63700 18200 81600 4030000 0.000 2771.191 11400
Min 0.007 0.000 0.013 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 418000 277000 590000 34000000 0.000 18600 121000
Total Mean 13900 3641.885 15300 877000 0.000 0.037 38000
Std. Dev. 67400 26400 83700 5680000 0.001 641.382 2570000
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 1410000 703000 2340000 177000000 0.089 18600 266000000
average, the banks in Europe have the highest total costs. On global average
Total Costs, the other regions have lower total costs.
Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics of Risk and Exposures Vari-
ables. On the global average, Africa and Europe have higher Non-Performing
Exposures than the rest of the world. A bank in Europe has the highest Non-
Performing Exposure. This shows why the authorities in Europe have started
focusing on the issue of Non-Performing Exposures. On the global average, the
United States and Canada have the least Liquidity Risk. The bank in Europe
has the highest Liquidity Risk whereas the bank in Latin America and the
Caribbean has the least. The average Global Funding Liquidity Risk is 0.666.
The United States and Canada on average have the highest Funding Liquidity
110
3. An analysis of Risk measures on the Cost Efficiency of the Banks.
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Risk and Exposure Variables.These variables are used
in SFA.The risk variables :- Non-Performing Exposures,Liquidity Risk and Funding Liquidity
Risk.The sample period is 2010-2018.The sample consists of 2630 banks in 6 regions.Reported
statisitcs are:- mean,standard deviation,minimum and maximum. Reported figures are in
emillions.
Global Region NPE LIQ FLIQ
Africa Mean 2.304 33.873 0.684
Std. Dev. 19.494 16.868 0.152
Min 0 3.367 0.228
Max 292.524 93.878 0.936
Asia-Pacific Mean 0.144 32.876 0.76
Std. Dev. 1.197 15.784 0.162
Min 0 0.322 0.04
Max 44.977 91.389 1.181
Europe Mean 1.276 31.922 0.617
Std. Dev. 19.289 18.195 0.211
Min 0 0.309 0
Max 890.779 108.894 4.014
Latin America and Caribbean Mean 0.241 31.305 0.636
Std. Dev. 0.99 15.391 0.212
Min 0 0.139 0.03
Max 12.262 90.603 0.961
Middle East Mean 0.133 33.462 0.693
Std. Dev. 0.285 16.788 0.165
Min 0 6.162 0.004
Max 2.865 96.139 0.91
United States and Canada Mean 0.065 26.07 0.794
Std. Dev. 0.21 12.908 0.087
Min 0 2.853 0.382
Max 3.598 93.358 0.959
Total Mean 0.889 31.934 0.666
Std. Dev. 15.113 17.184 0.202
Min 0 0.139 0
Max 890.779 108.894 4.014
risk while Europe has the least. However, the bank in Europe has the highest
Funding Liquidity Risk. In addition, the individual banks across the world
have funding liquidity risk higher than the average global funding liquidity
risk. The variability of funding liquidity risk is highest in Latin America and
the Caribbean and lowest in the United States and Canada.
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3.6.2 The relationship between cost efficiency and risk
measures
Table 3.5 provides the results of cost function estimations and the estimated
effects of various risk measures on the inefficiency effect. The specifications of
the cost function among each model are the same. However, different risk de-
terminants are used to cause different parameters of estimation results. Model
1, 2, and 3 lists three categories of risk: Funding Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Risk,
and Non-Performing Exposures. Model 4 presents an essential estimation for
all risk measures used in this study. The estimated individual coefficients in
the stochastic frontier given by the translog function form are due to many
interactions between output and input price variables but unfortunately, they
are not directly interpretable, unlike the Cobb-Douglas cost function where all
parameters have a clearly specified meaning. The normalisation of variables
permits the first-order parameters of the translog function to be directly inter-
preted as estimates of cost elasticities evaluated at the point of approximation.
The model satisfies the homogeneity conditions. λ provides allows testing the
validity of the imposed assumptions. It is the ratio of standard deviation
attributable to inefficiency relative to the standard deviation due to random
noise. λ is highly significant. This implies that the inefficiency prevails in this
model. The estimation results show good fit and the signs of the variables are
in line with the other studies. The residuals have the correct skewness for the
cost efficiency i.e., rightward for the cost efficiency.
The study performs the test for monotonicity using the Spearman Rank
Order correlation. Spearman’s correlation measures the strength and direction
of the monotonic association between two variables. If the Spearman corre-
lation coefficient of a variable is close to 0, it means there is no monotonic
relationship between variables. Table 3.5 presents the Spearman’s correlation
coefficients for the risk measures variable with the inputs, outputs, and to-
tal cost. The results show a very weak correlation. This indicates that the
monotonic relationship is very weak. Therefore, the study looks into the non-
monotonicity effects of the risk measures of efficiency.
In order to measure the cost efficiency of the banks, the study employs SFA.
The literature suggests a range of different approaches to model the cost func-
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Table 3.5: Spearman Rank Order Correlation for Inputs ,Outputs, Total Cost and the Risk
Measures. Inputs are: - Loans, Other Earning Assets, Total Deposits and Liquid Assets.
Outputs are: - Price of Funds and Price of Labour. Risk Measures are Funding Liquidity
Risk, Liquidity Risk and Non-Performing Exposures.The sample period is 2010-2018.The
sample consists of 2630 banks. (***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels,
respectively.)
TC Loans OEA TD LA PF PL NPE FLIQ
TC 1
Loans 0.163* 1
OEA 0.546* 0.280* 1
TD 0.169* 0.950* 0.285* 1
LA 0.169* 0.874* 0.297* 0.924* 1
PF -0.301* 0.063* 0.060* 0.056* 0.091* 1
PL 0.306* -0.008 0.011 -0.018* -0.045* -0.490* 1
NPE 0.042* -0.091* -0.299* -0.058* -0.015 -0.066* 0.019* 1
FLIQ 0.026* -0.066* -0.010 0.092* -0.064* -0.113* 0.052* -0.045 1
LIQ -0.013 -0.245* 0.016* -0.099* 0.178* 0.055* -0.038* 0.103* 0.047*
tions. Technical change is accounted for by a time trend. Wald test and
Likelihood Test support the inclusion of the technical change on the respective
restricted and unrestricted model. For the functional form, the study employs
Translog function instead of Cobb-Douglas cost function. This is supported
by Wald test and Likelihood test.
Table 3.6: Specification Tests for Cost Function.The cost function is used in SFA for mea-
suring efficiency.Wald Test and Likelihood-ratio Test is performed to check the inclusion of
the Technical Change and Translog function in SFA.
Hypothesis Test Test statistic p-Value Decision
No Technical Change Wald Test 3.01 0.003 Rejected
Likelihood-ratio Test 21.12 0.003 Rejected
No Translog form Wald Test 55.18 0.000 Rejected
Likelihood-ratio Test 747.75 0.000 Rejected
In Table 3.7, the signs of all parameters in each model are almost identi-
cal indicating a consistent and reasonable result. Most of the coefficients of
outputs are significantly negative except. This implies that a 1% increase in
Loans would be reducing the total costs by 14.7%. The input prices show a
significantly positive effect on total costs. This implies that a 1% increase in
price would increase the cost by 34.7%. The coefficient of the quadratic term
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for input prices is positive and significant at a 1% level. The results reflect
that the higher the price of each input is and the more output is produced, the
higher the total costs are. With respect to the time effect, the results show
that the total costs in bank operation are increasing year by year, while this
effect of rising costs declines gradually.
The main purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between
the bank’s cost efficiency and risk. Therefore, the study focuses on how risk
measures affect the level and variability of the inefficiency effect. Model 1
of Table 3.7 only regards Funding Liquidity Risk as the determinant of bank
efficiency. The results show that Funding Liquidity Risk has a positive effect
on the mean and the variance on the inefficiency effect. The results indicate
that the bank with a higher Funding Liquidity Risk will have a lower and
more varied cost efficiency. A higher Funding Liquidity Risk implies that the
bank has a greater possibility that over a specific horizon the bank will be-
come unable to settle obligations with immediacy (Drehmann and Nikolaou,
2013). A higher Funding Liquidity Risk implies that the bank would be fac-
ing difficulties to meet its current and future financial obligations because it
is unable to get access to the funding. This would be influencing the daily
operations of the bank. Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity Risk have an
inverse relationship. The downward spirals between increased market risk and
funding liquidity can emerge (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). This spiral
would be starting with a bank, which is short of funding liquidity and has
difficulty in getting it from the interbank market. Hence, it would be required
to sell the assets. During this period, if the asset market is characterised by
frictions. Then, large asset sales would lead to a fall in asset prices. As a
result, the banks would be required to post higher margins, which would be
increasing the liquidity outflows. For remaining liquid, the banks would be
required to sell more assets that would further depress the market prices. The
banks would be finding very difficult to roll over the debt. As a result, there
would be a possibility of the bank becoming insolvent. Moreover, a higher
funding liquidity risk pushes the bank’s cost efficiency down and increases the
fluctuation of cost efficiency. This was evident in the recent Global Financial
Crisis.
Model 2 of Table 3.7 shows the effects of Liquidity Risk on the cost effi-
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ciency of the bank. The results show that Liquidity Risk has a significantly
positive effect on the inefficiency effect. The level of bank liquidity ratios starts
falling when there is an increase in capital and loan activity. This would be
exposing the bank to increasing liquidity risk. Without required liquidity and
funding to meet the obligations, it would lead to a bank failure. This may
lead investors unwilling to lend to the bank and contribute towards the bank
failure (Ratnovski, 2013). Furthermore, an increase in Liquidity Risk lowers
the profitability of the bank, which pushes down the cost efficiency of the bank
and increases the fluctuation of the cost efficiency.
Model 3 of Table 3.7 illustrates the effects of Non-Performing Exposures
on the cost efficiency of the bank. It is found that Non-Performing Exposures
have a positive effect on the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect. This
indicates that a bank with higher Non-Performing Exposures will have a lower
and more varied cost efficiency. A bank engaged in risky lending behaviour
would be having poor asset quality of the portfolio of the bank. Also, it leads to
a decline in the interest income. This behaviour will increase non-performing
exposures for the banks. As a result, an increase in Non-Performing Exposures
lowers the bank’s cost efficiency. These results imply that the banks be focusing
on credit risk management which has been proven to be problematic in the
past. Serious banking problems have arisen from the failure of the banks to
recognise impaired assets and create reserves for writing off these assets.
Model 4 of Table 3.7 estimates the cost function and effects of all risk
variables on the inefficiency effect simultaneously. The result is identical to
the conclusions of the previous three models. As the size of the bank increases,
the bank would be able to hold different portfolio compositions. This would be
contributing to an increase in cost efficiency. The capital of the bank is very
significant. Capital acts as a buffer against loss, and hence failure with limited
liability. Numerous researchers have found that higher capital adequacy will be
resulting in smaller tax deduction or lower risk by having a higher proportion
of equity to debt (Wang, 2014). By having more capital in place, it would be
giving the depositors more confidence in a bank’s security and forms a type
of internal fund resource. Additionally, it has been seen that the large banks
tend to hold capital in excess of the most stringent regulatory requirements
as a response to perceived risk exposures and in some instances, with an aim
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of maintaining their future profit streams (Chortareas et al., 2011). Loan
Activity of the bank influences the cost efficiency of the bank. As there is
an increase in loan activity, there would be an enhancement in cost efficiency
(Kamarudin et al., 2017). However, there would be lending exposure. Loan
quality management is very crucial for the cost efficiency of the bank. Further,
credit risk management has been problematic for banks in the past. Banks have
found themselves in trouble due to impaired assets and non-performing loans.
These prevent the banks from becoming more cost efficient. Additionally, as
there is an increase the non-performing exposure especially during the crisis.
The banks face liquidity problems especially funding liquidity. This is because
the bank would be unable to face its current and future obligations. As a
result, the bank faces difficulty in access the funding. This influences the daily
operations of the banks. Therefore, the cost efficiency of the banks deteriorates.
To test the endogeneity problem, this study adopts a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test. Funding Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Risk, and Non-Performing Exposures
are treated as endogenous. The identification requires at least three instru-
mental variables, the study selects Deposits, Wholesale Funding, and Non-
Performing Assets. These three variables are not weak instruments and do not
correlate with total cost (an F-test statistic of joint significance is 1.48, with
a p-value of 0.21). The result of Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (F-test statistic
is 29.94, with a p-value of 0.00), then, does not indicate that the endogeneity
problem is a concern in this study. It is noteworthy that this result does not
imply that risk measures are exogenous, only that no statistically significant
problem arises from their endogeneity.
Table 3.7: Estimation results for the cost frontier and the determinants of inefficiency.The
study specifies four outputs and two input prices. The output variables includes total
loans(TL) , Other Earning Assets(OEA), Total Deposits (TD) , and Liquid Assets (LA).
Two inputs are price of labour (PL) and price of capital (PC). The total costs (TC) of
each sample bank consist of interest expenses and non-interest expenses. Models (1)–(3)
reveal the effect of a separate risk category on the inefficiency term, i.e. Funding Liquidity
Risk, Liquidity Risk, and Non-Performing Exposures in models (1), (2), (3), respectively.
Model (4) reveals the effect of the entire risk category together.The sample consists of 2630
banks in 147 countries for the period 2010-2018. (***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels, respectively.)
Dependent Variable In(TC/PF) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
β0 5.641*** 5.593*** 5.285*** 5.143***
(1.01) (1.012) 1.009) (1.016)
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Table 3.7 – Continued from previous page
Dependent Variable In(TC/PF) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
γ 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.085*** 0.089***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.017) (0.060)
In(TL) -0.155*** -0.147** -0.167*** -0.147**
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
In(OEA) -0.281*** -0.277*** -0.288*** -0.27***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
In(TD) -0.177 -0.206 -0.18 -0.166
(0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137)
In(LA) 0.147 0.167 0.179 0.187
(0.159) (0.16) (0.159) (0.16)
In(PL)2 0.361*** 0.362*** 0.36*** 0.347***
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
In(TL)2 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
In(OEA)2 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
In(TD)2 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
In(LA)2 -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** -0.016**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
In(PL)2 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
In(TL)x In(OEA) 0.006** 0.006 0.006* 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
In(TL )x In(PL) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
In(TL) x In(LA) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
In(TL)xIn(PL) 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
In(OEA)xIn(TD) -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
In(OEA)xIn(LA) 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
In(OEA)x In(PL) 0.006** 0.007** 0.006* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
In(TD )x In(LA) 0.017* 0.018 0.016* 0.018*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
In(TD )x In(PL) -0.016** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
In(LA) x In(PL) 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year 0.161*** 0.16*** 0.157*** 0.156***)
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Y ear2 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year x In(TL) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year x In(OEA) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 3.7 – Continued from previous page
Dependent Variable In(TC/PF) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Year x In(TD) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Year x In(LA) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Year x In(PL) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Effects on µit
δ0 1.328*** 1.504*** 1.467*** 0.797**










γ0 4.14*** 4.275*** 4.164*** 3.297***









σv -0.785*** -0.785*** -0.782*** -0.782***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 23670 23670 23670 23670
3.6.3 The Non-Linear Effects of Risk Measures
In this study, the non-monotonic effect of risk measures on the inefficiency ef-
fect has been emphasised. Table 3.7 presents the overall effects of risk measures
on the level and variability of the inefficiency effect. According to Equations
3.13 and 3.14, the marginal effects on the mean and variance of the inefficiency
effect can be calculated. The study sort and classify the samples into five
groups based on quantiles by each criteria variable. The criteria variables used
in the study are Funding Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Risk, and Non-Performing
Exposures. This is following by comparing the average cost efficiency and the
marginal effects on E(µit) and V(µit) across the groups (the lowest, middle,
and highest groups).
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The study performs the test for monotonicity using the Spearman Rank
Order correlation. Spearman’s correlation measures the strength and direction
of monotonic association between two variables. If spearman correlation coef-
ficient of a variable is close to 0, it means there is no monotonic relationship
between variables. Table 3.8 presents the Spearman’s correlation coefficients
for the risk measures variable with the efficiency. The results shows a very
weak correlation. This indicates that the monotonic relationship is very weak.
Therefore, the study looks into the non-monotonicity effects.
Table 3.8: Spearman’s correlation coefficients for the risk measures variable with the effi-
ciency.Risk Measures are Funding Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Risk and Non-Performing Expo-
sures.Efficiency scores are calculated using SFA.The sample period is 2005-2019.The sample
consists of 1931 banks.(***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respec-
tively.)
Risk Variables Efficiency
FUNDING LIQUIDITY RISK -0.003***
LIQUIDITY RISK 0.095***
NON-PERFORMING EXPOSURES -0.080***
Table 3.9 presents the calculation results of Cost Efficiency and Marginal
Effects by various sorted criteria variables using Bootstrapping with 1000 repli-
cations. For the criteria variables, the marginal effects on E(µit) and V(µit)
measures how an increase in the criteria variable changes the mean and vari-
ance of the inefficiency effect. The average marginal effect on E [µit] in the





means an increase in Funding Liquidity Risk leads to inefficiency increase and
an increase in Total Costs by 43.8%. This figure is statistically significant. Ta-
ble 3.9 does not represent non-monotonic effects, but rather non-linear effects
of some risk factors on the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect. This
is because there is the same marginal effects across different group sorted by
criteria variables affect efficiency non-linearly in the sample. The marginal ef-
fects in regard to the variance of the inefficiency effect are measured by V[µit]
in Table 3.9. For the banks in the lowest group (1st quantile) by Funding
Liquidity Risk, the bank’s cost efficiency becomes more variable if the levels
of Funding Liquidity Risk increases. In other words, an increase in Funding
Liquidity Risk increases the variation in Cost Efficiency by 16.5%. Combining
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the marginal effects on E[µit] and V[µit] , other things being equal, a bank
in the lowest group would have lower and more variable cost efficiency. The
results for Non-Performing Exposures are similar to Funding Liquidity Risk.
For Liquidity Risk, the results indicate that marginal effects on E[µit] and
V[µit] are non-monotonic because the signs are different across the groups.
For the lowest group (1st quantile), the average marginal effect on the mean
of the inefficiency is 6.96. For the highest group (5th quantile), it is -0.004.
This means that in the lowest group, an increase in Liquidity Risk increases
the inefficiency by 69.6% whereas, in the highest group, an increase in the
Liquidity Risk decreases the inefficiency by 4%. The average marginal effect
on the variance of the inefficiency in the lowest group and highest group are -
0.001 and 0.239. Together with the results on the marginal effects on the mean
of the inefficiency, the lowest group is likely to have higher cost inefficiency and
more stability in the cost efficiency whereas the highest group will have lower
cost inefficiency and more variable cost efficiency.
In this study, the time trends of cost efficiency and average marginal effects
on E(µit) and V(µit) over the sample period has been investigated. The risk
variables are selected if their overall effect is significant according to Table
3.7 and then compared with the average marginal effects over years. Table
3.10 shows that average cost efficiency of the banks globally improved from
35.0% in 2010 to 35.7% in 2012. This shows that the banks were gradually
improving the cost efficiency following the global financial crisis. However,
the average cost starts to deteriorate after 2012 until 2015. This is due to
scheduled introduction of the new regulations such as Basel III. From 2017
onwards, the cost efficiency has improved and reached 38.8% in 2018. The
results of the marginal effects of the risk measures over the year in Table 3.10
indicate that the effects of the risk measures are not consistent over time. For
Funding Liquidity Risk , the marginal effect on E(µit) was very high in the year
2011. After 2011, the effect starts declining until 2016. However, from 2017
onwards, the effect has again started increasing. The marginal effect shows
the negative effect on the cost efficiency. The marginal effect on V(µit) shows
the variability in the cost efficiency was high in 2012 before the variability
started declining. It reached its lowest in 2014. After 2014, the marginal effect
on V(µit) has been rising. The marginal effect on V(µit) has both negative
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3. An analysis of Risk measures on the Cost Efficiency of the Banks.
and positive effect on the cost efficiency over the years. However, from 2017
onwards, the marginal effect has a positive effect on the cost efficiency. For
Liquidity Risk , the marginal effect on E(µit) was very high in the year 2010. In
the following years, the effect started declining and reaching its lowest in 2013.
However, from 2014 onwards the effect started increasing. The marginal effect
of Liquidity Risk on E(µit) is U shape like pattern. After 2014, the increase in
the marginal effect indicates the negative effect on the cost efficiency. Similarly,
The marginal effect of Liquidity Risk on V(µit) has a negative effect on the cost
efficiency.For Non-Performing Exposures, The marginal effect on E(µit) has a
positive effect on the cost efficiency.This means that when the marginal effect
on E(µit) increases , the cost efficiency declines and vice versa. However, the
marginal effects on V(µit) show inverse U shape like pattern.This might mean
that this effect weakens over the sample period though they still significantly
and negatively affect the cost efficiency.
3.6.4 Cost Efficiency Across regions
The study aims to provide a comprehensive view of how the risk measures
affects the cost efficiency of the banks across different regions. Basel I was
formed to create harmonisation of regulatory and capital adequacy standards
only within the member states of the Basel Committee. All the states of
the G-10 are considered developed markets by most international organisa-
tions.Therefore, the regulations were tailored for banks operating in developed
markets.However, the banks operating in emerging markets adopted Basel I
requirements.This created a false sense of security within an emerging econ-
omy’s financial sector while creating new, less obvious risks for its banks (Balin,
2008).Therefore, it is important for conduct a comprehensive analysis of how
the risk measures such NPEs affect the cost efficiency of the banks across
different regions.By doing so, the regulators would be able to get a detailed
analysis of how it impacts the efficiency of the banks.Furthermore, it will al-
low the regulators and authorities to form effective regulations which would
help in preventing excessive risk taking by the banks.Additionally, by exam-
ining the marginal effects of risk measures across different regions will provide
more detailed facts about how these risk measures influence both the level and
variability of the inefficiency effect across regions.
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3. An analysis of Risk measures on the Cost Efficiency of the Banks.
Table 3.11: Descriptive statistics of Cost Efficiency for different regions.Cost Efficiency
scores are calculated using SFA.The sample period is 2010-2018.The sample consists of 2630
banks in 6 different regions.Reported statistics are mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum.
Region Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Africa 0.296 0.191 0.000 0.740
Asia-Pacific 0.341 0.184 0.000 0.771
Europe 0.369 0.186 0.000 0.819
Latin America and Caribbean 0.300 0.190 0.001 0.833
Middle East 0.360 0.190 0.000 0.730
United States and Canada 0.344 0.204 0.001 0.791
Total 0.353 0.189 0.000 0.833
Table 3.11 presents the descriptive statistics of Cost Efficiency for the dif-
ferent regions over the sample period 2010-2018. The global average Cost
Efficiency is .353. At the global level, the banks could reduce input costs by
approximately 64.7% by using their inputs more efficiently at a given level
of output. Over the sample period, the most cost-efficient banks are in Eu-
rope. The average cost efficiency of Europe is .369, which is higher than the
global average cost efficiency. The banks are in Europe could reduce input
costs by approximately 63.1% by using their inputs more efficiently at a given
level of output. The banks in Europe can generate more output from their in-
puts. Furthermore, In Europe, banks have efficient management in their total
costs. There is no bank in the sample, which is fully cost, efficient. The banks
in Africa are found to be the least cost efficient with mean cost efficiency is
.296. This implies that on average banks in Africa could reduce input costs
by approximately 70.4% by using its inputs more efficiently at a given level
of output. The difference between the average cost efficiency in Africa and
global cost efficiency might be because the banks in Africa have problems in
generating outputs more cost-efficiently. This could be explained by the loans
generated in Africa is the lowest. Loans generated is lower than deposits.
Also, it could be interpreted that the banks in Africa have more difficulties
compared to banks in other regions to have efficient management in their total
cost. Latin America and the Caribbean region’s average cost efficiency is near
the average cost efficiency of Africa. This reflects the problem in the banking
sector in Latin America and the Caribbean region over the sample period. The
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average Cost Efficiency of Asia-Pacific and the United States and Canada are
close to each other. Only Europe and Middle East’s average cost efficiency is
higher than the global cost efficiency.
The study compares the trend pattern of each region’s cost efficiency and
examines whether the marginal effects of risk measures differ across regions.
Figure 3.1 presents the average cost efficiency of the banks over time. The
changes in the average cost efficiency could be explained by the changes in
the outputs and input prices over the years. From 2012, the average cost effi-
ciency has been decreasing. It reaches the lowest point in 2017. This is lower
than the average cost efficiency in 2010. Loans and Price of labour increased
while Other Earning Assets and Price of Deposits decreased. Also, Total Costs
have increased over this period. This reflects that the banks were not efficient
in managing their total costs. As a result, the cost efficiency was declining.
However, only in 2018, Cost Efficiency has increased. In 2018, the outputs
and input prices are increasing and decreasing. In addition, Total Costs have
increased every year. Nevertheless, banks have become more efficient in man-
aging their total costs. Therefore, the banks have become more cost efficient
and improved their cost efficiency.
The Cost Efficiency of Africa and Latin America and Caribbean have been
lower than in other regions over time. Since 2012, the Cost Efficiency of Africa
has been improving over time. But in 2016, there has been a decrease in the
Cost Efficiency of Africa. This is due to the continental problems, which led
to some of the global banks to leave the continent. The continental prob-
lems are the opportunities for more growth in the region diminished and the
near future signs were not promising. Furthermore, the unemployment fig-
ures suggested that there are not enough jobs being created for the people to
start opening up bank accounts. Cost Efficiency in Latin America and the
Caribbean region has been decreasing over the years. Brazil has been one of
the major economies of Latin America. Brazil suffered from a severe economic
crisis from 2014 till 2016. The growth in Brazil slowed significantly in 2014,
which was followed by a drop in growth for two consecutive years. Further-
more, the Crisis in Venezuela contributed to a decrease in cost efficiency. This
crisis was a result of political corruption and the country started facing cash
shortages. The country experienced hyperinflation. These domestic financial
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vulnerabilities ten to amplify the adverse impact of severe turbulence episodes
in international financial markets. The average cost efficiency in the United
States and Canada has been declining since 2011. This is due to the banks
struggling to recover from the financial crisis. The regulators have issued new
regulations. These regulations forced the banks to fund their operations with
less debt and more equity has proved to be problematic for the banks. Over
the years, the cost efficiency in the Middle East has deteriorated. Political
issues such as the Arab Spring have contributed to this deterioration in cost
efficiency. Additionally, the high population growth and low productivity, and
high trade restrictiveness have led to this deterioration. Global cost Efficiency
has been decreasing until 2018. The events across the different regions have
contributed to this decline in efficiency. However, in 2018, the global cost ef-
ficiency has increased along with most of the regions witnessing an increase
in efficiency. This could be because the banks have become familiar with the
new regulations and the economic environment in which they are operating
has become more stable.Moreover, the banks have recovered from the financial
difficulties of the crisis. It reveals that such financial crisis makes the recovery
period for the banks longer.Additionally, it takes time for the banks to improve
their efficiency.
This study compares the marginal effects on E(µit) and V(µit) among the
sorted criteria in each region.The marginal effects provide a detailed view of
how the cost efficiency is affected by the risk measures across different re-
gions.Furthermore,the study examines whether marginal effects differ across
regions.
The study sort and classify the samples into five groups based on quantiles
by each criteria variable. The criteria variables used in the study are Funding
Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Risk and Non-Performing Exposures. This is followed
by comparing the average cost efficiency and the marginal effects on E(µit)
and V(µit) across the groups (the lowest, middle, and highest groups). Table
3.12 gives the calculation results of Cost Efficiency and Marginal Effects by
various sorted criteria variables across different regions using Bootstrapping
with 1000 replications. For Funding Liquidity Risk, the marginal effects on
E(µit) on the banks of Asia-Pacific , Latin America and Caribbean , Middle
East ,and United States and Canada show a non-monotonic pattern. This
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Figure 3.1: Average Cost Efficiency of the different regions from 2010-2018.Cost Efficiency
scores are calculated using SFA.The sample period is 2010-2018.The sample consists of 2630
banks in 6 different regions.Reported is the average cost efficiency over time in 6 different
regions.
means that in these regions, there is a negative inefficiency effect in the lowest
group. But, the effect turns to positive inefficiency effect in the middle and
highest group. This suggests the behaviour the banks and how they banks with
different risk levels operate.As the bank with the lowest funding liquidity risk
in Middle East will becoming more cost inefficient.While the bank with highest
funding liquidity risk in same region becoming more cost efficient.This provides
a detailed evidence of how the funding liquidity risk affects the cost efficiency
of the bank differently among the banks based in same region. For Africa
and Europe , the marginal effects shows a linear effect and have a positive
inefficiency effect across all the groups. The marginal effects on V(µit) for
Latin America , Middle East and United States and Canada reveal a non-
monotonic pattern. In these regions , the banks in the lowest group have a
negative variability in the lowest group and turns positive in the middle and
highest groups. The banks in Africa have the highest variability. This means
the cost efficiency is more varied in this region.
For Liquidity Risk , The marginal effects on E(µit) in Europe shows a non-
monotonic pattern. It shows a negative inefficiency effect on the low and middle
groups whereas a positive inefficiency effect on the highest group. In Africa,
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the marginal effects on E(µit) across all the groups shows a positive inefficiency
effect. The results reveal how the banks operate differently in different regions.
The liquidity risk has different influence across different groups in different
regions.This can lead to damaging effects on the economy because the certain
banks will engage themselves in high liquidity risk in order to improve their
cost efficiency. However, this trade-off between liquidity risk and cost efficiency
could prove lethal for the sector. For Europe, the marginal effects on V(µit)
across on the groups is positive and shows a monotonic effect. Asia –Pacific ,
Latin America and United States and Canada shows the marginal effects on
V(µit) across the groups to be negative. The marginal effects on V(µit) across
all the groups in Africa reveal a non-monotonic pattern. The banks in middle
and highest groups in Europe have the highest variability. This reveals that
the cost efficiency is more varied among the banks in Europe.
For Non-Performing Exposures, marginal effects on E(µit) across all the
regions reveals a positive inefficiency effect. This shows a positive monotonic
effect. On average across the groups, Latin America and Caribbean has the
highest positive inefficiency impact. The marginal effects on V(µit) is similar
to the marginal effects on E(µit). The marginal effects on V(µit) increases as
we move along the groups. The lowest group has the lowest variability , this
increases as we move to middle and highest groups.These results reveal the
significance of NPEs.It provides a detailed analysis why having a harmonised
measure for credit risk is important.Furthermore, it reveals that this new def-
inition has same effect across different groups in different regions.As a result,
it ensures all the banks will be taking this risk measure seriously.
The marginal effects provides a comprehensive analysis of the risk measures
on the cost efficiency of the banks across different regions.The results reveal
that the different risk measures have different effect on the cost efficiency
across different groups across different regions.It is significant to take into
consideration how the banks operations when formulating a policy.By taking
it into the consideration, the policymakers and regulators will be able to ensure
the policies made by them is meeting the target.Moreover,it will ensure the
financial stability in the country.
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Table 3.12: Cost Efficiency and marginal effects by various sorted criteria among the different
regions.Cost Efficiency scores are calculated using SFA.The sample period is 2010-2018.The
sample consists of 2630 banks in 6 different regions.The study sort and classify the samples
into five groups based on quantiles by each criteria variable. The criteria variables used in
the study are Funding Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Risk and Non-Performing Exposures. This
is followed by comparing the average cost efficiency and the marginal effects on E(µit) and
V(µit) across the groups (the lowest, middle, and highest groups). (***, ** and * indicate
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.)
Africa Asia-Pacific Europe Latin America and Caribbean Middle East United States and Canada
Marginal Effect on E[µit]
Funding Liquidity Risk
Low 0.296** -1.235** 0.928** -1.313** -0.964** -1.372**
Middle 0.332** 0.424** 0.199** 0.172** 0.394** 0.317**
High 0.544*** 0.806*** 0.12*** 0.693*** 0.712*** 0.535***
Liquidity Risk
Low 0.005** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.006** -0.002*** -0.002**
Middle 0.307** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002***
High 0.329** -0.002** 0.017*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001**
Non-Performing Exposures
Low 0.427** 0.408*** 0.432*** 0.451** 0.415** 0.376**
Middle 0.395** 0.392*** 0.43*** 0.413*** 0.397** 0.382**
High 0.229*** 0.504*** 0.372*** 0.619** 0.453*** 0.416***
Marginal Effect on E[νit]
Funding Liquidity Risk
Low 16.325** 5.982** 0.81*** -0.321** -0.166** -0.81***
Middle 12.352*** 1.598*** 1.778*** 1.267*** 1.39** 1.217***
High 11.598*** 2.432*** 1.79*** 1.97*** 2.127** 1.57***
Liquidity Risk
Low -0.005** -0.003** 0.000*** -0.005** -0.003** -0.003***
Middle 1.27*** -0.002** 3.026** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.002**
High 1.368** -0.001*** 3.924*** -0.003** 0.004** -0.002***
Non-Performing Exposures
Low 0.654** 0.74*** 0.682*** 0.703** 0.698** 0.697***
Middle 0.693*** 0.796** 0.724*** 0.739*** 0.776** 0.74***
High 0.865*** 1.682** 1.72*** 1.253*** 0.839** 0.843***
3.6.5 Robustness Checks on Cost Efficiency Estimates
In this section, the study compares SFA-efficiency results with efficiency out-
comes using the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) and the Distribution Free
Approach (DFA). TFA uses the same functional form for the frontier cost
function as SFA but is based on a regression which is estimated using only
the ostensibly best performers in the data set—those in the lowest average-
cost quartile for their size class. DFA specifies a functional form for the cost
function, as does SFA and TFA, but DFA separates inefficiencies from random
error in a different way. It does not impose a specific shape on the distribution
of efficiency, as does SFA, neither does it impose that deviations within one
group of firms are all random error and deviations between groups are all in-
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efficiencies, as does TFA. Instead, DFA assumes that there is a core efficiency
or average efficiency for each firm, which is constant over time, while random
error tends to average out over time. Bauer et al. (1998) found that SFA, TFA,
and DFA parametric approaches tended to yield about the same distributions
of efficiency, rank banks in roughly the same order, and identify mostly the
same banks as best-practice and worst-practice. Following Bauer et al. (1998)
and Rossi et al. (2009), this study compares the SFA efficiency scores with
TFA and DFA which will allow us to assess the robustness of efficiency scores
obtained using SFA.
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 shows the robustness results of SFA results by com-
paring them to efficiency scores using TFA comparing them to efficiency scores
using TFA and DFA as well as to standard non-frontier measures of perfor-
mance, such as banks‘ ROA, their cost ratio or their cost/income ratio. The
results of these consistency checks support our efficiency estimates by means of
Spearman rank correlations. Firstly, the study compares the efficiency scores
obtained from SFA with TFA and DFA. The results show the efficiency scores
obtained from SFA are highly significant positive rank correlations with the
TFA and DFA.
Table 3.13: The robustness checks for cost efficiency with different techniques. Spearman
Rank correlations between efficiency results obtained using SFA ,DFA and TFA. (***, **




TFA 0.5592*** 0.5972*** 1
The study compares the SFA efficiency scores with non-frontier measures
of performance. The standard performance measures are returns on asset, cost
ratio, and cost-to-income ratio. Cost Ratio is defined as the ratio of total costs
to total assets. The bank managers and consultants to assess their perfor-
mance and rank themselves against their peers within the industry (Bauer et
al., 1998) use these measures. These performance measures are indicators of
economic optimization in terms of bank costs and revenues. The positive rank
order correlation with ROA and negative rank order correlation with cost ratio
and cost-to-income ratio. This would give assurance that the frontier measures
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are not simply artificial products of the assumptions made regarding the un-
derlying optimization concept, the shape of the efficient frontier, the existence
of random error, and any distributional assumptions imposed on the ineffi-
ciencies and random error. The results presented in Table 14 show that cost
efficiency scores are significantly correlated with non-frontier measures with
the expected signs.
Table 3.14: The robustness checks for cost efficiency with standard performance measures
using Spearman Rank correlations. Cost Efficiency is obtained using SFA. Cost Ratio = total
cost/total assets. . (***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.)
Return on Assets Cost-to-Income Ratio Cost Ratio
Cost Efficiency 0.135*** -0.156*** -0.165***
3.7 Conclusion
This study explores the role of risk measures such as Funding Liquidity Risk,
Liquidity Risk, and NPEs in determining the cost efficiency of the banks.
In this study, the heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model is used for the
estimation. This allows us to find the effect of each risk measure on the mean
and variance of the cost efficiency. Additionally, it allows us to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the effects of risk measures on the cost efficiency of
the banks.
The results show that each risk measure presents a similar effect on the
cost efficiency of the banks. Funding Liquidity Risk has a positive effect on
the mean and the variance on the inefficiency effect. This means a bank with a
higher Funding Liquidity Risk will have a lower and more varied cost efficiency.
Liquidity Risk has a significantly positive effect on the inefficiency effect. This
indicates that an increase in Liquidity Risk lowers the profitability of the bank,
which pushes down the cost efficiency of the bank and increases the fluctuation
of the cost efficiency. Additionally, NPEs have a significantly positive effect
on the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect.
The study looked into the marginal effects of the risk measures on the
mean and variance for a detailed analysis. The results indicate that there are
non-linear effects of some of the risk factors such as Funding Liquidity Risk
and NPEs on the mean and variance of the inefficiency effect. However, for
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Liquidity Risk, the marginal effects indicate a non-monotonic effect.
The study investigates the effects of the risk measures on the mean and
variability of the inefficiency effect over time. The results reveal that the effects
of the risk measures are not consistent over time. In 2011, the marginal effect of
Funding Liquidity Risk on the mean is very high. After 2011, the effect starts
declining until 2016. However, from 2017 onwards, the effect has again started
increasing. The marginal effect shows the negative effect on cost efficiency.
The marginal effect on variance has both a negative and positive effect on cost
efficiency over the years. For Non-Performing Exposures, The marginal effect
on mean has a positive effect on the cost efficiency and the marginal effect on
variance shows inverse U-shape like pattern. For Liquidity Risk, the marginal
effect on mean shows U-shape pattern and on variance has a negative effect
on the cost efficiency.
The comparison of the trend pattern of each region’s cost efficiency reveals
that the Cost Efficiency of Africa and Latin America and Caribbean have been
lower than in other regions over time. From 2011, the average cost efficiency
in the United States and Canada. Over the years, the cost efficiency in the
Middle East has deteriorated. Global cost Efficiency has been decreasing until
2018. The events across the different regions have contributed towards this
decline in efficiency. However, in 2018, the global cost efficiency has increased
along with most of the regions witnessing an increase in efficiency.
In this study, the marginal effects of how these risk measures affect both
the level and variability of the inefficiency effect across the regions have been
investigated. For Funding Liquidity Risk, the marginal effects on the mean
of the inefficiency effect of the banks in Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the
Caribbean , Middle East, and the United States and Canada show a non-
monotonic pattern. The marginal effects on variability of the inefficiency effect
for Latin America, the Middle East, and the United States and Canada reveal
a non-monotonic pattern. In these regions, the banks in the lowest group
have a negative variability in the lowest group and turn positive in the middle
and highest groups. For Liquidity Risk, The marginal effects on the mean in
Europe show a non-monotonic pattern. It shows a negative inefficiency effect
on the low and middle groups whereas a positive inefficiency effect on the
highest group. The marginal effects on the variability across on the groups in
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Europe is positive and shows a monotonic effect. This reveals that the cost
efficiency is more varied among the banks in Europe. For Non-Performing
Exposures, marginal effects on the mean of the inefficiency effect across all
the regions reveals a positive inefficiency effect. On average across the groups,
Latin America and Caribbean has the highest positive inefficiency impact. The
marginal effects on variability on the inefficiency effect increases as we move
along the groups. The lowest group has the lowest variability, this increase as
we move to middle and highest groups.
The study provides an in-depth analysis of the risk measures.The recent
crisis showed how having inconsistent international standards for categorising
problem loans and funding liquidity proved to be a major problem for the
banks.The investigation will be useful for the regulators and policymakers.As
an increase in funding liquidity risk in a region impacts on the cost of the effi-
ciency of the bank.Furthermore,NPEs which provides consistent international
standards for categorising problem loans impacts on the cost efficiency.The
results will be useful for the regulators and policymakers.The results will help
in shaping new regulations which will be preventing the bank from excessive
risk-taking.Additionally,the results show how the changes in the risk measures
impacts the cost efficiency.
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Chapter 4
The role of Cross-Border
Exposures and Liquidity Shock
on Technical Efficiency of the
banks.
4.1 Introduction
Banks take a central role in cross-border capital flows. In most countries
around the world, banks acquire foreign assets in addition to domestic assets.
These foreign assets include loans to foreign entities and holdings of foreign
bonds and other instruments. Equally, on the liability side, banks raise exter-
nal funding. Such foreign liabilities include deposits of non-residents and the
sale of bonds and other securities to foreign investors. With the continuing
move towards financial integration, cross-border banking has gained increas-
ing attention in the academic literature over the last decade. Cross- Border
banking may not only influence individual banks but may have wider conse-
quences for the economy and the financial system. The wider benefits from
cross-border banking may, among others, arise from non-financial firms being
more resilient against domestic crises via access to credit from non-local banks
(Keeton et al., 2009), or from more efficient banking sectors through increased
competition from foreign banks (Schoenmaker and Wagner, 2013).
The market liquidity failures intensified the Global Financial Crisis. The
financial institutions had to manage their balance sheets in response to mea-
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sured risk and price changes. This translated to cross-border banking. During
the crisis, the banks decreased their local lending and their cross-border lend-
ing ((Takáts, 2010) and (Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2013). De Haas et al. (2011)
found that the reduction in cross-border lending is limited for the banks which
are geographically closer to the borrower and have a local office or strong
relations with the local banks. The effects on the cross border lending de-
pend on the interaction of borrower’s demand and lender’s supply. Numerous
researchers found that it is likely the cross-border lending increases are per-
manent after banks and customers have invested in overcoming informational
imperfections.
During the Global Financial Crisis, the aggregate liquidity shock is asso-
ciated with the increasing volatility of asset prices with aggravated concerns
over counterparty risk, liquidity risk and market conditions. This resulted in
disruptions in the interbank market(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Addition-
ally, this affected not only the funding costs of banks but also bank lending
(Allen et al., 2011). Using data from the US interbank market,Afonso et
al. (2014) show that borrowers pay lower prices and borrow more from their
concentrated lenders and that—when there are exogenous shocks to liquid-
ity supply—concentrated lenders insulate borrowers from the shocks without
charging significantly higher interest rates. Bräuning and Fecht (2017) evalu-
ates the effects of lending relationships on the price and availability of liquidity
in the German interbank market. They found that, during the crisis, relation-
ship lenders provided cheaper loans to their closest borrowers, confirming that
lending relationships help banks to reduce search frictions, even for opaque
borrowers.
This study investigates the impact of cross-border banking, i.e., geograph-
ical diversification, on individual banks with liquidity shock in relation to
the financial development of the home country. Generally, diversification has
the potential to reduce risk (Markowitz, 1959). There are opposite views on
whether geographical diversification is beneficial for banks.Levy and Sarnat
(1970) found that geographical diversification could generate positive effects,
as there is a non-perfect correlation across country-specific risks. Therefore,
resulting in risk reduction in an internationally diversified portfolio. How-
ever,Winton (1999) argues that geographical diversification is not always ben-
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eficial. For example, when banks have loans with high downside risks or when
banks expand into sectors where they have little expertise. In addition, the
further a bank away from its home country, the more difficult it may be to
manage.
Financial development increases a country’s resilience and boosts economic
growth, but trade-offs between growth, and stability can emerge. Financial de-
velopment has numerous benefits such as it mobilizes savings, promotes greater
information sharing, improves resource allocation, and facilitates diversifica-
tion and management of risk. However, there are costs as well, particularly
at high levels of financial development. In fact, there can be instances where
there is “too much finance”— that is, instances where the costs outweigh the
benefits of financial development. The diversity of financial systems across
countries implies that one needs to look at multiple indicators to measure fi-
nancial development. As a result, the study employs a more comprehensive
financial development indicator developed by Svirydzenka (2016). This allows
us to investigate the role of countries with similar financial development have
on cross-border banking with liquidity shock on the efficiency of the banks. As
the Global Financial Crisis, raised questions about what went wrong and how
the changes in the cross-border banking played a part in deepening this crisis.
The study attempts to fill the gap by providing evidence on the role of cross-
border banking with liquidity shock on the efficiency of the banks in relation to
the financial development of the home country. To do so, the study conducts
an analysis of the impact of the cross border banking with liquidity shock on
the efficiency scores estimated by Weighted Russell Directional Distance Model
by using sub-samples based on the financial development of the home country.
The study uses the balance sheet data of the banks, macroeconomic conditions,
cross-border exposures, and liquidity shock to investigate the impact on bank
efficiency. To my knowledge, this is the first study to do. The study uses
a sample of 1931 banks in 15 countries in Europe. The study employs a
Financial Development indicator to divide the sample into 2 sub-sample. With
sub-sample with high financial development has 1229 banks in 8 European
countries and with lower financial development have 702 banks in 7 European
countries.
The results indicate that the average technical efficiency of the banks in
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the country with high financial development is 0.19. The average bank in
the sample could improve its technical efficiency by 81%. The average tech-
nical efficiency of the banks in the country with low financial development is
0.183. The average bank in the sample could improve its technical efficiency
by 81.7%. The financial development difference between the two sub-samples
is 0.054. However, the major difference appears by looking at individual coun-
tries in the two sub-samples. The most financially developed country in the
sample was Germany could improve its technical efficiency by 80.8%. The least
financially developed country in the sample was Spain. The average technical
efficiency of the banks in Spain is 0.230. This means that it could improve
its technical efficiency by 77%. The average technical efficiency of the banks
in Spain witnessed many fluctuations. On average, the technical efficiency of
the banks declined after the Global Financial Crisis. The changes in the tech-
nical efficiency of the banks facing liquidity shocks are more unstable. The
technical efficiency of the banks facing Liquidity Shocks is much lower during
the Global Financial Crisis. The technical efficiency of the banks not facing
liquidity shock is more similar to the average technical efficiency of the banks.
The decline in the cross-border exposures was a witness with a decline in effi-
ciency. But, the decline was minimum in the domestic exposures. This reflects
the significance of the cross-border exposures on the efficiency of the banks.
Following this, the Honore’s Tobit Estimator results provide evidence of
the cross-border exposures with liquidity shock on the efficiency of the banks
in relation to the financial development of the home country. In countries with
high financial development, both domestic exposures and foreign exposures
have a significant impact on the technical efficiency of the banks. The case is
different for the banks located in countries with less financial development. In
those countries, only foreign exposures are having a significant impact. The
results reflect the different banking practices in relation to the financial devel-
opment of the home country. With high financial development, the bank can
diversify better. However, with low financial development, the bank is looking
to get better returns by investing in foreign countries. When controlling for
domestic exposures and exposures from different regions, the results indicate
that the exposures from different regions are highly significant. For countries
with high financial development, Domestic Exposures, Europe Exposures, and
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North America Exposures have a significantly positive relation with technical
efficiency. South America, Africa, and Asia Exposures have a significantly
negative relation with technical efficiency. For countries with lower financial
development, Domestic Exposures, South America Exposures, Africa Expo-
sures, and Asia Exposures have a significantly positive relation with technical
efficiency. The results indicate that banks are more likely to invest in countries
with similar levels of financial development. By investing in such countries, the
bank can improve its technical efficiency. However, in countries with high fi-
nancial development, the banks improve efficiency by reducing exposures from
countries with lower financial development. The results indicate that the role
of financial development and cross-border exposures play in the efficiency of
the banks.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides an
overview of the Cross Border Banking, Cross-Border banking during the fi-
nancial crisis, Determinants of cross border positions, and Cross-border bank-
ing and liquidity. Section 4.3 outlines Weighted Russell Directional Distance
Model while Section 4.4 presents the sample and variables used in the study.
Section 4.5 discuss the results and Section 4.6 concludes the study.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Cross-Border Banking
According to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2011a), “direct cross-
border (“offshore”) lending to non-banks and the cross-border component
channelled by resident banks – become more important. That is, during booms
these two international components tend to grow faster than the credit granted
by banks located in the country.” The term cross-border banking is used for
both banks and banking customers going abroad. Cross-border banking has a
significant role to play on financial stability. The recent crisis highlighted the
role of cross-border banking played in intensifying the crisis. This led to an
increase in attention towards cross-border banking. Cross-border banking has
both benefits and costs.
A major benefit of cross-border banking is due to the potential for risk
diversification (Markowitz, 1959). This allows the assets of cross-border banks
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to be less sensitive to country-specific shocks and the probability of collapse.
A bank becomes less exposed to a domestic or foreign shock by spreading its
activities across different countries. This helps to reduce lending volatility.
Cross-border banking facilitates international risk sharing.
With financial liberalisation and integration, domestic investors can diver-
sify their asset portfolios internationally by holding assets issued by firms and
financial institutions around the world in addition to domestic ones. Therefore,
they become less exposed to localised shock. This results in a better sharing
of an economy’s risk with other countries. The existence of cross-border bank-
ing can also increase competition for domestic banks. An important strand of
the literature has shown that more competition is beneficial to stability (e.g.
(Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005)).
The diversification benefits and interaction between competition and ef-
ficiency appear to be more apparent in the financial industry. The foreign
bank entrance and competition between banks generate a greater variety of
financial services at a lower price. For example, lower lending rates for bor-
rowers. A lower cost of investment will raise domestic borrowers’ profits and
net worth and consequently reduce the likelihood of defaults. The presence
of foreign banks enables the application of more sophisticated banking tech-
niques and highly advanced risk management systems that help to improve the
quality of financial services and mitigate credit risk. The foreign bank penetra-
tion contributes to the stabilisation of domestic lending by offering domestic
firms multiple lending relationship opportunities. When domestic banks are
lending-constrained due to idiosyncratic shock, domestic borrowers may sub-
stitute domestic lending with foreign-based financing. The same benefits can
be obtained on the banks’ liability side. Specifically, during financial turmoil
depositors may shift their funds to foreign banks that are perceived to be
sounder than domestically-owned ones, instead of transferring assets abroad
through capital flight. Under these circumstances, cross-border linkages in-
crease banking system efficiency and enhance financial stability.
Financial liberalisation accompanied by free flows of capital and the effect
of foreign factors may stimulate better regulation, accounting standards, and
financial and legal structures. This will encourage countries to pursue more
disciplined macroeconomic policies. This results in a reduction in the frequency
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of policy mistakes. As mentioned in Obstfeld (1992), unsound policies (i.e.
excessive government borrowing or inadequate bank regulation) may spark
speculative capital outflows and higher domestic interest rates. Greater policy
discipline translates into greater macroeconomic and financial stability. This
ensures a more efficient allocation of resources and higher rates of economic
growth.
The potential structural changes in banks’ international lending activi-
ties are highly important for policymakers for several reasons. Firstly, bank
lending is particularly important for small and medium-sized firms. If exter-
nal funding from abroad becomes scarce, the costs of borrowing for certain
groups of borrowers may significantly increase in some countries. Second, the
financing of cross-border trade may suffer from increasingly segmented loan
markets with adverse effects on international trade flows. Third, international
banking sector integration has not only enhanced cross-border lending, but
also other types of capital flows. If cross-border banking decreases, other in-
ternational capital flows may reduce as well. This may imply, for instance,
less risk-sharing between countries and higher external funding costs for firms.
Moreover, credit market fragmentation reduces competitive pressures in the
banking system (Bremus, 2015).
Despite extensive potential benefits, increased cross-border linkages have
generated a great deal of concern about financial instability, such as domestic
misallocation of capital flows that may hamper economic growth, risks associ-
ated with foreign bank penetration, the high degree of capital flow volatility
and in particular the risks of cross-border contagion. Although, international
capital inflows may stimulate domestic investment and raise economic growth.
This effect may be quite limited or even become negative in the long-run if
the cross-border capital flows are misallocated to unproductive investments.
For example, in some catching-up countries, capital inflows are used to finance
private consumption or excessive public deficits or are invested in speculative
and non-tradable sectors (e.g. in real estate). Large amounts of funds invested
in weak productive sections may push up inflation and real exchange rates,
leading to serial problems such as low real interest rates, growing external
imbalances and associated large current account deficits, excessive credit, and
asset price distortions. Misallocation of capital flows usually arises in countries
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with weak banks (i.e., banks with low capital to risk-adjusted asset ratios) and
poorly supervised financial systems (Agénor, 2001). Easier access to the capi-
tal market by the banking system may exacerbate the moral hazards problem.
The lenders may engage in riskier and more concentrated loan operations. This
happened in East Asian economies in the 1990s, causing a serious banking and
currency crisis in 1997-1998.
Although foreign-bank penetration generates potential efficiency and sta-
bility benefits, it may weaken the position of the domestic banking system.
If domestic banks are burdened with bad debts, operate less efficiently, or
are technically disadvantaged, this makes them unable to cope with compet-
itive pressures (De Haas et al., 2002).Pardee et al. (1998) emphasised foreign
competition can raise the probability of a banking crisis as lower margins for
domestic banks to make them more vulnerable to loan losses. Also, foreign
banks usually concentrate their credit provisions on large and often multi-
national firms with higher creditworthiness. This leaves domestic banks with
the remaining bad corporate credit risks and the retail market. The higher
degree of credit rationing to small firms and household borrowers may bring
about adverse effects on output, employment, and outcome distribution. An-
other risk of foreign bank entrance is the concentration process arising from
the pressure of mergers between local banks for them to remain competitive
and the acquisition of domestic banks by foreign banks. This results in banks
becoming “too big to fail”. This is likely to increase the moral hazard problem
and monopoly power.
Global integration with higher financial openness to cross-border transac-
tions increases the level of capital flow volatility because it leads not only to
domestic capital flight but also to large capital inflows, which are highly sus-
ceptible to the sudden reversal in times of financial distress. During the past
two decades, currency or financial crises accompanied by capital withdrawals
have become more frequent and severe. However, the effects of financial liber-
alisation on capital flow volatility are varied, depending on the form of capital
flows and economic region (Broner and Ventura, 2010). For example, For-
eign Direct Investment(FDI) is considered more stable and more difficult to
liquidate than portfolio and other investment flows( Lipsey,2001 ;Berger and
Udell,2004).
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Tong and Wei (2011) conducted a test of the effect of capital flow composi-
tion in 24 Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) during the 1999-2009 period.
They found that the adjustments of international bank loans are sharper than
portfolio investment and much sharper than that of FDI flows. The volatile
level of capital movement is also higher for short-term liabilities, which are
more prone to “cut and run” by international banks during a period of finan-
cial turmoil. Additionally, the volatility in net capital flows is more severe in
EMEs than in advanced economies because the change in external liabilities
(i.e. a sudden stop in capital inflows) is relatively higher than an adjustment
in external assets (limited capital outflows). After all, EMEs are generally less
interconnected and less flexible in offsetting the changes in both inward and
outward linkages. They are therefore more vulnerable to the one-way risk of
deleveraging.
The highest potential cost of financial interconnection and the associated
capital flow volatility is the risk of cross-border contagion. Financial literature
provides many approaches to defining contagion. On one hand, cross-border
financial linkages reduce investors’ exposure to domestic shocks. On the other
hand, investors become more vulnerable to foreign shocks. In other words,
financial linkages may facilitate shock propagation across countries through
various transmission mechanisms. The most obvious channel is from direct
exposure, i.e. overlapping claims that different countries/regions or banking
sectors have on one another. A negative shock that hits one country will cause
unexpected losses in others because their claims on the troubled country fall
in value. If the loss is substantial enough, it will cause a crisis in the affected
countries.
Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) develop theoretical mod-
els to demonstrate that the possibility of contagion depends strongly on the
completeness of the structure of interregional claims. For example, countries
whose banking sectors had more exposure to structural credit products in the
United States of America (US) experienced larger losses during the 2007-2009
subprime mortgage crisis. In that case, European banks were major purchasers
of asset-back securities and obtained dollar funding in the US money markets
Bernanke et al., 2011. Therefore, they suffered more severe sub-prime losses
than EMEs in Asia or Latin America. This affected their domestic lending
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and consequently led to the economic recession.
4.2.2 Determinants of Cross-Border positions
International banks may grow their foreign claims portfolio in two ways. First,
the bank may establish affiliates in different countries and extend claims locally
through their branches and subsidiaries in these countries. Second, the bank
may also extend cross-border claims by financing and booking the claims from
outside the recipient or host countries. The cross-border claims are typically
extended from the bank’s headquarters. The local claims involve some form
of foreign direct investment in the host country’s financial sector, cross-border
claims do not.
Jeanneau and Micu (2002) analysed the cross-border lending to large Asian
and Latin-American countries during the period 1985 and 2002. They found
that the economic cycles in the lending countries might have a pro-cyclical
impact on the international bank claims. Additionally, they found that the
foreign bank lending flows would be encouraged in the fixed and intermedi-
ate exchange rate arrangements. However, the floating rate agreements may
impede the lending flows.Peria et al. (2005) analysed the cross-country deter-
minants and financial stability implications of the mix of international banks’
foreign claims using data on Italian, Spanish, and US banks’ foreign claims for
the period 1997-2002. They found that the regulatory barriers to banking and
restricted business opportunities in borrowing countries to have a significantly
negative impact on the share of a lending bank’s claim in favour of cross-border
claims. Furthermore, they found that the foreign claim volatility is lower in
countries with a larger share of local claims. Papaioannou (2005) using data
on 40 lending and 140 recipient countries for the period from 1984 to 2002 to
assess how institutions affect international lending. They found that the major
obstacles for foreign bank lending to emerging markets to be under-performing
institutions in recipient countries. These under-performing institutions have
weak property rights, legal inefficiencies, or a high risk of expropriation. Addi-
tionally, he suggested that the political liberalization, privatization, and other
structural policies might enable local economies to attract substantially more
foreign bank capital.
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Herrmann and Mihaljek (2013) examined the impact of financial distress in
the source and recipient countries on the international bank lending based on
the cross-border bank flows between 17 advanced and 28 emerging countries
during the period 1993-2008. They found that the country-specific risk factors
to be significant determinants of cross-border bank flows. They identified that
increasing expected global financial market volatility, higher fiscal deficits and
deteriorating banking sector performance in emerging markets along with loose
financial and monetary linkages between the source and the recipient country
to reduce cross-border banking flows.
Buch and Goldberg (2015) (2009) examined the relationship between macroe-
conomic shocks and changes in the international bank’s foreign assets using
a sample of 17 OECD countries during the period 1999 to 2006. They found
that temporary overshooting and subsequent adjustment over several quarters
characterized the bank lending. Also, they found banks reduce their foreign
assets in response to a relative increase in domestic interest rates, and they
increase their foreign assets when the growth rate of world energy prices rises.
Houston et al. (2012) investigated whether the cross-country differences in
regulations have affected the international banks’ flows. They use data on in-
ternational bank flows from 26 lending countries to 120 borrowing countries for
the period from 1996 to 2007. They found that the banks transferred funds to
markets with fewer regulations. This form of regulatory arbitrage restricted the
domestic regulator’s ability to limit bank risk-taking. Additionally, they found
that the links between regulation differences and bank flows are significantly
stronger if the recipient country is a developed country with strong property
rights and creditor rights. This suggests that differences in regulations have
significant influences, however, without a strong institutional environment, lax
regulations are not enough to encourage massive capital flows. Ongena et al.
(2013) analysed the business lending by 155 banks to 9,613 firms in 1,946 dif-
ferent localities across 16 European countries over the period 2005-2008. They
found that the lower barriers to entry, tighter restrictions on bank activities,
and to a lesser degree higher minimum capital requirements in domestic mar-
kets are associated with lower bank lending standards abroad. Furthermore,
they found that higher restrictions on non-core bank activities such as bank
involvement in securities markets, insurance, real estate, etc. may result in
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banks are less efficiently supervised at home, and are observed to exist inde-
pendently from the impact of host-country regulation. These findings point to
the possibility that there could be more risk-taking activities for multinational
banks when they enter a less restrictively regulated banking market.
4.2.3 Cross-border banking and financial crises
Numerous researchers have looked into the volatility in cross-border banking
flows, especially the adjustment in international lending during crisis episodes,
with various pull and push factors. The pull factors deal with the reduction
in lending from international bank’s reactions to the economic and financial
disturbances in the host country. This was witnessed by simultaneous with-
drawals of global banks from emerging economies during the financial crises
of the 1990s (Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997-1998, Brazil and Russia in
1999, Turkey in 2000 and Argentina in 2002). The push factor corresponds
to the spillovers from home country shocks through credit contraction by par-
ent banks or foreign affiliates and branches. Most of the recent studies of the
global financial crisis stress the significance of global push factors, especially,
risk, liquidity, interest rates, and growth.
The market liquidity failures intensified the recent global financial crisis.
This is comparable to a bank run on a liquid market, which changes liquid se-
curities to illiquid loans, following a shock that makes traders and asset holders
uncertain regarding the underlying assets value (Davis, 2008).Adrian and Shin
(2010) indicated that market liquidity failure reflects contagion through market
price changes. This means financial institutions manage their balance sheets
in response to measured risk and price changes.Barrell and Davis (2008) found
that when a bank’s balance sheet is strong, the bank has low leverage and
seeks to extend its balance sheet through increased lending and short-term
liabilities incurrence. This is witnessed as enhanced liquidity across the whole.
Therefore, the bank was able to lend to sub-prime borrowers in the run-up to
2007. When there is a market price shock, financial institutions, which mark
to market, find their leverage high and seek to reduce their balance sheets that
required ceasing to lend in the interbank market.
Another important source of financial instability resulted from exposure
to bad financial debt, which arose from real estate bubbles. It is argued that
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the bubble in real estate prices in the U.S. caused the global financial crisis.
Financial fragility led to an over-expansion in housebuilding in other countries,
such as Spain and Ireland. This influenced the banks in these countries for
their capacity to respond to the crisis in the Eurozone. The overvaluation of
house prices and subsequent fall affected the financial institutions. This led to
bank failures in the U.S., U.K., and Ireland, which affected the real economy.
In the U.S., this was compounded by the failure in the securitised mortgage
markets and markets for assets such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
These securities were then held by European banks either by the purchase of
the derivative assets or of financial institutions that held them. As a result,
the crisis spread quickly from the U.S. to Europe.
Most of the assets backed by sub-prime loans were offloaded by the banks.
In the early months of the crisis,Greenlaw et al. (2008) shows that there was
a big amount of recapitalisation from sovereign wealth funds. The dynamics
of the crisis was vastly been affected by cross-border banking. The European
banks were holding U.S. securities such as MBS and CDS. This made European
banks exposed to the U.S. crisis. This was the result of the global banks
operating on either the selling or buying side. The nature of failure in credit
and collapse in asset markets was global which fed across borders because of the
complex linkages through the global ownership of financial assets. The nature
of the crisis caused a severe shortfall in liquidity among the European banks,
which were short of US dollars. This situation had to be resolved. Therefore,
the solution for the shortage was resolved through a currency swap initiative
by the major central banks. The market liquidity failure for securitised loans
affected the banks because of mark-to-market pricing. As the price decreased,
it affected the solvency. In the past banking crises, loans have been held at a
known cost with no specific price. This made the global financial crisis different
from past crises.
The effect of the financial crisis on cross border banking can occur in the
lender country, borrower country, or both countries at the same time. However,
this depends on the nature of the crisis. The existing studies have mainly
emphasises on the importance of banks which are directly experienced a crisis
in the lending country. In the literature, the banks decrease their local lending
and their cross-border lending (Takáts,2010 and Herrmann and Mihaljek,2013.
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Also, this occurs with a decrease in the local lending by foreign office (Cetorelli
and Goldberg, 2011). The reduction in cross-border lending is limited to the
banks, which are geographically closer to the borrower and have a domestic
office or strong historical ties to the domestic banks (De Haas et al., 2011) .
In the literature, there seems to be a consensus that the financial crisis
limits international banking. From a customer point of view, one might reach
a different conclusion as crises in the home country can lead to domestic credit
rationing and induce borrowers to look for funding in stable countries abroad.
On the other hand, this increase may be dampened by the foreign bank’s con-
cerns about lending across borders due to substantial information asymmetries
in the retail sector. Additionally, the peculiarities of the nation’s legal system
make it more difficult for foreign banks to work efficiently and effectively han-
dle a default and collateral recovery. Therefore, the observed effects of banking
crises on cross border lending will depend on the interaction of borrower’s de-
mand and lender’s supply. This will show which effect dominates.
Banking crises will lead to more loans when credit rationing at home is more
severe than informational imperfection. However, once cross-border lending in-
creases the effect is likely permanent after banks and customers have invested
in overcoming informational imperfections. In contrast, there is limited evi-
dence for deposits in the literature. Some studies investigated the determinants
of cross-border deposits or considered banks’ overall cross-border liabilities.
However, none of these studies considered the impact of financial crises.
Ferri et al. (1998) found evidence for a “flight to quality (safety) by depos-
itors” during the Asian crisis of 1997/08. The depositors in Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand turned to safer foreign banks operat-
ing in these countries. By analysing depositor behaviour during crises, there
is a clearer picture of the effects of the crisis has on cross-border banking. As
deposits are not hampered by information asymmetry problems. Depositors
can exercise direct market discipline by withdrawing deposits or by requiring
higher rates of return from riskier banks. Discipline incentives are strongest
in the absence of deposit insurance or for uninsured depositors who risk losing
their deposits above the deposit-insurance ceiling.
Empirical evidence for direct market discipline is weak except for periods of
crisis when depositors are able to “vote with their feet” (Rochet, 2004).(Park
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and Peristiani, 1998) found that during the U.S. savings and loan crisis thrifts
paid higher deposit rates but attracted less insured as well as uninsured de-
posits. Peria et al. (2005) found similar effects during the banking crises in
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (2004) states that deposit insurance schemes depend on their specific
features, which can either increase or decrease market discipline. This means
that during crises, the depositors do not perceive the deposit insurance scheme
as fully credible.
Herrmann and Mihaljek (2013) showed spillovers effects on bank lending
flows from advance economies to emerging market economies through different
channels such as the weak performance of banks in advance economies global
financial market volatility and global risk aversion, measured by the spreads
between US corporate bond yields and 10-year Treasury bond yields.Rai and
Kamil (2010) investigated the effect of the global credit crunch on foreign
banks’ lending to emerging market economies. The result showed that the
weakening of parent banks’ financial health and a decrease in the economic
growth of the home country consistently lead to slower growth in international
banks’ lending to Latin America. Specifically, a rise in one standard deviation
in parent banks’ Expected Default Frequency is associated with a 1.5 percent-
age point average decrease in the growth rate of foreign banks’ lending in the
subsequent quarter. These results are consistent with the findings ofCihák and
Brooks (2009) that bank loan supply in the euro area moves in line with par-
ent banks’ financial soundness. Similarly,Popov and Udell (2010) confirmed
the hypothesis that the credit crunch was transmitted to CEE following the
contraction in parent and foreign banks’ balance sheets caused by losses on
financial assets and deterioration of their equity positions.
While some researchers have emphasised the ‘pull factors’ as key drivers of
cross-border banking flows, especially domestic fundamentals, fiscal position,
country specific risks, financial policies, and external exposure through trade
and financial links. Derviz and Podpiera (2007) found that host country fac-
tors instead of home country ones are particularly important as a source of
cross-border lending contagion. Influential host economic development vari-
ables include inflation, long-term interest rates, and exchange rate volatility,
while the equivalent variables for the home country appear to be insignifi-
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cant.Hawkins (2003) showed that internal bank lending to emerging economies
is subject to the strength of both home and host countries, which is captured
by their respective returns. However, it is found that the pull factors to be
much stronger than the push factors.
Contagion factors have been considered in terms of the structure of cross-
border banking flows. Besides the existence of common lenders,Geršl et al.
(2007) analysed two other main factors that increase the vulnerability in the
CEE banking system. These factors are maturities of cross-border exposures
and funding concentration. According to BIS, banks’ short-term claims fell
much more during the crisis than long-maturity claims, which suggests the
dominant effect of bank deleveraging. Moreover, if the foreign bank claims
of a country are concentrated with one large creditor, when that creditor is
hit by a shock that forces it to liquidate foreign investments, the impact on
the debtor country will certainly be greater than if the domestic economy
uses foreign capital from several countries.Rai and Kamil (2010) argued that
the size of foreign banks’ lending response to shocks depends on their lend-
ing structure. Cross-border lending flows which are largely denominated in
foreign currencies and funded in wholesale markets, experience much higher
volatility. Lending flows from foreign affiliates and branches are less volatile
because they are mostly denominated in local currencies and financed by do-
mestic deposits.Hoggarth et al. (2010) examined the dynamic international
bank capital flows from the perspectives of borrowers. They concluded that
withdrawals were much greater with bank funding flows to non-related banks
than the banking sector, with cross-border lending than lending from foreign
subsidiaries, and over a shorter period. A possible reason is that banks are
more likely to reduce exposures in markets where they have less knowledge of
their customers.
In addition to global and country-specific risks, another strand of litera-
ture emphasises regional contagion factors and the structure of cross-border
banking flows as determinants of the sudden reversals in international lend-
ing. For example, the importance of the common lender effect of contagion
was empirically investigated by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000),Salgado et al.
(2000),Hernández and Valdés (2001),Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003),Peria
et al. (2005) and Pontines and Siregar (2014). All of them found that the
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vulnerability to the risk of the sudden stop could spread among clusters of
countries that depend on the same lenders. Additionally,Salgado et al. (2000)
showed that the countries, which are most important to the common lenders,
are more likely to experience financial crises than those, which only receive a
very small proportion of the common lenders’ total lending. Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2003) investigated the withdrawals of common lenders, which led
to remarkable capital outflows from emerging economies during the Mexican,
Asian and Russian crises. However, in the Russian crisis, a more general rever-
sal of bank flows was due to the wake-up call effect caused by a sudden increase
in banks’ risk aversion, even if financial links via common lenders were weak
among these emerging economies. Also,De Haas et al. (2011) looked into the
importance of the wake-up call effect. They found that the sub-prime mort-
gage problem in mid-2007 acted as a wake-up call for banks to review their
screening and monitoring standards. This lead to a significant shrinking of
syndicated loans in both advanced economies and emerging economies.
4.2.4 Liquidity and Cross-Border Banking
An extensive literature has established that the two main global liquidity com-
ponents, cross-border loan, and bond flows through market-based participants,
are impacted not only by local factors but also by global factors.Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2011) using quarterly data for U.S. banks for the period 1980 –
2005 investigated the internal capital markets among the banks and the inter-
nal flows of funds within a banking organisation are systemically associated
with the changes in the monetary policy. They found that the transmission
of impulses through global banks to their affiliate locations internationally via
internal capital markets follows a pecking order, with the degree of shock trans-
mission to countries dependent on their bank-specific importance in lending
and funding activity (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). Further, they concluded
geographic national boundaries are increasingly losing significance in evaluat-
ing the effects of domestic shocks and the rise of global banking is an effective
vehicle of transmission across borders.
Forbes et al. (2017) using bank-level data from the U.K. investigated the
deglobalisation in cross-border bank lending. They found that increases in
micro-prudential capital requirements tend to reduce international bank lend-
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ing and some forms of unconventional monetary policy can increase this effect.
In the U.K., the Funding for Lending Scheme significantly amplified the ef-
fects of increased capital requirements on cross-border lending. Quantitative
easing did not appear to have a similar effect and countries with stronger pru-
dential capital regulations were partially insulated against the effects of these
changes in UK policy. Similarly,Damar and Mordel (2016) investigated how
the changes in prudential requirements affect cross-border lending of Canadian
banks. They found that when a destination country tightens local prudential
measures, Canadian banks increase the growth rate of lending to that juris-
diction, and the effect is particularly significant when capital requirements are
tightened and weaker if banks lend mainly via affiliates. Furthermore, they
showed that Canadian banks adjust foreign lending in response to domestic
regulatory changes.
Bank’s balance sheet characteristics are significant for the response to
shocks. Higher bank capital, and more retention of bank earnings, reduce the
cost of debt financing, increases bank lending growth, and reduces the mag-
nitude of monetary policy transmission into lending (Gambacorta and Shin,
2018). US monetary policy tightening and episodes of dollar appreciation are
associated with deleveraging of global banks, reduced capital flows to emerg-
ing markets, and an overall tightening of global financial conditions (Bruno
and Shin, 2015).Cornett et al. (2011) examined how the banks managed the
liquidity shock during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. They found that banks
with more illiquid asset portfolios, i.e., those banks that held more loans and
securitized assets, increased their holdings of liquid assets and decreased lend-
ing. In addition, they showed that banks that relied more heavily on stable
sources of financing, i.e., core deposits and capital, continued to lend relative
to other banks.
Buch and Goldberg (2015) found that liquidity conditions affecting parent
banks transmit into both the domestic and foreign lending of the banks in the
sample. Large and small banks differ in their response to liquidity shocks. For
many countries, the large banks are the internationally active banks. However,
exposure to liquidity risk depends on the type of home market, in particular,
whether a country has been home or host to internationally active banks. Fur-
thermore, they found internationally active banks have used internal capital
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markets as an additional channel of adjustment to liquidity risk, both during
normal times and during the crisis. Banks increased net borrowing from affili-
ates as liquidity risk rose in order to support domestic and cross-border lending.
Caccavaio et al. (2014)assessed the extent of liquidity shocks has an impact on
domestic and cross-border lending of Italian banks. They looked for differences
across banks depending on their international exposure and accounts for the
effects of the sovereign debt crisis and the ECB’s nonconventional monetary
policy measures. Using the Euribor-Eonia spread as a measure of liquidity
stress, results showed: individual bank characteristics have a limited effect on
lending, with little difference across banks with and without foreign affiliates.
When using the proxy liquidity stress with the spread on Italian sovereign
bonds (10-year BTP-Bund spread), they found that banks without foreign
affiliates reduce lending more than other banks when the spread widens.
Segalla (2015) examined how different types of banks adjust their balance
sheet positions in response to a liquidity shock. It distinguishes between dif-
ferent definitions of lending activities, such as changes in domestic C&I lend-
ing, foreign C&I lending, total credit, cross-border claims, foreign offices local
claims, and internal borrowing between affiliated banks. The results showed
smaller banks (parent banks without affiliates) response to liquidity risk de-
pends on core deposit funding for foreign C&I lending and total credit. The
cross-sectional differences in large banks (parent banks with affiliates) in re-
sponse to liquidity risk cannot be uniformly explained by one particular ex-ante
determinant. The growth of cross-border claims is negatively correlated with
a higher share of illiquid assets (Illiquid Asset Ratio) and with a higher share
of capital and positively correlated with the commitment ratio.
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) examined the relationships between adverse
liquidity shocks on main developed-country banking systems to emerging mar-
kets across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, isolating loan supply from loan
demand effects using 17 source countries and 94 destination countries from
the emerging market. They found that the direct transmission of the shock
is through the cross-border lending of source countries. The indirect trans-
mission takes place through the internal capital markets of globalized banks,
where reduced support of emerging market affiliates or increased outflows from
emerging markets trigger reduced lending at home by these affiliates. Further-
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more, they demonstrated that both foreign-owned banks and local stand-alone
banks are expected to be impacted by foreign liquidity conditions but to dif-
fering degrees. These magnitudes are based on their exposure to cross-border
funding and to the internal capital markets of the broader banking organiza-
tions in which they participate.
4.2.5 Efficiency and Cross Border Banking
Cross-border banking activities require banks to operate in a country different
from their home country. Microeconomic theory of market contestability states
that, with weak market barriers to entry and assuming that local firms wish
to deter new entries, the former has to be efficient; otherwise, new firms would
have competitive advantages (Baumol, 1986). The idea behind this theory
is that technological differences are supposed to be an important feature of
firms’ competitive capacity so that using a more advanced banking technology
in a country could be a barrier to new entries. For determining how efficiently
banks set up their products, some works have used a common efficient frontier
to control for the variability in bank performance across borders. When the
aim is to control the efficiency of banks operating in the same market, the
particular environment where banks develop their activity becomes a relevant
factor that could explain efficiency differences.
Numerous researchers have shown that environmental conditions affect the
efficiency scores of cross-border banking analysis. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas
(2000) investigated the efficiency of French and Spanish banks. By including
the environmental variables, the results showed that the differences between
both banking industries are reduced substantially. They concluded that ne-
glecting these variables leads to important misspecification of the common
frontier and overestimates inefficiency. Further, they suggested that in terms
of cross-border competition, banks entering each other’s market seem to have
to accommodate to the different environment.Chaffai et al. (2001) analysed the
productive differences of banks in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They
used a Malmquist type index, which allows productivity gaps among banking
industries in different countries to be measured and the difference to be broken
down into difference due to pure technological effects and differences due to
environmental effects. The index takes into account the domestic environmen-
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tal conditions in which the banks operate. The results indicate on average,
the differences due to environmental conditions always are larger than the dif-
ferences in banking technology. They conclude that ignoring environmental
conditions could lead to inaccurate conclusions when important issues such as
the competitiveness of banking markets and the opportunities for cross-border
consolidation for the future of the banking industry are considered. Numerous
researchers have supported the role of environmental conditions influencing
efficiency. This suggests that environmental conditions influence banks’ cross-
border activity.
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) investigated the role of environmental condi-
tions of another country on the bank in one country. The results indicate
that adverse (advantageous) environmental conditions are a positive (nega-
tive) factor for the home banking industry and being technically efficient ap-
pears to be a significant deterrence to foreign competition. This suggests
that advantageous (adverse) environmental conditions are an aid (obstacle)
for cross-border banking activity. Using a sample of 700 banks in 11 European
countries,Lozano-Vivas and Pastor (2010) analysed whether banking technol-
ogy and environmental conditions act as barriers for the entry of foreign banks
in each European banking industry. The results show that being technolog-
ically advanced appears to be a significant deterrent to foreign competition
and adverse environmental conditions constitute a real barrier for cross-border
banking activity. Additionally, host-nation banking performance is a good
safeguard against cross-border competition due to the differences in available
technology and environmental conditions.
Amihud et al. (2002) examined the effects of cross-border bank mergers on
the risk and (abnormal) returns of acquiring banks. The results suggest that
whether an acquirer’s risk rises or falls, following a cross-border acquisition
is highly idiosyncratic. There is no evidence that cross-border merging banks
add to the risk exposure of either domestic or host country regulators, whether
looking at the total risk of the acquirer or its systematic risk relative to various
banking industry indexes (home, host, and world).Fraser and Zhang (2009)
provided evidence on operating performance changes in a sample of U.S. banks
acquired by non-U.S. banking organisations over the 1980–2001 period. The
results indicate that foreign acquirers of U.S. banks have generally acquired
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U.S. targets that were slightly below the industry norm in terms of their cash
flow performance. The foreign parents were able to improve the performance
of the targets. The evidence of improvement in performance includes a more
efficient usage of labour and no increase in loan loss.
4.3 Weighted Russell Directional Distance Model
The directional distance function developed by Chambers et al. (1996) and
Chambers et al. (1998) assumes that the inputs and undesirable outputs are
contracted and desirable outputs are expanded at the same.Therefore, they
may still be treated as a radial measure of efficiency. From the perspective of
axiomatic approach on efficiency measurement, radial measure may be more
favourable as the efficiency function has some desirable mathematical charac-
teristics (Sahoo et al., 2011). However, radial efficiency measures may overes-
timate the efficiency when there exist non-zero slacks (Fukuyama and Weber,
2009).The undesirable outputs are ignored in almost all these measures (Chen
et al., 2014). In practice, there are some cases in which both outputs which
are desirable (goods) and undesirable (bads; such as bad loans) are produced
jointly.It is important to consider not only all the inefficiency sources of inputs
and desirable outputs but also all the inefficiency sources of undesirable outputs
when we evaluate the performance of a decision making unit (DMU).Several
studies have investigated how to incorporate the slacks to provide a meaningful
efficiency measure (Barros et al., 2012; Fukuyama and Weber, 2009).
Following by Chen et al. (2014) and Barros et al. (2012), Weighted Rus-
sell Directional Distance Model is used to measure the productive inefficiency.
Chen et al. (2014) argued that the non-radial model can compute inputs and
outputs inefficiency individually in addition to the overall inefficiency score.
This is not possible with the radial models because they are based on the as-
sumption of proportional changes in inputs and outputs. Chen et al. (2014)pro-
posed a measure based on directional distance function which is evaluated in
linear form. As a result, it possesses the attractive advantages of easy compu-
tation and easy extension of incorporating the additional undesirable outputs
into the programming problems.WRDDM allows for not only the technical
inefficiency associated with desirable output, undesirable output and input to
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be different, but also allows the technical inefficiency among each of the desir-
able outputs, the undesirable outputs and the inputs to be different (Chen
et al., 2014).This allows to identify the source where we need to improve
most.This contribution effect cannot be determined in conventional produc-
tive inefficiency analysis. The contribution effects enable us to discuss how and
why such firms successfully decreased their productive inefficiency.Another ad-
vantage of WRDMM over the traditional directional distance function model
is that it directly incorporates weights to consider the appropriate relation-
ship among input and output items, while the traditional model weights them
equally.WRDDM takes into account for all the slacks for the inputs, desir-
able outputs and undesirable outputs. This allows the model to provide more
accurate results performance evaluation results Chen et al. (2014).By using
WRDDM, we can quantify the affect on the bad loans on the technical effi-
ciency of the banks.This will allow to us to identify which resource uses or
production of outputs (including goods and bads) need to be improved most.
Let inputs be denoted by εRN+ , good outputs by y εR
M
+ , and undesirable
outputs by b εRL+ . The directional distance function seeking to increase the
desirable outputs and decrease the undesirable outputs and inputs directionally
can be defined by the following:
−→
D(x, y, b|g) = sup (β : (x+ βg, y + βg, b+ βg)ε T ) (4.1)
where the vector g = (gx, gy, gb) determines the directions in which inputs,
desirable outputs and undesirable outputs are scaled. The technology reference
set T = (x, y, b) : x can produce (y, b) satisfies strong disposability of desirable
outputs and inputs, and weak disposability of undesirable outputs.
Suppose there are j = 1, 2, ..., k, ..., j firms in the dataset. Each firm uses
inputs x = x1, x2, ..., xNεR
N
+ to jointly produce outputs y = y1, y2, ..., yMεR
M
+
and undesirable outputs b = b1, b2, ..., bLεR
L
+.The WRDDM for inefficiency
calculation of the firm k can be described as follows:
−→
















ΣJj=1zkymj ≥ ymk + βkmgymk ,m = 1, . . . ..,M (4.3)
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ΣJj=1zkbij = blk + β
k
l gblk , l = 1, ..., L (4.4)
ΣJj=1zkxnj ≤ xnk + βkngxnk , n = 1, ..., N (4.5)





n are the individual inefficiency measures for desirable
outputs, undesirable outputs, and inputs ,respectively. Zk is the intensity
variable to shrink or expand the individual observed activities of firm k for
the purpose of constructing convex combinations of the observed inputs and
outputs. To estimate productivity change indicators, we set directional vector
g = (gxnk, gymk, gblk) = (−xnk, ymk,−blk). The WRDDM is shown as follows :
−→
















ΣJj=1zkymj ≥ ymk(1 + βkm) ,m = 1, . . . ..,M (4.8)
ΣJj=1zkbij = blk(1− βkl ) , l = 1, ..., L (4.9)
ΣJj=1zkxnj ≤ xnk(1− βkn) , n = 1, ..., N (4.10)
Zj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , k, . . . , J (4.11)
This type of directional vector assumes that an inefficient firm can decrease
productive inefficiency while increasing desirable outputs and decreasing un-
desirable outputs and/or inputs in proportion to the initial combination of
actual inputs and outputs. The advantage of the directional vector is that it
yields a straightforward interpretation of the inefficiency score.It will allow to
identify the source which needs to improve the most.
By using WRDDM, the study will incorporate bad loans in into account
for technical efficiency measurement. This will provide a more comprehensive
efficiency results.Furthermore, WRDDM allows to identify variable-wise ineffi-
ciencies on which inefficient banks need to focus.WRDDM is able to determine
each variable’s contribution effect on efficiency. This is one of the strong points
of the WRDDM. This contribution effect cannot be determined in conventional
productive inefficiency analysis. The contribution effects enable us to discuss
how and why such firms successfully decreased their productive inefficiency.
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The review of the cross-country studies indicates that the intermediation ap-
proach is most commonly used. This is consistent with the modern empirical
literature of studies, which examines individual countries. Following these
studies, the intermediation approach is adopted. The model is estimated us-
ing 3 inputs, 2 outputs, and 1 bad output. The inputs are the number of
full-time employees(Labour), total deposits, and physical capital(Fixed As-
sets) that is defined as a sum of premises and real estate plus bank premises
and equipment. The outputs are Total Loans that exclude NPLs, securities,
and Other Earning Assets.An undesirable output is Bad Loans. Bad Loans
include past-due loans in arrears by 6 months or more, Loans in arrears by 3
months or more and less than 6 months, Restructured loans, Bankrupt and
quasi-bankrupt assets, Doubtful assets, Substandard loans. Table 4.1 presents
descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs.
Table 4.1: Description of Inputs and Outputs for WRDDM.WRDDM is used for calculating
efficiency scores.
Inputs Outputs
1.Number of Employees (Labour) 1.Loans
2.Deposits 2.Other Earning Assets
3.Physical Capital (Fixed Assets) 3.Bad Loans
Control Variables
In this study, five bank-specific, liquidity shock, one country-specific domestic
exposure, and cross-border exposure control variables have been used. The
country-specific variable account for the macroeconomic conditions. The bank-
specific variables are: LOGTA is the logarithm of bank’s assets and controls
for bank’s size; NPL is loan loss provisions over total loans and is a measure
of Asset Quality; ROE is the pre-tax profit divided by equity; EQAS is equity
to assets ratios and is a measure for the capital strength of the bank and
LOANTA is total loans over total assets and is a measure of loan activity.
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These variables have been used in the past studies to reveal the bank-specific
characteristics that have an impact on the efficiency (Pasiouras et al., 2006;
Pasiouras, 2008b).
To identify the impact of liquidity shock, the study follows Sarmiento (2018)
methodology. First, we use the bank’s deposits outflow as our measure of
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, based on that banks suffer from liquidity shocks
associated with unexpected withdrawals by their depositors that condition
their liquidity. Therefore, if the bank suffers a deposits outflow in t-1, it may
force the bank to borrow in t from the interbank market, and depending on the
bank’s characteristics and market conditions it may entail a greater borrowing
cost. The study defines the borrower’s LiquidityShockit as a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the rate of change of the deposits of the bank is negative in t-1
and, 0 otherwise.
Earlier studies have used different variables for controlling the macroeco-
nomic conditions. In this study, annual growth in GDP is used for controlling
the macroeconomic condition. Earlier studies have found that favourable con-
ditions would be affecting positively the demand for the supply of banking
services and would possibly contribute towards an improvement in the bank’s
efficiency. Maudos et al. (2002) found that the banks operating in expanding
markets proxy by the real growth rate of GDP present higher levels of profit
efficiency. However, under expansive demand conditions, banks would feel less
pressurised to control their costs and could be less cost efficient.
The key challenge in this area of research is to get a complete overview of
the cross-border positions of banks, as there are no regular reporting standards
for banks’ foreign exposures split by country. Following, the study follows
Duijm and Schoenmaker (2018) methodology to get a complete overview of
cross-border positions including those via branches. Due to the absence of a
standard reporting format, some assumptions and simplifications had to be
made. Firstly, the majority of banks report their foreign exposures in loans
or assets. As we are especially interested in banks’ credit exposures to other
regions, we had an order of preference for exposures reported in i) loans; and
ii) assets.
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Honore’s Tobit Estimator
Numerous studies have suggested ways in which environmental variables could
be accommodated in the technical efficiency analysis. The environmental vari-
ables are described as the factors which could influence the efficiency of the
bank. In this case, such factors are not the traditional inputs and are assumed
to be outside the control of the manager (Sufian, 2009). The WRDDM scores
fall between 0 and 1 making the dependent variable a limited dependent vari-
able. The previous studies which have investigated the efficiency, have used the
Tobit model. This is because it could handle the characteristics of efficiency
measures. Therefore, providing the results which could provide important
policy guidelines to improve performance. Accordingly, WRDMM scores ob-
tained in the first stage are used as a dependent variable in the second stage
and are regressed against bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and
liquidity shock.
The standard Tobit model can be defined as follows for observation (bank)
i:
Y ∗t = β
′
Xi + εi;Yi = Y
∗
i , if Y
∗
i ≥0 and Yi = 0, Otherwise (4.12)
where εi ∼ N(0, σ2), xi and β are vectors of explanatory variables and
unknown parameters, respectively, while Y ∗i is a latent variable and Yi is the
WRDMM efficiency score.
Honoré (1992) Tobit fixed effect model builds on the idea of orthogonality
condition in semi-parametric and pairwise contexts. Honoré (1992) proposed
a trimmed least absolute deviations and trimmed least squares estimators to
secure consistency in the censored and truncated regression estimates with
fixed effects. Honoré (1992) fixed effect model is defined as :-
Y ∗t = α +Xtβ + εt, for t = 1, 2, (4.13)
where X1 and X2 are K-dimensional vectors of explanatory variables, β
is the parameter vector of interest,and α is the fixed effect,ε1 and ε2 are the
error terms.If ε1 and ε2 are independent and identically distributed conditional




2 ) conditional on (X1, X2) is
symmetric around 45◦ line through (∆Xβ, 0).
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The study uses Honore’s fixed-effects Tobit estimator (Honoré, 1992). This
estimation technique allows controlling for the differences between the coun-
tries and macroeconomic conditions. As a result, it allows only inter-temporal
changes in a bank’s characteristics to influence the parameter estimates. The
fixed-effects Tobit estimation technique also relies on symmetry conditions
imposed by a censored model, is semi-parametric, and does not require as-
sumptions of homoskedasticity or normality. The fixed-effects Tobit estimates
standard errors using the method of kernels, a procedure that involves a subjec-
tive judgement concerning the appropriate bandwidth (Silverman, 1986). The
use of the bootstrap avoids this subjectivity while providing an unbiased and
consistent estimate of the standard errors. The bootstrap method consists of
the following steps. First, parameter estimates are made using a Monte Carlo
technique that assigns a 1/n probability for each of the n sample observations.
This involves creating a bootstrapped sample from the original sample by ran-
domly pulling n observations with replacement. This procedure is repeated
500 times, creating 500 parameter estimates. The standard deviations of this
sample of 500 parameter estimates is used to generate the standard errors of
the parameter estimates.The standard fixed effect Tobit estimator for the bank
(i) is defined as :-





it > 0,= 0 otherwise (4.15)
where Yit is the variable of interest, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables,
αi is an individual effect and εit is a random error.
In this study, the fixed effect Tobit estimator is used to assess the deter-
minants of the bank efficiency and cross-border exposures in relation to the
liquidity shock. The bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, liquid-
ity shock, and cross border exposures would be used in this study. The first
model would be using bank characteristics and liquidity shock. The second
model would be using banking characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and
liquidity shocks. The third model would be incorporating bank characteristics,
macroeconomic conditions, liquidity shock, and domestic and foreign expo-
sures. Model 4 incorporates bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions,
liquidity shock, domestic exposures, and exposures from different regions.The
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study augments with year dummies to control for the time effects common
to all banks and country dummies to control for time-invariant heterogeneity
across industries. This allows to address the issue of heterogeneity. As any
remaining unobserved heterogeneity in the sample is captured by country fixed
effects and time fixed effects.
Y ∗it = αi + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + β4LOANTAit
+ β5ROEit + β6LIQSHOCKit + εit
(4.16)
Y ∗it = αi + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + β4LOANTAit
+ β5ROEit + β6LIQSHOCKit + β7GDPGRit + εit
(4.17)
Y ∗it = αi + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + β4LOANTAit
+ β5ROEit + β6LIQSHOCKit + β7GDPGRit + β8DEXPit
+ β9FEXPit + εit
(4.18)
Y ∗it = αi + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + β4LOANTAit
+ β5ROEit + β6LIQSHOCKit + β7GDPGRit + β8DEXPit
+ β9EUROEXPit + β10NAMEXPit + β11SAMEXPit
+ β12AFEXPit + β12ASEXPit + εit
(4.19)
where Y ∗it is the technical efficiency of the i
th bank obtained in period t and
αi is the country and time fixed effects.
Data
The focus is on commercial banks because it would allow us to examine a more
homogeneous sample in terms of services and consequently inputs and outputs
enhancing further the comparability among counties. The sample consists of
the banks in 15 countries in Europe with the financial data available from
Market Intelligence for the period 2005-2019. The banks were excluded from
the sample for one of the following reasons: - (i) they had no data available
for any of the years, (ii) they had missing or negative values for the required
inputs/outputs, and (iii) they had missing values for the bank-specific control
variables. The final sample consists of 1931 banks in 15 countries in Europe.
During the above procedure, we select the consolidated data only. The
reports prepared under International Financial Reporting Standards are used
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where available, but if only reports prepared under local generally accepted
accounting principles are available, then it is used. All the data was converted
to the Euro prior to downloading, using official exchange rates available in
Market Intelligence. The country-specific variable is downloaded from the
World Bank. The Financial Development Index data is downloaded from IMF.
Using the Financial Development Index, the study divides the sample of
1931 banks into 2 sub-samples:-The countries with higher Financial Develop-
ment Index and the lower Financial Development Index. Financial markets
include stock and bond markets. Financial development is defined as a combi-
nation of depth (size and liquidity of markets), access (the ability of individuals
and companies to access financial services), and efficiency (the ability of insti-
tutions to provide financial services at low cost and with sustainable revenues,
and the level of activity of capital markets).Svirydzenka (2016) developed a
number of indices that summarize how developed financial institutions and
financial markets are in terms of their depth, access, and efficiency, which cul-
minated in the final index of financial development. The countries are placed
into sub-samples based on its Financial Development Index being higher or
lower than the average of the sample. In sub-sample with a higher Financial
Development Index consists of 1229 banks in 8 countries. The sub-sample with
lower Financial Development Index consists of 702 banks in 7 countries.
Table 4.3: The table presents the sub-sample of the countries on the basis of the Financial
Development Index.The sample consists of 15 countries.The countries are placed into sub-
samples based on its Financial Development Index being higher or lower than the average
of the sample.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for the Inputs and the Outputs for WRDDM.WRDDM is
used for calculating Efficiency scores.The model is estimated using 3 inputs,2 outputs and 1
bad output.The inputs are the number of full-time employees, total deposits, and physical
capital. The outputs are total loans and other earning assets.An undesirable output is
Bad Loans.The sample consists of 1931 banks in 15 countries.The sample period is 2005-
2019.Reported is the mean on yearly basis.
Year Deposit Labour Fixed Assets Loans Other Earning Assets Bad Loans
2005 35900 0.006 0.382 41600 72300 0.833
2006 5657.266 0.002 0.116 7656.749 11900 0.907
2007 18200 0.002 0.179 15500 35600 0.624
2008 9238.196 0.005 0.159 12700 18800 1498.895
2009 35600 0.013 0.662 47800 77600 3643.437
2010 17000 0.004 217.285 20000 38400 1389.856
2011 15200 0.004 0.391 26200 39900 2081.056
2012 7260.734 0.003 0.150 7883.195 11400 1555.355
2013 7248.936 0.002 0.084 6919.133 10900 0.292
2014 14700 0.005 0.248 19100 34200 1239.341
2015 5906.645 0.003 0.102 6899.312 10300 0.274
2016 23700 20.507 0.565 23200 32500 1618.659
2017 16100 0.002 0.120 18400 72900 0.449
2018 37200 0.012 0.425 56800 91100 5210.494
2019 14700 0.004 0.168 16700 36900 0.733
Total 14700 0.004 0.170 16800 36900 0.745
Table 4.4 presents the average for the inputs and outputs.Over the years,
the inputs and outputs have increased and decreased.The state of economy
has influenced the inputs and outputs over the years. During the period 2005-
2019 ,Labour is mostly below the average of the period. Over the years, Other
Earning Assets has increased on average.When Deposits and Fixed Assets are
increasing, Loans are increasing. However, Bad Loans decline. Bad Loans
increase when there is a decline in the inputs and the other outputs. On
average, Bad Loans has been greater than the average of the period.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for the Inputs and the Outputs of the 15 countries in Europe
for WRDDM.WRDDM is used for calculating Efficiency scores.The model is estimated using
3 inputs,2 outputs and 1 bad output.The inputs are the number of full-time employees, total
deposits, and physical capital. The outputs are total loans and other earning assets.An
undesirable output is Bad Loans.The sample consists of 1931 banks in 15 countries.The
sample period is 2005-2019.Reported statistics are mean,maximum,minimum and standard
deviation in 15 countries.
Country Deposit Labour Fixed Assets Loans Other Earning Assets Bad Loans
Austria Mean 18500 317 0.009 22600 37700 1600
Max. 163000 2476.913 67.002 151000 232000 14500
Min. 45.540 0.180 0.058 35.655 102.455 0.000
S.D. 31400 566 0.018 35000 54300 2790
Belgium Mean 33600 347 0.006 53900 110000 983
Max. 168000 1796 40.750 372000 693000 7399
Min. 28.030 0.085 0.014 0.313 76.423 0.000
S.D. 42900 539 0.010 77600 159000 1520
Cyprus Mean 7340 120 3.485 7870 10800 1340
Max. 33000 497 25.100 28900 41400 8127.296
Min. 4.588 0.720 0.057 0.048 47.154 0.000
S.D. 8610 153 0.006 8910 12100 1980
Denmark Mean 4590 0.038 0.001 8770 14900 334
Max. 142000 1040 250.900 277000 519000 15200
Min. 0.015 0.000 0.005 0.011 0.025 0.000
S.D. 18700 116 10.630 39200 68300 1370
France Mean 35500 420 0.009 42400 106000 1620
Max. 797000 9802 203.092 879000 2360000 43700
Min. 0.022 0.002 0.008 0.890 15.513 0.000
S.D. 107000 1270 0.029 121000 338000 5240
Germany Mean 6780 0.057 0.001 7150 18600 206
Max. 602000 5802 102.062 462000 3280000 13700
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 7.279 0.000
S.D. 32000 270 0.006 30700 133000 976
Greece Mean 18500 488 0.008 23400 29700 5590
Max. 71200 2109 37.591 80800 114000 28800
Min. 2.428 0.092 0.029 54.959 43.622 5.491
S.D. 20300 604 0.010 25600 33100 8570
Luxembourg Mean 7760 0.098 0.001 6680 16700 169
Max. 56600 1303 22.432 65700 153000 5695
Min. 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 69.738 0.000
S.D. 9630 183 0.002 9370 23000 508
Norway Mean 3561.175 0.000 0.021 5993.228 11000 0.084
Max. 112000 13.620 0.910 180000 2040000 3673.101
Min. 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
S.D. 14400 0.002 0.075 24000 77700 0.423
Portugal Mean 6840 104 0.002 8490 11900 600
Max. 73400 1184.058 23.205 84500 123000 11500
Min. 0.000 0.011 0.006 0.000 18.398 0.000
S.D. 14700 220 0.005 18000 24900 1660
Russia Mean 2960 101 0.004 3270 4520 319
Max. 290000 10800 330.677 303000 384000 27300
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Country Deposit Labour Fixed Assets Loans Other Earning Assets Bad Loans
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000
S.D. 18500 639 0.024 20300 26100 1560
Spain Mean 34200 574 0.009 41300 64600 2310
Max. 780000 8324.215 202.713 906000 1420000 40400
Min. 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.009 19.484 0.000
S.D. 95600 1360 0.029 116000 190000 5850
Switzerland Mean 3940 0.042 0.000 3620 5860 0.048
Max. 232000 2230 9.857 172000 297000 1620
Min. 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.034 0.000
S.D. 14000 145 0.001 12500 19800 127
Ukraine Mean 679 0.044 0.004 1050 1210 363
Max. 5090 293 38.876 5780 8645.114 2820
Min. 0.004 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.010 0.000
S.D. 804 0.064 0.006 1260 1540 543
United Kingdom Mean 72300 590 0.016 76900 181000 3120
Max. 1250000 9140 315.520 1140000 3420000 75400
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
S.D. 178000 1550 0.043 180000 485000 9720
Total Mean 14700 0.004 0.170 16800 36900 0.745
Max. 1250000 330.677 10800 1140000 3420000 75400
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
S.D. 67500 0.019 0.740 73100 195000 3681.784
Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs for
the 15 countries in Europe. On average, United Kingdom and Belgium have
the highest loans while Ukraine and Russia have the lowest loans. However,
United Kingdom and Greece have the highest amount of Bad Loans on average
whereas Switzerland and Norway have the lowest. This reflects the recent fi-
nancial distress witnessed in these countries. On average, the United Kingdom
has the inputs and outputs more than the average of all the countries com-
bined. On average, Ukraine, Russia and Switzerland have the lowest Other
Earning Assets. This is lower than the average of all the countries combined.
On average, Switzerland and Norway have the lowest labour. This reflects the
role of higher wages. While the United Kingdom has the highest amount of
labour. This shows that the United Kingdom holds a significant place in the
banking sector of Europe.
Table 4.6 provides an overview of the geographical exposures for all the
banks in the dataset, grouped by country. On average, banks invest the ma-
jority of 43.8% of their assets in their home country. Majority of the foreign
exposures are held in other European countries (32.3%) and North America
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Table 4.6: Cross- Border Exposures of the banks in 15 Europe countries from 2005-2019.The
table shows the domestic exposures and foreign exposures by region for the 1931 European
banks in the dataset, grouped per country. The data is based on the average for the period
2005-2019 , and weighted by total banking assets.
Country Domestic Rest of Europe North America South America Africa Asia
Austria 35.557 15.511 10.708 0.122 0.000 0.004
Belgium 31.674 11.685 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cyprus 37.164 15.237 10.060 0.000 0.000 0.000
Denmark 48.428 13.344 21.560 2.120 0.000 0.012
France 52.986 14.960 44.790 9.110 0.075 0.031
Germany 26.327 83.532 51.450 1.994 0.006 0.026
Greece 59.436 19.079 5.594 0.000 0.000 0.000
Luxembourg 55.450 41.158 7.948 0.003 0.606 0.598
Norway 62.734 55.946 7.131 0.606 0.070 0.054
Portugal 34.698 19.103 32.926 0.624 0.556 0.042
Russia 42.787 19.581 0.000 0.000 0.000 36.729
Spain 34.153 91.277 12.983 0.165 0.000 0.000
Switzerland 88.008 11.513 26.596 1.252 0.293 3.358
Ukraine 13.758 3.745 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
United Kingdom 33.923 69.257 32.090 5.250 0.442 12.053
Total 43.806 32.329 17.589 1.416 0.137 3.527
(17.5%). On average, banks invest the least in Africa with 0.13%, which is
followed by South America with 1.4%. On average, a bank in Switzerland
have invested most in their own country and bank in Ukraine invested the
least. Spanish banks have invested most in the rest of Europe. The banks
in Ukraine have invested the least in the rest of Europe. Russian banks have
invested 36.729% in Asia, which is the most in the group. Similarly, French
banks have invested 9.11% in South America, which is the most in the sample.
The most invested in North America is 51.45% by German banks.
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics of the bank characteristics and macroeconomic variable
based on their country..The sample consists of 1931 banks in 15 countries.The sample period
is 2005-2019.Reported statistics are mean,maximum,minimum and standard deviation.
COUNTRY LOGTA NPL ROE EQASS LOANTA GDP
Austria Mean 16.606 0.035 8.601 0.080 0.571 1.592
Max. 19.283 0.331 58.315 0.520 0.866 3.690
Min. 12.035 0.000 0.053 0.024 0.016 -3.550
S.D. 1.384 0.030 7.933 0.041 0.169 0.397
Belgium Mean 16.352 0.016 10.278 0.077 0.570 1.326
Max. 20.220 0.084 38.516 0.163 0.921 2.860
Min. 11.297 0.000 0.796 0.019 0.004 0.450
S.D. 2.597 0.023 6.758 0.039 0.245 0.263
Cyprus Mean 15.678 0.096 11.587 0.086 0.660 3.081
Max. 17.568 0.296 49.922 0.204 1.019 4.360
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COUNTRY LOGTA NPL ROE EQASS LOANTA GDP
Min. 13.057 0.001 0.506 0.021 0.372 -6.550
S.D. 1.424 0.092 10.373 0.036 0.160 1.753
Denmark Mean 13.537 0.064 7.127 0.127 0.597 2.080
Max. 19.988 0.368 51.078 0.690 0.884 3.910
Min. 10.175 0.002 0.083 0.028 0.250 -4.910
S.D. 2.128 0.044 5.345 0.052 0.124 0.364
France Mean 16.193 0.030 7.070 0.100 0.668 1.249
Max. 21.455 0.275 40.786 0.988 1.226 2.610
Min. 9.698 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 -2.780
S.D. 1.972 0.027 4.654 0.079 0.202 0.133
Germany Mean 14.398 0.018 2.927 0.089 0.644 0.603
Max. 21.495 0.966 91.062 0.725 19.934 4.040
Min. 9.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.640
S.D. 1.574 0.048 4.157 0.042 0.675 0.150
Greece Mean 15.864 0.083 9.494 0.102 0.769 2.064
Max. 18.609 0.304 44.882 0.330 1.184 3.180
Min. 12.104 0.004 0.068 -0.033 0.395 -4.310
S.D. 2.341 0.089 9.336 0.076 0.158 0.827
Luxembourg Mean 15.582 0.009 9.265 0.085 0.346 2.414
Max. 18.459 0.088 29.104 0.180 0.795 8.340
Min. 11.196 0.000 0.058 0.013 0.000 -4.370
S.D. 1.829 0.014 6.102 0.036 0.206 0.902
Norway Mean 13.891 0.008 9.421 0.095 0.821 1.008
Max. 19.576 0.057 37.699 0.450 0.977 2.920
Min. 10.969 0.000 0.075 0.042 0.012 -1.280
S.D. 1.608 0.006 5.089 0.027 0.085 0.160
Portugal Mean 13.621 0.057 9.537 0.106 0.552 1.971
Max. 18.650 0.366 603.656 0.968 1.108 3.510
Min. 10.114 0.000 0.059 -0.114 0.000 -4.060
S.D. 2.304 0.049 33.913 0.086 0.212 0.382
Russia Mean 12.984 0.111 11.054 0.165 0.574 1.213
Max. 19.813 1.000 99.257 0.867 2.896 8.540
Min. 8.644 0.000 0.008 -3.040 0.000 -7.930
S.D. 1.992 0.125 10.743 0.179 0.231 0.408
Spain Mean 15.392 0.042 6.520 0.088 0.623 2.077
Max. 21.101 0.430 155.281 0.999 1.073 4.100
Min. 9.901 0.000 0.012 -0.028 0.000 -3.770
S.D. 2.694 0.030 8.366 0.076 0.214 0.393
Switzerland Mean 13.953 0.007 4.949 0.068 0.756 0.808
Max. 19.432 0.199 54.039 0.714 0.954 4.110
Min. 10.661 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 -2.230
S.D. 1.526 0.014 3.086 0.061 0.232 0.154
Ukraine Mean 13.222 0.156 14.746 0.158 0.730 3.362
Max. 16.009 0.842 96.023 0.675 1.847 7.900
Min. 9.941 0.002 0.019 -0.731 0.000 -14.760
S.D. 1.408 0.148 18.688 0.120 0.245 1.897
United Kingdom Mean 15.463 0.021 9.253 0.082 0.492 1.306
Max. 21.642 0.715 106.900 1.000 0.998 3.180
Min. 2.664 0.000 0.000 -26.773 0.000 -0.280
S.D. 2.882 0.059 10.157 0.959 0.249 0.116
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COUNTRY LOGTA NPL ROE EQASS LOANTA GDP
Total Mean 14.433 0.035 6.411 0.098 0.651 1.116
Max. 21.642 1.000 603.656 1.000 19.934 8.540
Min. 2.664 0.000 0.000 -26.773 0.000 -14.760
S.D. 2.127 0.069 9.118 0.249 0.420 0.669
Table 4.7 provides the descriptive statistics for the bank characteristics and
macroeconomic conditions for the 15 countries in the sample for the period
2005-2019. On average, NPL in Ukraine, Russia and Greece is higher than
the average of the 15 countries. This reflects the problem in the asset quality
especially non-performing loans in these countries over the last decade. On
average, in Denmark and Russia have smaller sized banks than the average
of the countries. The largest bank in the sample is located in the United
Kingdom. LOANTA in most of the countries in the sample is lower than the
average of the countries. The lowest LOANTA on average is in Luxembourg
while Norway has the highest. EQASS represents the capital strength of the
banks. On average, most of the banks have EQASS lower than the average
of the countries in the sample. Denmark has the highest EQASS on average
whereas Switzerland has the lowest.
4.5.2 Technical Efficiency Results
Table 4.8 presents the average technical efficiency scores for the banks and the
average financial development in the country for the period 2005-2019. The
average technical efficiency score of the banks in the sample is 0.184. The
average bank in the sample could improve its technical efficiency by 81.6%.
This means that if the average bank was producing on the frontier instead
of its current location, only 18.4% of the inputs currently being used would
be necessary to produce the same output vector. On average, Cyprus has
the lowest average technical efficiency in the sample with 0.133. A bank in
Cyprus could improve its efficiency by 86.7%. The Financial Development
reflects how developed financial institutions and financial markets are in terms
of their depth, access, and efficiency. The average financial development index
for the sample countries is 0.744. This reflects that the financial institutions
and markets in the sample countries are well developed in terms of their depth,
access and efficiency. The average technical efficiency of the banks in the
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country with high financial development is 0.19. The average bank in the
sample could improve its technical efficiency by 81%. This means that if the
average bank was producing on the frontier instead of its current location,
only 19% of the inputs currently being used would be necessary to produce
the same output vector. The average technical efficiency of the banks in the
country with low financial development is 0.183. The average bank in the
sample could improve its technical efficiency by 81.7%. This means that if the
average bank was producing on the frontier instead of its current location, only
18.3% of the inputs currently being used would be necessary to produce the
same output vector. The difference between the average technical efficiency of
the bank is minimal. However, financial development difference is about 0.054.
By investigating the efficiency of individual countries in the sub-samples,
there appear to be major differences in the technical efficiency of the banks. In
the sample, Germany has the highest financial development and the average
technical efficiency of the bank is 0.191. Germany can improve its technical
efficiency by 80.8%. The higher financial development index ranking may be
indicating the country’s financial system is stretched beyond its structural and
regulatory capabilities, with negative implications for growth and stability.
Spain has the lowest financial development. However, the average technical
efficiency of the bank is 0.23, which is the highest in the sample. This means
that it could improve its technical efficiency by 77%. The financial develop-
ment index captures only the characteristics and does not include their under-
lying drivers (such as the institutional, regulatory, and legal frameworks) or
outcomes (financial stability measures).
Figure 4.1 shows the average technical efficiency of the banks across differ-
ent countries for the period 2005-2019. The average technical efficiency of the
countries in the sample has changed over the years. On average, the technical
efficiency of the bank in the individual countries across the sample is chang-
ing over the years. The changes in technical efficiency can be explained by
the changes in the inputs and outputs. When the average technical efficiency
of the countries is declining, most of the inputs and outputs are decreasing.
However, Bad Loans as output is increasing. When an increase in technical
efficiency is witness, the inputs have declined. But, the outputs have increased.
The average technical efficiency of the banks in Austria is lower than the av-
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Figure 4.1: Average Technical Efficiency of the banks across different countries over
time.Efficiency scores are obtained using WRDDM.Average Technical Efficiency is the aver-
age technical efficiency of the banks in the individual country. Average Technical Efficiency
of the countries is the average technical efficiency of the 15 countries in the sample.The
sample period is 2005-2019.The sample consists of 1931 banks in 15 countries.
erage technical efficiency of the countries in the sample. When the technical
efficiency of the bank is declining, the inputs such as FA and Deposits are de-
creasing. The input FTE is increasing. However, the outputs such as bad loans
are increasing. The other outputs such as OEA and Loans are increasing. The
changes in the activities by the bank contributes towards the increase in the
technical efficiency of the bank. This could be explained by the increase in the
outputs such as Loans and OEA. The bank reduces bad loans. Furthermore,
the inputs witness a decline as well.
The technical efficiency of the banks in the countries witnesses fluctuations
over the years. Majority of the countries in the sample witness high fluctua-
tions in their technical efficiency over the years. Russia and Switzerland have
the least fluctuations in their technical efficiency. In countries such as Greece,
Portugal, and Spain, the average technical efficiency witnessed a lot of fluc-
tuations. The technical efficiency in Greece, Portugal, and Spain reflects the
problems faced by these countries over time. This could be explained by the
changes in the inputs and output over the years. The inputs such as Deposits,
Labour and Fixed Assets have been increasing over time until 2017. The out-
puts such as Other Earning Assets and Loans are decreasing as well during
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this time. However, Bad loans are increasing. After 2017, the efficiency of
the banks is increasing. The Global Financial Crisis hit Europe in 2008. The
efficiency of the banks fell to the lowest level during this time. In the follow-
ing year, the efficiency of the banks started improving. However, in 2010, the
Sovereign Debt Crisis hits Europe. This has resulted in the efficiency of the
banks to decrease again. In the following years, the improvement in the aver-
age efficiency is helped by the improvement in the stock market. However, the
improvement was much slower because Europe was once again on the brink of
recession. With Greece starting to cause panic. Furthermore, this was accom-
panied by inflation falling to record lows in the Eurozone and collapse of the
oil price.
Figure 4.2: Average Technical Efficiency of the banks across different countries over
time.Efficiency score is obtained using WRDDM.A bank is defined as facing liquidity shock
if the rate of change of the deposits of bank i is negative in t-1.The sample period is 2005-
2019.The sample consists of 1931 in 15 countries.Average Technical Efficiency is the average
technical efficiency of the banks in the individual country. Average Technical Efficiency of
banks facing liquidity shock is the average technical efficiency of the banks facing liquidity
shock in the individual country. Average Technical Efficiency of banks not facing liquid-
ity shock is the average technical efficiency of the banks facing not liquidity shock in the
individual country.
Figure 4.2 shows the average technical efficiency of the banks across differ-
ent countries for the period 2005-2019 with the banks facing Liquidity Shock
and not facing Liquidity Shock. The changes in the average technical efficiency
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of the banks facing Liquidity Shocks can be explained by the changes in the in-
puts and the outputs. On average, the Technical Efficiency of the banks facing
Liquidity Shocks is more unstable. This could be explained by the changes in
the inputs and the outputs over the years. The bank facing liquidity shock in
Greece witnessed a decline in its inputs such as Deposits, Labour, and Fixed
Assets. Also, the outputs such as Loans and Other Earning Assets are declin-
ing and moving in the same direction as the inputs. However, Bad Loans is
increasing when the other outputs and inputs are decreasing. This led to a
decline in the technical efficiency of the banks in Greece. When the technical
efficiency of the bank facing liquidity shock increases, it is because Bad Loans,
Labour, and Fixed Assets are declining. But, Deposits, Loans and Other Earn-
ing Assets do not change. This reflects the efficient management of the inputs
to outputs by the banks. For the banks not facing liquidity shock, the average
technical efficiency of the banks is similar to the average technical efficiency
of the banks in the country. The decline in technical efficiency is explained by
the decrease in the inputs and outputs. However, there is a massive increase
in Bad Loans. When the technical efficiency increases, Bad Loans and Labour
decline while Other Earning Assets increases. Additionally, Deposits, Fixed
Assets and Loans remain stable. Furthermore, this shows that the manage-
ment of the inputs to the outputs differs by the banks facing liquidity shock
and the banks not facing liquidity shock.
The technical efficiency of the banks facing Liquidity Shocks is much lower
during the Global Financial Crisis. During the crisis, these banks witnessed
an increase in Bad Loans and a decline in the other outputs and inputs. The
increase in Bad Loans is greater than the decline in the other outputs and
inputs leading to lower efficiency levels for these banks. However, the Sovereign
Debt Crisis hits Europe. This has resulted in the efficiency of the banks to
decrease. The technical efficiency of these banks recovers for the next couple
of years. During this period, the banks witness a decline in Bad Loans while
Other Earning Assets increases. Loans and the inputs remain stable. The
technical efficiency of the banks not facing liquidity shock is more similar to
the average technical efficiency of the banks. The economic events such as Oil
Price Shock, Brexit, and new regulations have contributed to a greater decline
especially for the banks facing Liquidity Shock. These events hit much harder
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on the technical efficiency of the banks facing Liquidity Shock in comparison
to the banks not facing Liquidity Shock. The banks not facing liquidity shock
are able to manage their inputs to outputs more efficiently. Furthermore, the
banks facing liquidity shock have a decline in their inputs especially Deposits
and a massive increase in Bad Loans. This makes the efficiency of the bank
to decline. Additionally, it reflects how the liquidity of the bank influences on
the technical efficiency of the bank.
Figure 4.3: Average Loan Exposure , Domestic Exposure , Foreign Exposure and Technical
Efficiency of the banks across the 15 countries in Europe for the period 2005-2019. Loan
Exposure is the average of the Loans to Assets of the banks in the individual country.
Foreign Exposure is the average of Foreign Exposure in Loans or Assets of the banks in the
individual country. Domestic Exposure is the average of Domestic Exposure in Loans or
assets of the banks in the individual country. Technical Efficiency is the average technical
efficiency of the banks in the individual country.
Figure 4.3 shows the average Loan Exposure, Domestic Exposure, Foreign
Exposure and Technical Efficiency of the banks across different countries over
time for the period 2005-2019. Foreign Exposure is increasing over the years.
The changes in the foreign exposures witness among the countries is similar in
most countries. However, the changes in domestic exposures is different among
the countries. Domestic Exposures has been lower over the years. Both Do-
mestic and Foreign Exposures are of Loan Exposures. But, Foreign Exposures
is the major driver of Loan Exposure. This reflects that the banks are more
exposed to Foreign Exposures than Domestic Exposures. The managing of
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Foreign Exposures is significant for the bank’s operations. The changes in
Loan Exposures are reflected on the technical efficiency of the banks. This
is because the role of the banks is turn inputs such as Deposits to Outputs
like Loans. A decline in Loan Exposure and Technical Efficiency shows the
bank’s inability to convert inputs to outputs. Over the years, Banks have
accumulated more Foreign Exposures in comparison to Domestic Exposures.
The operations of the bank is not limited to the country where it is located.
The bank is looking for different opportunities to increase its business. This
is the result of globalisation. Among most countries, the changes in foreign
exposures reflects on the change on the technical efficiency of the banks. In
these countries, the banks are more inclined towards foreign operations for
the business. The change of the economic conditions in the foreign nation is
reflected on Foreign Exposures. As a result, the bank’s ability to convert its
inputs to outputs suffer.
Over the last few years, the banks have started concentrating on the daily
operations in the host country. This has contributed towards an increase in
Domestic Exposures. The changes in the local economic conditions influences
domestic exposures. However, this is not reflected on the technical efficiency
of the banks. As the banks have diversified the portfolio such that foreign
exposure is one the major driver of the technical efficiency. Any changes in
foreign exposures has an influence on the technical efficiency.
During the Financial Crisis, the technical efficiency declined. The banks
were more reliant on the operations across the border. As a result, they ac-
cumulated lots of Foreign Exposures. The changes in the economic conditions
in the foreign country contributed towards the bank’s inability to convert in-
puts to outputs. Furthermore, Bad Loans were increasing for the banks. This
caused the technical efficiency to decline. During European Debt Crisis, the
countries witnessing the European Debt Crisis, they had a decline in their
domestic exposures. However, this decline did not influence the technical effi-
ciency. The bank’s portfolio included both Domestic and Foreign Exposures.
The decline in Domestic Exposures made the bank to rely more on its foreign
operations. As a result, the technical efficiency did not suffer. This high-
lights the role of globalisation played on cross-border banking. Additionally, it
highlights the role of the cross-border exposures on the efficiency of the banks.
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4.5.3 Honore’s Tobit Estimator Results
In the second stage of the analysis, the study employs a Tobit regression model
to investigate the role of liquidity shock and cross-border exposures. This is
done by using the WRDDM efficiency scores as the dependent variable. In
the earlier studies, due to the limited nature of our efficiency measure that
ranges between 0 and 1, this study uses an Honore Tobit Estimator rather
than OLS. Hausman Test is performed on each model to check the consistency
of the results estimated by Honore Tobit Estimator. For each model, the null
hypothesis is rejected in the Hausman Test. This show the results with Fixed
Effects are consistent. F-test has been used in the study for measuring the
significance of the model. The p-value of F-test is less than 5% in all the
models. This shows the model is a better fit. Following Pasiouras et al. (2006)
and Pasiouras (2008a), QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates
are calculated. This is because heteroskedasticity can emerge when estimated
parameters are used as dependent variables in the second stage analysis.
As a robustness check, the study follows Langfield and Pagano (2016).
They compared the results of the fixed effects panel with Honore Tobit esti-
mator. The study follows its methodology and preserves the fixed effects panel
set-up. The results for the fixed-effect panel are reported in table C.3 and C.4.
The results of tables C.3 and C.4 are found to be consistent with the results
obtained in tables 4.9 and 4.10 using Honore’s Tobit Estimator.
Controlling for Bank-specific characteristics
Table 4.9 and 4.10 presents the regression results when controlling for the bank-
specific characteristics. For the sub-sample with high financial development,
LOGTA and EQASS have a significantly positive impact on the technical ef-
ficiency of the banks. The findings suggest that by having higher capital, the
confidence of depositors in the bank’s security. LOANTA and NPL have a
significantly negative impact on the technical efficiency of the banks. These
findings are consistent with the earlier findings byKwan et al. (1995) and Resti
(1997). These results imply that banks must focus on credit risk management.
The credit risk management has been a problematic issue in the past. Serious
banking problems have arisen from the failure of the banks to recognize im-
paired assets and create reserves for writing off these assets.Havrylchyk (2006)
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Table 4.9: Honore Tobit Estimator results for the banks in countries with higher Finan-
cial Development than the average Financial Development of the sample over the period
2005-2019. The dependent variable is Technical Efficiency scores calculated using Weighted
Russell Directional Distance Model.Model 1 controls for bank characteristics. Model 2 con-
trols for bank characteristics and Macroeconomic Conditions. Model 3 controls for bank
characteristics ,Macroeconomic Conditions and Domestic and Foreign Exposures. Model 4
controls for bank characteristics, Macroeconomic Conditions and Exposures in different re-
gions. QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control
for heteroscedacity.The control variables have been standardised. (***Statistically signif-
icant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level, *Statistically significant at 10%
level).
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LOGTA 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
NPL -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LOANTA -0.017** -0.017** -0.015** -0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
EQASS 0.003* 0.003* 0.004 0.002**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
ROE 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
















LIQSHOCK 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.407 0.427 0.577 0.617
Hausman Test 32.88 35.39 44.40 51.21
Observations 18,435 18,435 18,400 18,240
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Table 4.10: Honore Tobit Estimator results for the banks in countries with lower Finan-
cial Development than the average Financial Development of the sample over the period
2005-2019. The dependent variable is Technical Efficiency scores calculated using Weighted
Russell Directional Distance Model.. Model 1 controls for bank characteristics. Model 2
controls for bank characteristics and Macroeconomic Conditions. Model 3 controls for bank
characteristics ,Macroeconomic Conditions and Domestic and Foreign Exposures. Model 4
controls for bank characteristics, Macroeconomic Conditions and Exposures in different re-
gions. QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates have been calculated to control
for heteroscedacity.The control variable have been standardised. (***Statistically significant
at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level, *Statistically significant at 10% level).
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LOGTA 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NPL -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LOANTA -0.021** -0.021** -0.022** -0.022**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
EQASS -0.001** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
ROE 0.002 -0.002** 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
















LIQSHOCK 0.015** 0.015* 0.015* 0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.526 0.580 0.612 0.653
Hausman Test 29.10 33.42 34.63 42.76
Observations 10,530 10,530 10,500 10,460
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found a negative relationship between LOANTA and efficiency. LOANTA is
considered as a proxy for Liquidity risk. Therefore, a negative relationship
could indicate that less efficient banks are also less liquid. The results indi-
cate that an environment of careful lending contributes to better bank perfor-
mances. Furthermore, it will be helpful in reducing the likelihood of financial
distress faced by the banks Pasiouras et al. (2009). LIQSHOCK is statisti-
cally significant and it has a positive impact on the bank inefficiency. This
is because Liquidity Shock affects the funding costs of the banks and bank
lending (Allen et al.,2011). The loans of the banks facing liquidity shock are
priced at higher spreads (Sarmiento, 2018). Furthermore, the banks will be
borrowing more liquidity from the interbank markets to overcome the liquidity
shock. The banks will rely more on the lending relationships in order to obtain
a lower spread for the interbank funds.
In the sub-sample with countries having less Financial Development, EQASS
exhibits a negative relationship with technical efficiency and is highly signif-
icant. This implies that the more efficient banks in these countries use less
equity compared to its peers. Also, it suggests that the less efficient banks
could be involved in riskier operations and this process tends to hold more
equity, voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e., the reason might be banks’ deliberate
efforts to increase safety cushions and in turn decrease the cost of funds or
perhaps regulatory pressures that mandate riskier banks to carry more equity.
The other results are similar to the results of the sample with higher financial
development.
For sample with higher financial development, A 1% increase in bank ef-
ficiency would require the bank’s EQASS to increase by 1.17%. Similiarily,
a 1% increase in bank efficiency would require the bank’s NPL to reduce by
3.15%. A 1% increase in bank efficiency would require the bank’s LOANTA to
decrease by 0.79%. A bank not facing the liquidity shock would be increasing
its efficiency by 80.73%. However, a bank facing liquidity shock would increase
by 19.26%. For a bank facing Liquidity Shock, to increase the efficiency by
1%, the bank will have to increase LOGTA by 1.44%. Similarly, an increase
in EQASS by 2.35% will increase the efficiency by 1%. The bank will have to
reduce NPL by 5.47% to increase efficiency by 1%. For increasing the bank
efficiency by 1%, the bank will have to decrease LOANTA by 1.95%. For a
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bank not facing Liquidity Shock, the bank will have to increase LOGTA by
3.21% to improve the efficiency by 1%. An increase in EQASS by 1.83% to
grow efficiency by 1%. To raise efficiency by 1%, the bank will have to reduce
NPL by 5.13%. For 1% increase in efficiency, the bank has to lessen LOANTA
by 1.52%.
For sample with lower financial development, A 1% increase in bank ef-
ficiency would require the bank’s EQASS to increase by 2.77%. Similiarily,
a 1% increase in bank efficiency would require the bank’s NPL to reduce by
9.63%. A 1% increase in bank efficiency would require the bank’s LOANTA to
decrease by 3.57%. A bank not facing the liquidity shock would be increasing
its efficiency by 73.36%. However, a bank facing liquidity shock would increase
by 26.63%. For a bank facing Liquidity Shock, to increase the efficiency by
1%, the bank will have to increase LOGTA by 3.34%. Similarly, an increase
in EQASS by 6.80% will increase the efficiency by 1%. The bank will have to
reduce NPL by 5.81% to increase efficiency by 1%. For increasing the bank
efficiency by 1%, the bank will have to decrease LOANTA by 5.37%. For a
bank not facing Liquidity Shock, the bank will have to increase LOGTA by
1.50% to improve the efficiency by 1%. An increase in EQASS by 3.79% to
grow efficiency by 1%. To raise efficiency by 1%, the bank will have to reduce
NPL by 4.56%. For 1% increase in efficiency, the bank has to lessen LOANTA
by 4.04%.
Controlling for Macroeconomic conditions
Table 4.9 and 4.10 presents the regression result when controlling for the bank
characteristics and the macroeconomic conditions. For the banks in countries
with higher financial development, the growth of the GDP in the model affects
the other bank-specific variables. GDPGR has a significantly positive impact
on technical efficiency. This indicates that the favourable economic conditions
affect the extent, depth and quality of financial intermediation and banking
services. This contributes toward making the financial institutions more ef-
ficient. Furthermore, by having a higher growth rate, it would be easier for
the debtors to meet their obligations. The other variables having a significant
impact on the efficiency are EQASS, LOANTA, NPL and LOGTA.
For sub-sample with countries having lesser Financial Development, the
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growth of GDP in the model affects the other bank-specific variables. GDPGR
has a significantly positive relation with technical efficiency. This shows the
role of favourable economic conditions play on financial intermediation and
banking services. ROE is having a negatively significant impact on the effi-
ciency of the banks. This suggests that a more profitable bank would have
lower inefficiency. This corroborates with similar findings of the other stud-
ies (Pastor et al., 1997; Das and Ghosh, 2006). Usually, the clients prefer
the banks, which report higher profitability ratios. These banks attract the
biggest share of deposits along with the best potential creditworthy borrow-
ers. Moreover, this also implies that the banks may have higher ROE by either
having higher leverage (debt) or higher risk-taking. The other variables having
a significant impact on the efficiency are LOGTA, NPL and LOANTA.
For banks in higher financial development, An increase in GDPGR by
0.80% would contribute towards 1% increase in the efficiency of the bank. For
banks in lower financial development, An increase in GDPGR by 1.32% would
contribute towards 1% increase in the efficiency of the bank. This reflects the
significance of the real GDP growth towards bank efficiency. The growth in
GDP reflects the growth in the economy. As a result, the role of favourable
economic conditions towards bank efficiency is significant (Chortareas et al.,
2011). This would be making the bank more efficient.
Controlling for Domestic and Foreign Exposures
Table 4.9 and 4.10 presents the regression results when controlling for the bank
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, domestic exposures and foreign ex-
posures. For banks located in the countries with higher financial development,
the results indicate DEXP and FEXP having a significant impact on the techni-
cal efficiency of the banks. The banks are looking for different asset portfolios,
which would be generating better returns and requires different resources to be
managed. The favourable economic conditions in the country where the bank
invests are very important. This allows the bank to become more efficient.
As the bank is looking to be engaged in activities that are more profitable.
With the bank located in a higher financial developed country, the bank has
greater depth (size and liquidity of markets), access (the ability of individuals
and companies to access financial services), and efficiency (the ability of insti-
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tutions to provide financial services at low cost and with sustainable revenues,
and the level of activity of capital markets) (Svirydzenka, 2016). This affects
the quality of financial intermediation and banking services. As a result, this
helps banks becoming more efficient. The foreign exposures may influence the
bank in excessive risk-taking activities. This shows how the dynamics of the
banking sector has changed over the years. The banks have become more in-
volved in managing their activities and not limiting their activities to their
located country. Furthermore, it reflects the growth in foreign nations in more
than the host country. This may be one of the factors influencing the banks
to increase their foreign exposures. The results indicate that the bank perfor-
mance in the host nation is a good safeguard against cross-border competition
due to the differences in available technology and environmental conditions
(Lozano-Vivas and Pastor, 2010). The other variables having a significant
impact on the efficiency are LOGTA, NPL, LOANTA and GDPGR.
For banks located in the countries with lower financial development, the
results indicate FEXP has a highly significant impact on the technical efficiency
of the banks. Foreign Exposures allows the bank to diversify its portfolio.
This results in generating better returns and managing different resources.
The bank invests in foreign countries. The investment presents the bank an
opportunity to engage in more activities that are profitable. Usually, the
growth in foreign nations is more than the host country. As a result, the
favourable economic conditions in the foreign nation contributes to generating
better returns for the bank. Also, it influences the bank to increases its foreign
exposures. Additionally, it contributes to increasing the technical efficiency of
the bank. DEXP is not significant on the technical efficiency of the bank.
The results indicate the role of the differences in the bank regulations plays
a significant role in the capital flows and technical efficiency of the banks.
The banking regulations in the lower financial developed country prevent the
opportunities for the banks required for its growth (Houston et al., 2012). As
a result, the bank invests abroad because it presents a better opportunity to
increase its returns. The other variables having a significant impact on the
efficiency are LOGTA, NPL, LOANTA AND EQASS.
For the bank in higher financial development, to increase the bank efficiency
by 1%, a bank would be required to increase its FEXP by 3.47%. DEXP
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increase by 0.82% contributes towards a 1% increase in bank efficiency. A
bank facing liquidity shock would increase its efficiency by 1% by increasing
its DEXP by 0.66%. Similarly, an increase in FEXP by 0.73% increase the
efficiency by 1%. A bank not facing liquidity shock would increase the efficiency
by 1% by increasing its FEXP by 0.60%. A 1% increase in the bank efficiency
for the bank not facing liquidity shock would be contributed by an increase in
FEXP by 0.65%.
For the bank in lower financial development, to increase the bank efficiency
by 1%, a bank would be required to increase its FEXP by 0.50%. DEXP
decreases by 0.66% contribute toward a 1% increase in bank efficiency. A
bank facing liquidity shock would increase its efficiency by 1% by decreasing
its DEXP by 0.86%. Similarly, an increase in FEXP by 0.83% increase the
efficiency by 1%. A bank not facing liquidity shock would increase the efficiency
by 1% by decreasing its DEXP by 0.35%. A 1% increase in the bank efficiency
for the bank not facing liquidity shock would be contributed by an increase in
FEXP by 0.56%.
Controlling for Domestic Exposures and Cross-Border Exposures
Table 4.9 and 4.10 presents the regression results when controlling for the
bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and exposures from different
regions. For the banks located in countries with higher financial development,
the results indicate that the exposures from different regions are highly signif-
icant. DEXP, EUROEXP and NAMEXP have a significantly positive relation
with technical efficiency. SAMEXP, AFEXP and ASEXP have a significantly
negative relation with technical efficiency. The exposures show the significance
of financial development in these regions. The regions with higher financial
development have a positive relation with the technical efficiency of the banks.
The regions with lower financial development have a negative relation with
technical efficiency. The financial development affects depth, access and effi-
ciency of the bank. By investing in a country with higher financial develop-
ment, the bank is able to generate better returns and manage its resources
more efficiently. This is because the bank is more familiar with the operations
in a higher financial developed country. Additionally, these results indicate
the role of the property rights, legal inefficiencies or a high risk of expro-
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priation have on the decision-making of the banks (Papaionnouc,2009). The
exposures reflect the economic conditions in those countries. The favourable
economic conditions have a significant role in the economy and the banking
sector. The banks will be looking for different asset portfolios, which will be
generating better returns and requires the different resources to be managed.
The favourable economic conditions in the region would be making the bank
more efficient. The bank would be looking to getting engaged in more prof-
itable activities. Furthermore, these activities would be making the balance
sheet of the bank’s inclined more towards the exposures with regions having
favourable economic conditions. The geographical diversification has a signifi-
cant role on the technical efficiency of the banks. The banks will be investing
in the regions with conditions that are more similar to their home country.
The other variables having a positive relation and are significant are EQASS,
LOGTA and GDPGR. LOANTA and NPL have a significantly negative rela-
tion with efficiency.
For banks located in the countries with lower financial development, the
results show DEXP, SAMEXP, AFEXP and ASEXP have a significantly posi-
tive impact on the technical efficiency of the banks. The portfolio of the bank
consists of different assets which allow them to generate better returns and
manage different resources. The bank invests more in the regions which have
financial development similar to the country where the bank is located. This
allows the bank to manage its resources more efficiently and generate better
returns. By investing in regions with similar financial development conditions,
the banks are able to manage their operations effectively. Technological devel-
opment plays an important role as well. In countries with similar technological
advancement, the bank is more efficient in setting up their products (Baumol,
1986). The other variables have a significant impact on the technical efficiency
are LOGTA, NPL, LOANTA, EQASS and GDPGR.
For the banks in countries with higher Financial Development, For the bank
facing Liquidity Shock, to increase the efficiency by 1%, the bank would have
to increase DEXP by 2.86%. Similarly, the bank would have to increase EU-
ROEXP and NAMEEXP by 3.86% and 2.28% to increase the bank efficiency
by 1% respectively. To increase the bank efficiency 1%, the bank would have
to reduce SAMEXP by 9.6%. Similarly, it would have to reduce AFEXP by
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5.06% to increase efficiency by 1%. For the bank not facing Liquidity Shock,
to increase the efficiency by 1%, the bank would have to increase DEXP by
1.09%. Similarly, the bank would have to increase EUROEXP and NAME-
EXP by 2.09% and 1.71% to increase the bank efficiency by 1% respectively.
To increase the bank efficiency 1%, the bank would have to reduce SAMEXP
by 7.49%. Similarly, it would have to reduce AFEXP and ASEXP by 6.43%
and 3.58% to increase efficiency by 1%.
For the banks in countries with lower Financial Development, For the bank
facing Liquidity Shock, to increase the efficiency by 1%, the bank would have
to increase DEXP by 3.02%. Similarly, the bank would have to decrease EU-
ROEXP and NAMEEXP by 6.76% and 5.44% to increase the bank efficiency
by 1% respectively. To increase the bank efficiency 1%, the bank would have
to increase SAMEXP by 7.93%. Similarly, it would have to increase AFEXP
and ASEXP by 2.07% and 1.14% to increase the efficiency by 1%. For the
bank not facing Liquidity Shock, to increase the efficiency by 1%, the bank
would have to decrease DEXP by 1.11%. Similarly, the bank would have to de-
crease EUROEXP and NAMEEXP by 2.04% and 0.92% to increase the bank
efficiency by 1% respectively. To increase the bank efficiency 1%, the bank
would have to reduce SAMEXP by 3.28%. Similarly, it would have to reduce
AFEXP and ASEXP by 5.10% and 2.87% to increase efficiency by 1%.
4.6 Conclusion
The study employs Weighted Russell Direction Distance Model and Tobit re-
gression to examine the role of cross-border exposures with liquidity shock
on the technical efficiency of the bank in relation to financial development.
The sample consists of 1931 banks operating in 15 European countries for the
period 2005-2019. The study employs a Financial Development indicator to
divide the sample into 2 sub-sample. With sub-sample with high development
has 1229 banks in 8 European countries and with lower financial development
has 702 banks in 7 European countries.
The results indicate that the average technical efficiency of the banks in
the country with high financial development is 0.19. The average bank in
the sample could improve its technical efficiency by 81%. The average tech-
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nical efficiency of the banks in the country with low financial development is
0.183. The average bank in the sample could improve its technical efficiency by
81.7%. Financial development difference between the sample is 0.054. How-
ever, a major difference appeared by looking at individual countries in the two
sample. The most financially developed country in the sample was Germany
could improve its technical efficiency by 80.8%. The least financially developed
country in the sample was Spain. The average technical efficiency of the banks
in Spain is 0.230. This means that it could improve its technical efficiency by
77%. The average technical efficiency of the banks in Spain witnessed many
fluctuations. On average, the technical efficiency of the banks declined after
the Global Financial Crisis. The changes in the technical efficiency of the
banks facing liquidity shocks are more unstable. The technical efficiency of
the banks facing Liquidity Shocks is much lower during the Global Financial
Crisis. The technical efficiency of the banks not facing liquidity shock is more
similar to the average technical efficiency of the banks. The decline in the
cross-border exposures was a witness with a decline in efficiency. But, the
decline was minimum in the domestic exposures. This reflects the significance
of the cross-border exposures on the efficiency of the banks.
Following Weighted Russell Directional Distance model’s result, Honore’s
Tobit estimator is used while controlling for bank characteristics, liquidity
shock, macroeconomic conditions, domestic exposures and cross-border expo-
sures. In the sample with high financial development, when controlling for
bank characteristics and liquidity shock, Size and Capital have a significantly
positive impact on the efficiency. Loan Activity and Asset Quality have a
significantly negative impact on efficiency. Liquidity Shock has a significantly
positive relation with the inefficiency. Liquidity Shocks affects the funding
costs of the bank and bank lending. The loans of the banks facing liquidity
shock are priced at the higher spread. This reveals the significance of the liq-
uidity shock on the technical efficiency of the banks. The results are similar
for the sample with lower financial development.
In the sample with high financial development, when controlling for the
bank characteristics, liquidity shock and macroeconomic conditions, the re-
sults show that real GDP growth has a significantly positive relation with the
technical efficiency of the bank. As the economy grows, the debtors would be
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able to meet their obligations. Capital and Size have a significantly positive
relation with efficiency. Loan Activity and Asset Quality have a significantly
negative impact on the efficiency of the banks. The results for lower financial
development countries show that real GDP growth has a significantly posi-
tive impact on efficiency. Size has a significantly positive impact on efficiency.
Asset Quality, Loan Activity and Profitability have a significantly negative
impact on the efficiency of the banks.
When controlling for the bank characteristics, liquidity shock, macroeco-
nomic conditions, domestic exposures and foreign exposures, the results in-
dicate the relation between the foreign exposures, the technical efficiency of
the banks is positive and highly significant for both the sample. However,
Domestic Exposures has a significantly positive impact on the efficiency for
the sample with high financial development. This reveals the significance of
financial integration and globalisation in the banking sector. The banks are
looking for different asset portfolios, which would be generating better returns
and requires different resources to be managed. The banks have become more
involved in managing their activities and not limiting their activities to their
located country. For the sample with high financial development, the other
variables such as Size and real GDP growth have a significantly positive im-
pact on efficiency. Loan Activity and Asset Quality have a negative relation
with the technical efficiency of the banks and are highly significant. For sam-
ple with lower financial development, Size has a significantly positive impact
on efficiency. Loan Activity, Asset Quality and Capital have a significantly
negative impact on efficiency.
When controlling for the bank characteristics, liquidity shock, macroeco-
nomic conditions, domestic exposures and foreign exposures from different
regions, the results indicate foreign exposures from different regions have sig-
nificant impact on the efficiency of the banks. For the banks in countries with
high financial development, Domestic Exposures, Europe Exposures and North
America Exposures have a significantly positive impact on efficiency. South
America Exposures, Africa Exposures and Asia Exposures have a significantly
negative impact on efficiency. For the banks in countries with low financial de-
velopment, Domestic Exposures, South America Exposures, Africa Exposures
and Asia Exposures have a significantly positive impact on the efficiency. The
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exposures from other regions to do not have a significant impact on efficiency.
The results show the role of financial integration and globalisation plays in the
banking sector. For the banks to improve their efficiency, they would be better
by investing in the countries with a similar level of financial development. This
would allow them to have better returns and improve their daily operations.
The results of the study are significant for the policymakers and the banks.
Most of the banks have increased cross-border exposures over the years. The
financial integration has fostered cross-border banking. Cross-border banking
provides the banks with an opportunity of diversification. The diversification is
risk-reducing. With favourable economic conditions in the foreign country, the
bank would be more inclined towards increasing their cross-border exposures.
Moreover, investing in a foreign country with a similar level of financial devel-
opment allows the bank to improve and have better returns. It allows the bank
to manage their resources better. The cross-border exposures from favourable
country contribute towards an increase in the efficiency of the banks. The
bank facing liquidity shock would be reducing the cross-border exposures from
regions with less favourable economic conditions. The barriers to cross-border
banking would discourage the banks towards cross-border activities. These
barriers may be in terms of the financial development of a foreign country.




This thesis bundles three empirical chapters in the area of efficiency in bank-
ing. These studies investigate the role of banking reforms or shocks on bank
efficiency. This chapter begins with a summary of the key findings and contri-
butions and then finishes with the remarks and suggestions for future work.
5.1 Key findings and Contribution
In Chapter 2, we investigate the role of EBA’s capital exercise on the technical
efficiency of the banks. We find that the average bank in the sample could
improve its technical efficiency by 52.47%. But, before the announcement,
it was 50.6%. The results indicate that the capital exercise has contributed
toward a slight increase in the average bank in the sample for improving its
technical efficiency. Following the Bootstrap DEA results, the Double Boot-
strap model is used while controlling for the bank-specific characteristics and
country-level characteristics accounting for macroeconomic conditions, finan-
cial development, and market structure. The capital exercise announcement
has led to change in the bank-specific characteristics which determine the tech-
nical efficiency of the bank.
For the bank-level analysis, the average efficiency of the capital exercise
banks has been lower than the non-capital exercise banks. After the Capital
Exercise, the capital exercise banks had a drop in their efficiency from 2011
to 2014. This has been because of the impact of the capital exercise as these
banks had to adjust their balance sheets according to the new capital require-
ments. The results indicate the bank characteristics have a significant impact
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on the technical efficiency of the banks. EBA capital announcement has made
the banks consider their activity in the banking sector and to manage their
portfolios. As a result, the banks would be having less likelihood of having
financial distress. EBA has looked to prevent the banks from potential sys-
temic risk. EBA’s capital announcement has contributed towards the banks
getting involved in careful lending practices, which would be improving the
overall performance and soundness of the banks.
The stricter capital regulations by EBA would only be improving the effi-
ciency of the banks if the regulatory screening ability is low. When the capital
regulations are placed, the banks are looking to substitute the loans with al-
ternative forms of assets. The banks are looking for different asset portfolios
which would be generating better returns and requires the different resources
to be managed. The results indicate that the capital requirement by the EBA
which came as a shock for the banks would be contributing towards making
the banks more stable. It would be preventing banks from excessive risk-taking
activities. Furthermore, it would be allowing the banks to withstand financial
distress. Although, the capital requirements would not be a highly significant
benefit for the efficiency gains. But, it would be creating favourable economic
conditions which would affect the extent, depth, and quality of financial inter-
mediation and banking services.
Chapter 3 explores the role of different risk measures on the cost efficiency
of the banks. Heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model is used to investigate
the effect of each risk measure on the mean and variance of the cost efficiency.
The results show that each risk measure presents a similar effect on the cost
efficiency of the banks. Funding Liquidity Risk has a positive effect on the
mean and the variance on the inefficiency effect. Liquidity Risk has a sig-
nificantly positive effect on the inefficiency effect. Additionally, NPEs have
a significantly positive effect on the mean and variance of the inefficiency ef-
fect. Furthermore, there are non-linear effects of some of the risk factors such
as Funding Liquidity Risk and NPEs on the mean and variance of the inef-
ficiency effect. However, for Liquidity Risk, the marginal effects indicate a
non-monotonic effect.
The effects of the risk measures are not consistent over time. In 2011, the
marginal effect of Funding Liquidity Risk on the mean is very high. After 2011,
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the effect starts declining until 2016. However, from 2017 onwards, the effect
has again started increasing. The marginal effect shows the negative effect
on cost efficiency. The marginal effect on variance has both a negative and
positive effect on cost efficiency over the years. For Non-Performing Exposures,
The marginal effect on mean has a positive effect on the cost efficiency and the
marginal effect on variance shows inverse U-shape like pattern. For Liquidity
Risk, the marginal effect on mean shows U-shape pattern and on variance has
a negative effect on the cost efficiency.
In this chapter, the marginal effects of how these risk measures affect both
the level and variability of the inefficiency effect across the regions have been
investigated. For Funding Liquidity Risk, the marginal effects on the mean
of the inefficiency effect of the banks in Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the
Caribbean , Middle East, and the United States and Canada show a non-
monotonic pattern. The marginal effects on variability of the inefficiency effect
for Latin America, the Middle East, and the United States and Canada reveal
a non-monotonic pattern. In these regions, the banks in the lowest group
have a negative variability in the lowest group and turn positive in the middle
and highest groups. For Liquidity Risk, The marginal effects on the mean
in Europe show a non-monotonic pattern. It shows a negative inefficiency
effect on the low and middle groups whereas a positive inefficiency effect on
the highest group. The marginal effects on the variability across the groups
in Europe are positive and show a monotonic effect. This reveals that cost
efficiency is more varied among the banks in Europe. For Non-Performing
Exposures, marginal effects on the mean of the inefficiency effect across all the
regions reveal a positive inefficiency effect. On average across the groups, Latin
America and the Caribbean has the highest positive inefficiency impact. The
marginal effects on variability on the inefficiency effect increase as we move
along the groups. The lowest group has the lowest variability, this increase as
we move to middle and highest groups.
The recent crisis showed how having inconsistent international standards
for categorising problem loans and funding liquidity proved to be a major
problem for the banks.The results will be useful for the regulators and poli-
cymakers.As the changes in the risk measures in a region impacts on the cost
of the efficiency of the bank.Furthermore,the risk measures have a monotonic
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effect across different regions.The results will be useful for the regulators and
policymakers.These results will help in shaping new regulations which will be
preventing the bank from excessive risk-taking.Additionally,the results show
how the the risk measures impacts the cost efficiency.
Chapter 4 examines the role of cross-border exposures with liquidity shock
on the technical efficiency of the bank in relation to financial development. Fi-
nancial Development indicator is used to divide the sample into 2 sub-sample.
The results indicate that the average technical efficiency of the banks in the
country with high financial development is 0.19. The average technical effi-
ciency of the banks in the country with low financial development is 0.183.
Financial development difference between the sample is 0.054. The changes in
the technical efficiency of the banks facing liquidity shocks are more unstable.
The technical efficiency of the banks facing Liquidity Shocks is much lower
during the Global Financial Crisis. The technical efficiency of the banks not
facing liquidity shock is more similar to the average technical efficiency of the
banks. The decline in the cross-border exposures was a witness with a decline
in efficiency. But, the decline was minimum in the domestic exposures. This
reflects the significance of the cross-border exposures on the efficiency of the
banks.
Domestic Exposures have a significantly positive impact on the efficiency
for the sample with high financial development. This reveals the significance
of financial integration and globalisation in the banking sector. The banks are
looking for different asset portfolios, which would be generating better returns
and requires different resources to be managed. The banks have become more
involved in managing their activities and not limiting their activities to their
located country. Furthermore, When controlling for the bank characteristics,
liquidity shock, macroeconomic conditions, domestic exposures, and foreign
exposures from different regions, the results indicate foreign exposures from
different regions have a significant impact on the efficiency of the banks. For
the banks in countries with high financial development, Domestic Exposures,
Europe Exposures, and North America Exposures have a significantly positive
impact on efficiency. South America Exposures, Africa Exposures, and Asia
Exposures have a significantly negative impact on efficiency. For the banks in
countries with low financial development, Domestic Exposures, South America
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Exposures, Africa Exposures, and Asia Exposures have a significantly positive
impact on the efficiency. The exposures from other regions do not have a sig-
nificant impact on efficiency. The results show the role of financial integration
and globalisation plays in the banking sector. For the banks to improve their
efficiency, they would be better by investing in countries with a similar level
of financial development. This would allow them to have better returns and
improve their daily operations.
The results of the study are significant for the policymakers and the banks.Over
the years,the financial integration has increased cross-border banking.Cross-
border banking provides the banks with an opportunity of diversification.As a
result,cross-border exposures has increased.Cross-border banking provides an
opportunity for diversification.Diversification is helpful in risk reduction.With
favourable economic conditions in the foreign country, the bank would be more
inclined towards increasing their cross-border exposures. Moreover, investing
in a foreign country with a similar level of financial development allows the
bank to improve and have better returns. It allows the bank to manage their re-
sources better. The cross-border exposures from favourable country contribute
towards an increase in the efficiency of the banks. The bank facing liquidity
shock would be reducing the cross-border exposures from regions with less
favourable economic conditions. The barriers to cross-border banking would
discourage the banks towards cross-border activities. These barriers may be
in terms of the financial development of a foreign country. This may have a
negative impact on the efficiency of the banks.
5.2 Concluding remarks and suggestions for
the future work
This thesis sheds light on the role of banking reforms or shocks on bank effi-
ciency. However, it is still possible to further strengthen the empirical evidence
following this thesis.
Chapter 2 focuses on the role of EBA’s capital exercise on the technical
efficiency of the banks. For a possible future extension of this research, it
would be interesting to investigate whether the change in technical efficiency
is something that was particular to this increase in the capital requirements.
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Also, to investigate the role of the capital exercise on the profit and cost effi-
ciency of the banks. As the stricter capital requirements reduce the likelihood
of financial distress but, the profits may decline. Further research is required
on the role of the post-crisis capital and liquidity requirement on the technical
efficiency of the banks.
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of different risk measures on the cost efficiency
of the banks. Future work could include other risk measures such as market
risk and operational risk to provide a comprehensive analysis. Also, it would
be interesting to further examine the role of different risk measures on the cost
efficiency in individual countries. It would be also worthwhile to extend the
analysis by taking financial development into consideration.
Chapter 4 examines the role of cross-border exposures with liquidity shock
on the technical efficiency of the bank in relation to financial development.
It would also be enlightening to consider the role of cross-border exposures
with liquidity shock on the profit and cost efficiency of the banks. For further
extension of this research, it would be interesting to include the cross-border
exposures from individual countries.
This thesis provides an analysis of the role of banking reforms or shocks on
bank efficiency. Chapter 2 highlights the role of the capital exercise require-
ment on the technical efficiency of the banks and how the bank characteristics
and environmental variables play a role on efficiency. Chapter 3 provides an
analysis of different risk measures such as NPEs and Funding Liquidity Risk
on cost efficiency. Chapter 4 highlights the role of cross-border exposures with
liquidity shock on the technical efficiency of the bank in relation to financial
development. These findings would be of interest to regulators, policymakers,
and banks. Globalisation has increased the activities of the banks. The banks
are managing different portfolios in order to maximise the returns. These find-
ings will help in making better regulations for the banks. Further, it would be






Table A.1: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables used in Boostrap DEA.Input vari-
ables are Deposits,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Expenses.Output variables are
Loans,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The inputs and outputs variables are
used in DEA for calculating efficiency scores.The sample period is 2008-2015.The sample
consists of 194 banks for each year.(* statistically significant at 1% level)
Deposits Equity Int. Expenses Non-Int. Expense Loans Non-Int.Income OEA
Deposits 1
Equity 0.969* 1
Int.Expenses 0.633* 0.563* 1
Non-Int.Expense 0.921* 0.895* 0.700* 1
Loans 0.957* 0.930* 0.728* 0.901* 1
Non-Int.Income 0.859* 0.843* 0.634* 0.962* 0.828* 1
OEA 0.900* 0.897* 0.587* 0.891* 0.844* 0.848* 1
Table A.2: Correlation of the control variables used in Double Bootstrap Truncated regres-
sion model.The sample period is 2008-2015.The sample consists of 194 banks for each year.(*
statistically significant at 1% level)




NPL -0.118 -0.034 0.080 1
ROE -0.023 0.073 -0.006 -0.097 1
CLAIMS 0.215* -0.123 0.000 -0.031 -0.024 1
ASSGDP 0.030 -0.025 -0.229* -0.103 -0.010 0.056 1
CONC 0.049 -0.170 0.046 0.085 0.046 0.503* -0.231* 1
GDPGR 0.120 0.015 -0.272* -0.199* -0.086 0.004 0.282* -0.174* 1
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Table A.3: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables used in Bootstrap DEA before
the Capital Exercise.Input variables are Deposits,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest
Expenses.Output variables are Loans,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The
inputs and outputs variables are used in Bootstrap DEA for calculating efficiency scores.The
sample period is 2008-2011.The sample consists of 194 banks for each year.(* statistically
significant at 1% level)
Deposits Equity Int.Expenses Non-Int. Expenses Loans Non-Int.Income OEA
Deposits 1
Equity 0.952* 1
Int. Expenses 0.949* 0.929* 1
Non-Int. Expense 0.958* 0.925* 0.915* 1
Loans 0.985* 0.967* 0.961* 0.944* 1
Non-Int.Income 0.869* 0.841* 0.809* 0.895* 0.8514 1
OEA 0.894* 0.894* 0.886* 0.855* 0.915* 0.774* 1
Table A.4: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables used in Bootstrap DEA after the
Capital Exercise.Input variables are Deposits,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Ex-
penses.Output variables are Loans,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The in-
puts and outputs variables are used in Bootstrap DEA for calculating efficiency scores.The
sample period is 2012-2015.The sample consists of 194 banks for each year.(* statistically
significant at 1% level)
Deposits Equity Int. Expenses Non-Int. Expense Loans Non-Int.Income OEA
Deposits 1
Equity 0.977* 1
Int. Expenses 0.745* 0.703* 1
Non-Int. Expense 0.956* 0.958* 0.700* 1
Loans 0.966* 0.942* 0.818* 0.926* 1
Non-Int.Income 0.911* 0.927* 0.662* 0.972* 0.875* 1
OEA 0.909* 0.925* 0.660* 0.962* 0.861* 0.949* 1
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Figure A.1: Density of Technical Efficiency before the Capital Exercise.The sample period is
2008-2011.The sample consists of 194 banks for each year.The efficiency scores are calculated
using Bootstrap DEA.
Figure A.2: Density of Technical Efficiency after the Capital Exercise.The sample period is




Table A.5: Correlation of the control variables used in Double Bootstrap Truncated regres-
sion model before the Capital Exercise.The sample period is 2008-2011.The sample consists
of 194 banks for each year.(* statistically significant at 1% level)
LOGTA EQASS LOANTA NPL ROE CLAIMS ASSGDP CONC GDPGR
LOGTA 1
EQASS -0.207* 1
LOANTA -0.201* -0.157 1
NPL -0.176 -0.030 0.089 1
ROE -0.018 0.074 -0.009 -0.059 1
CLAIMS 0.234* -0.120 -0.004 -0.041 -0.025 1
ASSGDP 0.021 -0.028 -0.228* -0.068 -0.013 0.058 1
CONC 0.122 -0.159 0.019 0.105 0.042 0.510* -0.229* 1
GDPGR 0.032 -0.009 -0.253* -0.219* -0.084 0.020 0.288* -0.092 1
Table A.6: Correlation of the control variables used in Double Bootstrap Truncated regres-
sion model after the Capital Exercise.The sample period is 2012-2015.The sample consists
of 194 banks for each year.(* statistically significant at 1% level)
LOGTA EQASS LOANTA NPL ROE CLAIMS ASSGDP CONC GDPGR
LOGTA 1
EQASS -0.323* 1
LOANTA -0.111 -0.032 1
NPL 0.238* -0.040 -0.027 1
ROE 0.002 0.026 -0.099 -0.018 1
CLAIMS 0.204* -0.282* 0.090 0.095 0.086 1
ASSGDP 0.037 -0.019 -0.118 -0.100 0.035 0.073 1
CONC 0.038 -0.312* 0.067 0.092 -0.089 0.461* -0.208* 1
GDPGR 0.087 0.091 -0.234* -0.039 0.040 -0.069 0.289* 0.171 1
Table A.7: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables for Non-CEB before the Cap-
ital Exercise.Input variables are Deposits,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Ex-
penses.Output variables are Loans,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The in-
puts and outputs variables are used in Bootstrap DEA for calculating efficiency scores.The
sample period is 2008-2011.The sample consists of 148 banks for each year.(* statistically
significant at 1% level).
Deposits Equity Int. Expenses Non-Int. Expense Loans Non-Int.Income OEA
Deposits 1
Equity 0.941* 1
Int. Expenses 0.577* 0.600* 1
Non-Int. Expense 0.932* 0.978* 0.590* 1
Loans 0.073* 0.016* 0.163* 0.029* 1
Non-Int.Income 0.843* 0.910* 0.475* 0.945* 0.037* 1
OEA 0.877* 0.952* 0.752* 0.953* 0.018* 0.857* 1
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Table A.8: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables for CEB before the Capi-
tal Exercise.Input variables are Deposits,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Ex-
penses.Output variables are Loans,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The in-
puts and outputs variables are used in Bootstrap DEA for calculating efficiency scores.The
sample period is 2008-2011.The sample consists of 46 banks for each year.(* statistically
significant at 1% level).
Deposits Equity Int. Expenses Non-Int. Expense Loans Non-Int.Income OEA
Deposits 1
Equity 0.986* 1
Int. Expenses 0.984* 0.953* 1
Non-Int. Expense 0.999* 0.989* 0.981* 1
Loans 0.333* 0.311* 0.345* 0.338* 1
Non-Int.Income 0.999* 0.990* 0.981* 0.999* 0.328* 1
OEA 0.997* 0.979* 0.991* 0.996* 0.354* 0.997* 1
Table A.9: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables for Non-CEB after the Capi-
tal Exercise.Input variables are Deposits,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Ex-
penses.Output variables are Loans,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The in-
puts and outputs variables are used in Bootstrap DEA for calculating efficiency scores.The
sample period is 2012-2015.The sample consists of 148 banks for each year.(* statistically
significant at 1% level).
Deposits Equity Int. Expenses Non-Int. Expense Loans Non-Int.Income OEA
Deposits 1
Equity 0.638* 1
Int. Expenses 0.842* 0.639* 1
Non-Int. Expense 0.689* 0.962* 0.727* 1
Loans 0.102* 0.355* 0.165* 0.384* 1
Non-Int.Income 0.611* 0.827* 0.487* 0.762* 0.141* 1
OEA 0.891* 0.830* 0.863* 0.884* 0.253* 0.690* 1
Table A.10: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables for CEB after the Capi-
tal Exercise.Input variables are Deposits,Equity,Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Ex-
penses.Output variables are Loans,Non-Interest Income and Other Earning Assets.The in-
puts and outputs variables are used in Bootstrap DEA for calculating efficiency scores.The
sample period is 2012-2015.The sample consists of 46 banks for each year.(* statistically
significant at 1% level).
Deposits Equity Int. Expenses Non-Int. Expense Loans Non-Int.Income OEA
Deposits 1
Equity 0.970* 1
Int. Expenses 0.216* 0.026* 1
Non-Int. Expense 0.992* 0.953* 0.290* 1
Loans 0.245* 0.321* 0.138* 0.245* 1
Non-Int.Income 0.822* 0.909* 0.357* 0.785* 0.334* 1
OEA 0.977* 0.903* 0.380* 0.986* 0.172* 0.716* 1
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Table A.11: Correlation of the control variables used in the Double Bootstrap Truncated re-
gression model before the Capital Exercise for Non-CEB.The sample period is 2008-2011.The
sample consists of 148 banks for each year.(* statistically significant at 1% level).
Non-CEB ROE NPL LOGTA EQASS LOANTA
ROE 1
NPL 0.055 1
LOGTA -0.077 -0.187* 1
EQASS 0.155* 0.006 -0.250* 1
LOANTA -0.051 0.184* -0.244* 0.113 1
Table A.12: Correlation of the control variables used in the Double Bootstrap Truncated
regression model before the Capital Exercise for CEB.The sample period is 2008-2011.The
sample consists of 46 banks for each year.(* statistically significant at 1% level).
CEB ROE NPL LOGTA EQASS LOANTA
ROE 1
NPL 0.021 1
LOGTA 0.251 -0.000 1
EQASS 0.002 -0.296 -0.236 1
LOANTA -0.171 -0.222 -0.399 0.569* 1
Table A.13: Correlation of the control variables used in the Double Bootstrap Truncated re-
gression model after the Capital Exercise for Non-CEB.The sample period is 2012-2015.The
sample consists of 46 banks for each year.(* statistically significant at 1% level).
Non-CEB ROE NPL LOGTA EQASS LOANTA
ROE 1
NPL 0.011 1
LOGTA 0.087 0.348* 1
EQASS -0.076 -0.366* -0.067 1
LOANTA -0.009 -0.288* -0.241* 0.437* 1
Table A.14: Correlation of the control variables used in the Double Bootstrap Truncated
regression model after the Capital Exercise for CEB.The sample period is 2012-2015.The
sample consists of 46 banks for each year.(* statistically significant at 1% level).
CEB ROE NPL LOGTA EQASS LOANTA
ROE 1
NPL 0.402 1
LOGTA 0.343 0.311 1
EQASS 0.108 0.241 0.006 1
LOANTA -0.552* -0.103 -0.577* 0.601* 1
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Table A.15: This table lists all 61 banks initially included in the 2011 EBA capital exercise.
As this study wants to track the behaviour of independent banks over time, we exclude
all banks which were acquired during the sample period, all banks which received capital
injections during the pre-treatment period and all banks with negative levels of equity. This
sample construction procedure finally leaves us with a sample of 46 EBA banks.The cross
in the sample panel indicates the bank present in the sample.
Bank Country Sample
Erste Group Bank AG Austria X
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Austria X
KBC Bank NV Belgium
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited Cyprus
Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. Cyprus X
Danske Bank A/S Denmark
Jyske Bank A/S Denmark X
Nykredit Realkredit A/S Denmark X
Sydbank A/S Denmark X
OP Financial Group Finland X
BNP Paribas SA France X




Commerzbank AG Germany X
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale Germany
Deutsche Bank AG Germany X
Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG Germany X
HSH Nordbank AG Germany
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG Germany
Landesbank Baden-W¨urttemberg Germany X
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG Germany
Landesbank Hessen-Th¨uringen Girozentrale Germany X
NORD/LB Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Germany X
Westdeutsche Genossenschafts-Zentralbank AG Germany X
Allied Irish Banks, Plc Ireland
Bank of Ireland Ireland X
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Italy X
Banco Popolare Societ Cooperativa Italy X
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA Italy X
UniCredit SpA Italy X
Unione di Banche Italiane SCpA Italy X
OTP Bank Nyrt. Hungary
Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat Luxembourg
Bank of Valletta Plc Malta X
ABN AMRO Group NV Netherlands
ING Bank NV Netherlands X
Rabobank Group Netherlands
SNS Bank NV Netherlands X
DNB Bank ASA Norway X
Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA Poland X
Banco BPI SA Portugal X
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Table A.15 – Continued from previous page
Bank Country Sample
Banco Comercial Portugus SA Portugal X
Caixa Geral de Depsitos SA Portugal X
Espirito Santo Financial Group SA Portugal X
Nova Kreditna banka Maribor d.d. Slovenia X
Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. Slovenia X
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA Spain X
Banco Popular Espanol SA Spain X
Banco Santander SA Spain X
La Caixa Spain X
Nordea Bank AB Sweden X
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden X
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden X
Swedbank AB Sweden X
Barclays Plc United Kingdom X
HSBC Holdings Plc United Kingdom X
Lloyds Banking Group Plc United Kingdom X




Figure B.1: Density of cost efficiency under SFA.The efficiency scores are calculated using
SFA.The sample consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics of Cost Efficiency Scores obtained using DEA.The sam-
ple consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.The sample has 6 regions :-
Africa,Asia-Pacific,Europe,Latin America and Caribbean,Middle East, and United States
and Canada.
Region Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Africa 0.576 0.071 0.428 1.000
Asia-Pacific 0.530 0.062 0.366 0.897
Europe 0.575 0.074 0.364 1.000
Latin America and Caribbean 0.546 0.069 0.393 1.000
Middle East 0.524 0.047 0.431 0.755
United States and Canada 0.563 0.067 0.388 0.765
Total 0.560 0.072 0.364 1.000
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Figure B.2: Average Cost Efficiency over the sample period. Cost Efficiency scores are
obtained using DEA.The sample period is 2010-2018.The sample consists of 2630 banks.The
sample has 6 regions :- Africa,Asia-Pacific,Europe,Latin America and Caribbean,Middle
East, and United States and Canada.
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Efficiency Scores obtained using DFA.The sam-
ple consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.The sample has 6 regions :-
Africa,Asia-Pacific,Europe,Latin America and Caribbean,Middle East, and United States
and Canada.
Region Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Africa 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.089
Asia-Pacific 0.014 0.026 0.000 0.272
Europe 0.024 0.046 0.000 0.690
Latin America and Caribbean 0.012 0.054 0.000 1.000
Middle East 0.021 0.058 0.000 0.556
United States and Canada 0.016 0.044 0.000 0.391
Total 0.020 0.046 0.000 1.000
Figure B.3: Density of Cost Efficiency under DEA.The efficiency scores are calculated using
DEA.The sample consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.
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Figure B.4: Average Cost Efficiency over the sample period. Cost Efficiency scores are
obtained using DFA.The sample consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.The
sample has 6 regions :- Africa,Asia-Pacific,Europe,Latin America and Caribbean,Middle
East, and United States and Canada.
Figure B.5: Density of Cost Efficiency under DFA. Cost Efficiency scores are obtrained using
DFA.The sample consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.
Table B.3: Descriptive statistics of Cost Efficiency Scores obtained using TFA.The sam-
ple consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.The sample has 6 regions :-
Africa,Asia-Pacific,Europe,Latin America and Caribbean,Middle East, and United States
and Canada.
Region Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Africa 0.011 0.017 0.000 0.187
Asia-Pacific 0.013 0.033 0.000 0.573
Europe 0.015 0.026 0.000 0.429
Latin America and Caribbean 0.012 0.015 0.000 0.315
Middle East 0.015 0.027 0.000 0.321
United States and Canada 0.014 0.023 0.001 0.292
Total 0.013 0.021 0.000 0.573
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Figure B.6: Average Cost Efficiency over the sample period. Cost Efficiency scores are
obtained using TFA.The sample consists of 2630 banks.The sample period is 2010-2018.The
sample has 6 regions :- Africa,Asia-Pacific,Europe,Latin America and Caribbean,Middle
East, and United States and Canada.
Figure B.7: Density of Cost Efficiency under TFA.The efficiency scores are calculated using




Figure C.1: Density of Technical Efficiency of the banks.The efficiency scores are obtained
using WRDDM.The sample period is 2005-2019.The sample consists of 1931 banks.
Table C.1: Correlation of Inputs and Outputs variables for WRDDM.WRDDM is used
for calculating efficiency scores.The model is estimated using 3 inputs,2 outputs and 1 bad
output.The inputs are the number of full-time employees, total deposits, and physical capital.
The outputs are total loans and other earning assets.An undesirable output is Bad Loans.The
sample period is 2005-2019.The sample consists of 1931 banks.(* statistically significant at
1% level)
Labour Deposit Physical Capital Loans Other Earning Assets Bad Loans
Labour 1
Deposit 0.8609* 1
Physical Capital 0.9200* 0.9007* 1
Loans 0.8463* 0.9602* 0.9009* 1
Other Earning Assets 0.7936* 0.9172* 0.8392* 0.9066* 1
Bad Loans 0.7041* 0.7528* 0.7635* 0.8122* 0.7196* 1
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Figure C.2: Technical Efficiency of the banks facing liquidity shock.The efficiency scores
are obtained using WRDDM.The sample period is 2005-2019.A bank is defined as facing
liquidity shock if the rate of change of the deposits of bank i is negative in t-1.
Figure C.3: Technical Efficiency of the banks not facing liquidity shock.The efficiency scores
are obtained using WRDDM.The sample period is 2005-2019.A bank is defined as facing
liquidity shock if the rate of change of the deposits of bank i is negative in t-1.
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Figure C.4: Average Loan Exposure , Domestic Exposure , Foreign Exposure and Technical
Efficiency of the banks facing liquidity shock across different countries over time.Technical
Efficiency scores are obtained using WRDDM.Loan Exposure is the average of the Loans
to Assets of the banks in the individual country.Foreign Exposure is the average of Foreign
Exposure in Loans or Assets of the banks in the individual country.Domestic Exposure
is the average of Domestic Exposure in Loans or assets of the banks in the individual
country.Technical Efficiency is the average technical efficiency of the banks in the individual
country.A bank is defined as facing liquidity shock if the rate of change of the deposits of
bank i is negative in t-1.The sample period is 2005-2019.
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Figure C.5: Average Loan Exposure , Domestic Exposure , Foreign Exposure and Tech-
nical Efficiency of the banks not facing liquidity shock across different countries over
time.Technical Efficiency scores are obtained using WRDDM.Loan Exposure is the average
of the Loans to Assets of the banks in the individual country.Foreign Exposure is the average
of Foreign Exposure in Loans or Assets of the banks in the individual country.Domestic Ex-
posure is the average of Domestic Exposure in Loans or assets of the banks in the individual
country.Technical Efficiency is the average technical efficiency of the banks in the individual
country.A bank is defined as facing liquidity shock if the rate of change of the deposits of
bank i is negative in t-1.The sample period is 2005-2019.
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Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics for Inputs and Outputs variables For
WRDDM.WRDDM is used for calculating efficiency scores.The model is esti-
mated using 3 inputs,2 outputs and 1 badoutput.The inputs are the number
of full-time employees, total deposits, and physical capital.The outputs are
total loans and other earning assets.An undesirable output is Bad Loans.The
sample period is 2005-2019.The sample consists of 1931 banks.
Year Deposit Labour Fixed Assets Loans Other Earning Assets Bad Loans
2005 Mean 35900 0.006 0.382 41600 72300 0.833
Max. 230000 30.600 2113.233 236000 369000 5188
Min. 0.026 0.016 0.000 0.017 0.036 0.192
S.D. 67200 0.010 0.648 74100 127000 1600.756
2006 Mean 5657.266 0.002 0.116 7656.749 11900 0.907
Max. 32500 19.156 736 51500 73900 7853
Min. 32.755 0.017 2.544 0.659 85.609 0.000
S.D. 10700 0.005 0.223 14500 21700 2136.821
2007 Mean 18200 0.002 0.179 15500 35600 0.624
Max. 183000 15.163 1258.451 88700 228000 3533.862
Min. 0.021 0.005 0.000 0.024 31.039 0.000
S.D. 46900 0.004 0.367 26000 66300 0.968
2008 Mean 9238.196 0.005 0.159 12700 18800 1498.895
Max. 111000 58.182 1667 139000 203000 12800
Min. 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.207 0.000
S.D. 28200 0.015 0.425 35700 51800 3731.752
2009 Mean 35600 0.013 0.662 47800 77600 3643.437
Max. 403000 137.968 8020.612 433000 744000 25300
Min. 0.230 0.025 0.001 0.022 0.320 0.000
S.D. 103000 0.035 2043.178 112000 193000 7557.926
2010 Mean 17000 0.004 217.285 20000 38400 1389.856
Max. 72200 17.958 960.208 84900 272000 16400
Min. 0.051 0.017 0.001 0.021 0.061 0.058
S.D. 24200 0.005 0.300 29600 71300 4180.414
2011 Mean 15200 0.004 0.391 26200 39900 2081.056
Max. 142000 28.651 3724.328 186000 282000 19500
Min. 0.004 0.012 0.000 0.019 0.068 0.000
S.D. 36900 0.008 987.903 52300 80600 5172.587
2012 Mean 7260.734 0.003 0.150 7883.195 11400 1555.355
Max. 40300 17.174 1086 48200 54400 17400
Min. 0.093 0.069 0.001 0.056 0.117 0.000
S.D. 11800 0.005 0.302 13000 15900 4438.370
2013 Mean 7248.936 0.002 0.084 6919.133 10900 0.292
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Table C.2 – Continued from previous page
Year Deposit Labour Fixed Assets Loans Other Earning Assets Bad Loans
Max. 24800 9.457 458.477 24100 35900 1047.133
Min. 0.025 0.019 0.651 0.018 0.030 0.000
S.D. 8921.144 0.003 0.133 8932.198 13600 0.347
2014 Mean 14700 0.005 0.248 19100 34200 1239.341
Max. 117000 40.403 1965 170000 354000 9631
Min. 0.050 0.021 0.000 0.003 200.988 0.000
S.D. 29900 0.010 0.514 43500 89800 2767.746
2015 Mean 5906.645 0.003 0.102 6899.312 10300 0.274
Max. 53800 20.106 1037.916 58800 92100 1347.079
Min. 0.071 0.028 0.000 0.076 0.114 0.000
S.D. 13600 0.005 0.261 14900 23400 0.378
2016 Mean 23700 20.507 0.565 23200 32500 1618.659
Max. 263000 293.752 7469.784 267000 348000 21000
Min. 3.851 0.011 0 0.008 0.023 0.000
S.D. 67100 0.076 1914.842 68100 88700 5386.812
2017 Mean 16100 0.002 0.120 18400 72900 0.449
Max. 107000 9.849 776.026 113000 721000 3845
Min. 0.073 0.019 0.002 0.040 0.086 0.001
S.D. 32700 0.003 0.208 36500 192000 0.996
2018 Mean 37200 0.012 0.425 56800 91100 5210.494
Max. 458000 107.144 4616.816 738000 1160000 66200
Min. 0.057 0.014 0.000 0.028 0.066 0.000
S.D. 117000 0.031 1202.193 189000 299000 17000
2019 Mean 14700 0.004 0.168 16700 36900 0.733
Max. 1250000 330.677 10800 1140000 3420000 75400
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
S.D. 67700 0.019 0.738 73100 196000 3642.060
Total
Mean 14700 0.004 0.170 16800 36900 0.745
Max. 1250000 330.677 10800 1140000 3420000 75400
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
S.D. 67500 0.019 0.740 73100 195000 3681.784
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Figure C.6: Density of Technical Efficiency of the banks using DEA. DEA is used for calcu-
lating efficiency scores.The sample period is 2005-2019.The sample consists of 1931 banks.
Figure C.7: Technical Efficiency of the banks using DEA facing liquidity shock. DEA is
used for calculating efficiency scores.The sample period is 2005-2019.A bank is defined as
facing liquidity shock if the rate of change of the deposits of bank i is negative in t-1.
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Figure C.8: Technical Efficiency of the banks using DEA not facing liquidity shock . DEA
is used for calculating efficiency scores.The sample period is 2005-2019.A bank is defined as
facing liquidity shock if the rate of change of the deposits of bank i is negative in t-1.
Figure C.9: Average Technical Efficiency of the banks across different countries over time us-
ing DEA.Technical Efficiency scores are obtained using DEA.Average Technical Efficiency
is the average technical efficiency of the banks in the individual country.Average Techni-
cal Efficiency of the countries is the average technical efficiency of the 15 countries in the
sample.The sample period is 2005-2019.The sample consists of 1931 banks.
217
C. Chapter 4
Figure C.10: Average Technical Efficiency of the banks across different countries over time
using DEA.Technical Efficiency scores are obtained using DEA.Average Technical Efficiency
is the average technical efficiency of the banks in the individual country. Average Technical
Efficiency of banks facing liquidity shock is the average technical efficiency of the banks facing
liquidity shock in the individual country. Average Technical Efficiency of banks not facing
liquidity shock is the average technical efficiency of the banks facing not liquidity shock in
the individual country.A bank is defined as facing liquidity shock if the rate of change of the




Figure C.11: Average Loan Exposure , Domestic Exposure , Foreign Exposure and Technical
Efficiency of the banks across different countries over time using DEA.Technical Efficiency
scores is obtained using DEA.Loan Exposure is the average of the Loans to Assets of the
banks in the individual country.Foreign Exposure is the average of Foreign Exposure in
Loans or Assets of the banks in the individual country.Domestic Exposure is the average
of Domestic Exposure in Loans or assets of the banks in the individual country.Technical
Efficiency is the average technical efficiency of the banks in the individual country.A bank




Table C.3: Fixed Effect Panel model results for the banks in countries with higher Fi-
nancial Development than the average Financial Development of the sample for the period
2005-2019. The dependent variable is Technical Efficiency scores calculated using Weighted
Russell Directional Distance Model. Model 1 controls for bank characteristics. Model 2
controls for bank characteristics and Macroeconomic Conditions. Model 3 controls for bank
characteristics ,Macroeconomic Conditions and Domestic and Foreign Exposures. Model
4 controls for bank characteristics, Macroeconomic Conditions and Exposures in different
regions. Reported are the standard errors in the brackets..The control variables have been
standardised.(***Statistically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level,
*Statistically significant at 10% level).
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LOGTA 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NPL -0.005** -0.005** -0.005* -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
LOANTA -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EQASS 0.002** 0.002* 0.002 0.002**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROE 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
















LIQShOCK 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.185*** 0.183***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.432 0.421 0.594 0.632
Hausman Test 42.85 43.25 48.67 50.61
Observations 18,435 18,435 18,400 18,240
220
C. Chapter 4
Table C.4: Fixed Effect Panel model results for the banks in countries with lower Finan-
cial Development than the average Financial Development of the sample for the period
2005-2019. The dependent variable is Technical Efficiency scores calculated using Weighted
Russell Directional Distance Model.Model 1 controls for bank characteristics. Model 2 con-
trols for bank characteristics and Macroeconomic Conditions. Model 3 controls for bank
characteristics ,Macroeconomic Conditions and Domestic and Foreign Exposures. Model
4 controls for bank characteristics, Macroeconomic Conditions and Exposures in different
regions. Reported are the standard errors in the brackets. The control variables have been
standardised. (***Statistically significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level,
*Statistically significant at 10% level).
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LOGTA 0.003** 0.003* 0.005** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NPL -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LOANTA -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
EQASS -0.002** -0.002 -0.001** -0.001**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ROE 0.000 -0.000** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
















LIQShOCK 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.180*** 0.174*** 0.213** 0.171***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.104) (0.005)
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.534 0.573 0.591 0.639
Hausman Test 37.26 41.65 47.28 53.50
Observations 10,530 10,530 10,500 10,460
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